The potential influence of climate change on migratory behaviour - a study of drought, hurricanes and migration in Mexico by Schmidt-Verkerk, Kerstin
   
 
A University of Sussex DPhil thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Potential Influence of Climate Change on 
Migratory Behaviour – A Study of Drought, 
Hurricanes and Migration in Mexico 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DPhil 
 
Kerstin Schmidt-Verkerk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Sussex 
 
September 2011 
 
i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statement 
 
 
 
 
 
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been 
and will not be, submitted in whole or in part 
to another University for the award of any 
other degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
Signature:……………………………………… 
  
ii 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The research presented in this thesis has been very much inspired by Richard 
Black’s earlier work and by his critical thinking on potential environment-migration 
linkages. Having had the opportunity to benefit from his knowledge and experience 
as a supervisor was a great privilege, and I am very grateful for his constant 
support and enthusiasm towards my work. Dominic Kniveton has added many 
important thoughts from a climate change science perspective and my research 
has tremendously benefited from his knowledge and fresh ideas. He patiently 
helped me understand important aspects related to my work, which my social 
scientist’s mind could not easily capture. I thank both Richard and Dom for being 
so inspirational, motivational and critical over the last years. 
 
Thanks also to Grace Carswell who supervised part of my thesis at an earlier stage 
and taught me all about Sustainable Livelihood Approaches, which turned out to 
become a major component of my work. During my first year at Sussex, I received 
a lot of input from faculty and fellow students of the MSc on Comparative and 
Cross-Cultural Research Methods. Thanks to all for sharing their experiences, 
providing advice or just listening to my concerns. Many more people have made 
my time at Sussex University a very beneficial and pleasant one. In particular, 
thanks to Chisato Tanaka, Silja Weyel and Prosper Asima, for their friendship and 
support. And last, but certainly not least, thanks to Christina Oelgemoller for her 
advice but also for her tremendous help with logistic matters at Sussex while I was 
in Mexico. 
 
Part of my research was funded by a Bucerius Ph.D. Scholarship in Migration 
Studies of the ZEIT Foundation’s Settling into Motion Programme. Apart from 
providing the very crucial financial support, this programme also offered the great 
opportunity to discuss my work among distinguished experts in the field of 
migration studies and among fellow Ph.D. students working on migration issues. 
Thanks to the Advisory Board, the ZEIT Fellows and the Secretariat for their 
advice, their support, and for the great times we had during the meetings and 
fieldtrips. I am looking forward to continue to be involved in the ZEIT Foundation’s 
Alumni Network.  
 
I am also very grateful to UNU-EHS and Munich RE who invited me to - and 
funded my participation in - the 2008 Summer Academy on Environmental Change, 
Migration and Social Vulnerability in Hohenkammer, Germany. It was a great week 
of exchange of ideas among experts working on social vulnerability and risk, and 
among fellow Ph.D. students interested in environment-migration linkages. 
 
In general, the interaction with fellow Ph.D. students and more senior researchers 
at various occasions and in different contexts was very beneficial for my work. 
Thanks to all who invited me to present my work at conferences and seminars over 
the last years, and to those who took the time to engage with my presentations. 
iii 
 
 
Many of their comments have tremendously contributed to the shaping of new 
ideas. They also helped me making the most out of my time as a Ph.D. student 
and assured that the result of my Ph.D. is much more than a lengthy document.  
 
Many researchers based in Mexico helped me understand various aspects of 
Mexican life, relevant for my research topic and for my stay in the country. I am 
particularly grateful to Haydea Izazola for her continued advice over the last five 
years and for bringing me in contact with other Mexican researchers in the field. 
Also, with her friendship and hospitality she and her family always made my short 
stopovers in Mexico City, or at several other places in the world, very special. 
Josefina Pérez at the Colegio de la Frontera Norte and at Sussex University invited 
me to visit the COLEF and put me in contact with many researchers working on 
Mexico-US migration there. Thanks for taking care of me so well during my short 
stay in Tijuana. 
 
In Zacatecas, I owe a lot to Eva García and Armando Márquez and their family, 
who introduced me into the two villages in which I conducted fieldwork. They also 
taught me a lot about life in Zacatecas and treated me as family from the first day, 
which was, and still is, a great experience. Also thanks to Luis Octavio Vásquez 
and his family for inviting me to Mazapil and for their hospitality and support. 
 
In Veracruz, many people provided orientation and advice about the selection of 
the communities and about the interpretation of the first results. Silvia Méndez and 
Daniel Romero answered my first questions and made me feel very welcome in 
Xalapa. I am also particularly grateful to Patricia Zamudio and Carlos Welsh, who 
continuously supported me from my first visit to Veracruz until now and provided 
valuable information on migration and climate change issues in Veracruz, 
respectively. Carlos Serna helped me find access into the community of Cascajal 
del Río and Orlando Saucedo told me a lot about the history of Nuevo 
Renacimiento. 
 
People at INEGI and CONAGUA helped me find statistical data relevant for my 
research and I thank all of them for their time and effort. 
 
Fieldwork would have been impossible without the support of the people in Laguna 
Seca, El Tigre, Cascajal del Río and Nuevo Renacimiento. I am grateful to 
everybody who invested their time into my research project and shared their 
thoughts and experiences. Although, I do not mention their real names, much of 
this thesis is based on the people who agreed to answer my questions. Many of 
them invited me into their houses and into their lives. I learned so much – for my 
research and far beyond. Thanks to all for making my time in their village such a 
special experience. In particular, I am extremely grateful to my four host families. 
They not only shared shelter and food with me but integrated me into their family 
lives. Their friendship beyond fieldwork means a lot to me. 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
A Ph.D. tends to affect many aspects in life and goes far beyond the academic 
realm. I experienced a lot of understanding from family members, friends and 
colleagues and I am grateful to all. I would like to particularly thank my colleagues 
at ICSU for their tremendous support during the last and very intense phase of my 
Ph.D. Thanks to Manuel Limonta for being so supportive and flexible and to María 
Teresa Viramontes for her kindness. 
 
Akiiki Babyesiza always listened to my Ph.D. experiences from the start and 
provided valuable advice on many academic and non-academic matters. Thanks 
for being so motivating and supportive. Finally, thanks to Paul Verkerk for his 
constant support, especially during the last months, and for believing that I could 
make it. 
 
 
 
Kerstin Schmidt-Verkerk 
Mexico City, September 2011 
 
 
v 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
This thesis develops a conceptual and methodological approach to understanding 
how future climate change is likely to affect migration, and then applies this 
approach to explore the likely effects of climate change on different migration flows 
in and from Mexico. Scientific and policy interest in the climate change-migration 
nexus has been growing over the last decade, yet empirical results remain 
inconclusive. Existing approaches are often conceptually and methodologically 
unconvincing as they assume a linear relationship between climate change and 
migration, or try to separate climate stressors from other factors involved in 
migration decisions. Furthermore, most current research into the climate-migration 
nexus has focused on a relatively simple framing of localised environmental 
pressures forcing people to migrate. In contrast, this thesis acknowledges the 
complexity of migration and suggests that climate change is likely to affect factors 
involved in migration decisions at the local and the global level. It develops a more 
realistic understanding of the potential effect of climate change on migration by 
examining the impact of the local and global consequences of climate change on 
livelihood stressors and other factors involved in migration decisions. 
  
This thesis adopts a qualitative and comparative approach to illustrate this concept, 
based on fieldwork in Zacatecas and Veracruz, two Mexican states with different 
migration profiles and different local climate stressors. It analyses the factors 
involved in migration decisions, which include livelihood stressors but also 
networks, recruiters and individual agency. A risk matrix is then developed to 
explore the climate sensitivity of the various factors that influence internal and 
international migration flows. It analyses the extent to which each factor is likely to 
be affected by climate change in combination with the relevance of this factor for 
the migration decision-making process. This approach allows identifying those 
factors that, affected by future climate change, have the highest potential to impact 
on existing migration patterns. It also allows a comparison between different 
migration flows. Results suggest that climate change is likely to have moderate 
effects on migration, mainly on internal rural flows. Alarmist predictions of large 
numbers of ‘climate change refugees’ are thus inappropriate and policies should 
instead focus on the factors projected to impact most on migration under scenarios 
of future climate change. Policies should also aim at mitigating the negative effects 
of climate change on people’s livelihoods and at protecting migrants and non-
migrants. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction - The nexus between climate change and migration 
The nexus between climate change and migration is little understood despite the 
interest in the subject among scientists, policy makers and the media. Existing 
literature is often concerned with attempts to categorize and quantify climate-
related migration, while only few publications so far tried to understand the nature 
of and the elements involved in climate change-migration linkages. Conceptual and 
methodological approaches to studying the potential effects of climate change on 
migration are often based on simplistic assumptions, ignoring the complexity of 
climate change and migration and of their potential relationship. 
 
This thesis seeks both to fill this gap, and to move beyond simplistic assumptions 
by grappling head-on with the complexity of migration-climate change linkages. It 
does so through the development of a conceptual model to address these complex 
linkages; and then through the application of this model to two regions of Mexico 
that are heavily affected by migration, and are predicted to be severely impacted 
by climate change. This introductory chapter starts with a brief overview of the 
existing literature on the projected effects of climate change on migration, which 
mostly seeks to estimate numbers of people likely to become displaced by the 
consequences of future climate change. The first part of the chapter also analyses 
the negative connotations of migration as a response to climate change. In much of 
the literature, migration is considered a failure to adapt, and the view of migration 
as an adaptation strategy is only slowly emerging. The section goes on to argue 
that the key issues impeding a more nuanced understanding of the nexus between 
climate change and migration are the focus on categorizations and definitions, the 
inadequacy of the theoretical approach, as well as the lack of empirical evidence.  
 
The second section of this introduction highlights two recent major assessments 
into the relationship between the environment and migration, the Environmental 
Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR) project and the Foresight 
project on migration and global environmental change. An important contribution of 
both assessments is that they explore the potential effects of environmental 
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change on migration in a global context and within the framework of a large 
research project. In contrast, most previous case studies analysed the effects of 
one specific environmental stressor on local migration patterns in one region of the 
world. 
 
The last part of the chapter introduces the contribution of this thesis to answering 
the question how climate change is likely to affect migration. In response to the 
lack of a convincing conceptual and methodological approach for studying the 
relationship between climate change and migration, this thesis develops such an 
approach. This approach is illustrated with empirical data from Mexico, based on 
long-term fieldwork in four rural communities in the Mexican states of Zacatecas 
and Veracruz. The last section of this chapter also provides an overview of the 
content of the following chapters of this thesis. 
 
1.1 Projected effects of climate change on migration 
Climate change and migration are two topics of long-standing policy interest, and 
concern about the nexus between the two phenomena has been growing in recent 
years. Despite this policy interest, there is little sound evidence so far about the 
likely future effects of climate change on migration. Research into climate change 
and migration needs to tackle the complexity of climate change, as well as the 
complexity of the role that migration might play as an adaptation strategy to the 
consequences of climate change. Although there have recently been signs of a 
more nuanced understanding of climate-change migration linkages and an 
acknowledgement of their complexity (Tacoli 2010, Hunter 2005), most policy 
publications still assume a linear and positive relationship between climate change 
and migration (Action Aid International 2007, Christian Aid 2007, Conisbee and 
Simms 2003).  
 
In particular, potential migration associated with climate change is generally 
perceived as the negative consequence of a failure to adapt to changing 
precipitation and temperature patterns and extreme events. These perceptions 
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about the climate change-migration nexus are related to fears of exponentially 
growing numbers of people displaced by climate change, and to the implicit 
assumption that all climate related migration will be international and dominated by 
moves from poor to economically more developed countries. In contrast, the 
following paragraphs highlight the complexity of climate change and of adaptation 
measures, and demonstrate why prevalent assumptions about future mass 
migration triggered by climate change are not solid. The last part of this section 
analyses the key issues related to research into the climate change-migration 
nexus, including the focus on definitions and categorisations, the inadequacy of the 
existing theoretical approach as well as the lack of systematic empirical evidence. 
 
1.1.1 Climate change and climate change adaptation 
Climate change and migration are two widely debated and highly complex 
phenomena. An analysis of their relationship needs to consider various sources of 
uncertainty, related to predicted future climate change, to its impacts on people’s 
livelihoods, and to people’s responses to climatic stressors. The uncertainty in 
climate change predictions is caused by the chaotic nature of the atmosphere, 
different outcomes of different climate change models, and the unknown scale of 
future mitigation efforts, leading to different emission scenarios (Black et al. 2011). 
The potentially abrupt occurrence of tipping points, thresholds at which whole 
ecosystems might suddenly collapse, adds an element of uncertainty to scenarios 
of future climate change (Foresight 2011a). Nevertheless, the 2007 IPCC report, 
which provides the most recent comprehensive assessment of observed and 
predicted climate change, suggests that it is highly likely that climate change will 
lead to changing precipitation and temperature patterns and to changes to the 
frequency and severity of extreme climatic events (Parry et al. 2007). As a 
consequence, some already dry regions might become drier and the probability of 
the occurrence of droughts might increase in these regions. Elsewhere, 
precipitation might increase in total volume and intensity, leading to higher flood 
risks. Yet, rising temperatures might improve climatic conditions in high latitude 
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regions, and in some parts of Europe and Northern America agriculture might 
become more productive under future climate change (Solomon et al. 2007). 
 
The question how future climate change is likely to impact on people’s livelihoods 
thus depends to a large extent on the local effects of climate change on existing 
climatic conditions in different regions of the world. However, climate change might 
also entail negative consequences felt at the global level, for instance an increase 
in commodity prices (Brown and Funk 2008, Lobell et al. 2008). Yet, the impacts of 
climate change on people’s livelihoods also depend on people’s vulnerability and 
adaptive capacity to shocks and stresses. The Sustainable Livelihood Approach 
(SLA) provides a useful framework for analysing how people respond to external 
climatic and non-climatic livelihood stressors. The SLA suggests that people make 
use of a combination of available assets to mitigate the effects of livelihood 
stressors (DFID 2000). The impact of the consequences of climate change on 
people’s livelihoods thus depends to a large extent on the availability of assets to 
affected people and the way how they make use of these assets and of potential 
livelihood strategies. 
 
Migration might or might not be one livelihood strategy among others that people 
affected by climatic stressors choose to make use of. Furthermore, many factors 
play into migration decisions (Kritz et al. 1992, Castles and Miller 1993, Boyle et al. 
1998), and in most cases it is unlikely that people’s migration decisions are only 
based on climatic stressors. Much also depends on the form of migration. For 
instance, seasonal short-distance moves have been a response to drought in the 
Sahel for centuries (Rain 1999). Other forms of migration, particularly long-distance 
international moves, might not be feasible options for everybody as they require 
access to financial resources and to networks. Furthermore, climate change is 
predicted to most seriously affect poor people (Parry et al. 2007, Yamin et al. 
2005). Thus climate change might even deprive more people from the option of 
choosing migration as a livelihood strategy, because a growing number of people 
might not be able to afford migration anymore.  
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1.1.2 Assumed migration increase caused by climate change  
Despite the potential of migration as an adaptation strategy in response to the 
consequences of climate change, migration is still most often considered a failure 
to adapt to climate change (Tacoli 2009). The potential role of migration as a 
livelihood strategy is thus ignored in much of the climate change-migration 
literature. Also ignored is the fact that climate change might limit people’s potential 
to make use of migration as a livelihood strategy, because a growing number of 
people might become unable to afford migration as a consequence of future 
climate change. Instead, the established discourse on climate change and 
migration claims that climate change will cause the displacement of millions of 
people. 
 
The 2006 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change suggested that 
climate change might force millions of people worldwide to migrate. It uses 
language that stresses the negative undertone of migration as a consequence of 
climate change and refers to a “risk of displacement or migration” for a large 
number of people worldwide (Stern 2006:111). Although the report does not put 
forward an exact number of potential climate change migrants, it reports that 200 
million people worldwide live in flood prone coastal areas alone. Furthermore, 
Stern (2006) argues that frequently cited estimates of 200 million future ‘climate 
change refugees’ are based on “conservative assumptions”. 
 
Several other organisations (Christian Aid 2007, Greenpeace 2007, Environmental 
Justice Foundation 2008) have published policy papers after the Stern Review, 
equally claiming that climate change will force large numbers of people to migrate. 
All of these publications conceptualise migration as a failure to adapt to climate 
change, or as the Stern Review puts it “a last-resort adaptation for individuals, but 
one that could be very costly to them and the world” (Stern 2006:111). Fears of 
large numbers of climate change migrants have since then dominated the policy 
discourse, at the expense of calls for better protection of poor people affected by 
climate stressors and migrants in general. 
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1.1.3 Key issues 
One of the key issues which hinders a profound understanding of the nexus 
between climate change and migration is the focus on categorizations and 
definitions for people expected to migrate because of climate change (Dun and 
Gemenne 2008). These categorizations and definitions are needed to produce 
estimates of projected numbers of climate-related migrants, and to establish a 
protection scheme for so-called ‘climate change refugees’. However, although 
some form of legal protection of people displaced by climate change might be 
desirable or even necessary at some point in the future, the focus on a protection 
regime for climate migrants runs the risk of excluding migrants who become 
displaced on other grounds, as well as people affected by climate change who are 
unable to migrate. Next to this practical concern, there are theoretical arguments 
against the establishment of a separate protection scheme for people displaced by 
climate change and against the categorization of ‘climate change refugees’ itself.  
 
These arguments include the inherent difficulty in finding a convincing definition of 
‘climate change refugees’ or ‘climate change migrants’ in order to distinguish them 
from other migrants or refugees. Despite various attempts, a concrete definition of 
this group of migrants does not yet exist. This difficulty is linked to the lack of a 
convincing conceptual and methodological approach, which is another theoretical 
argument that speaks against a protection scheme for ‘climate migrants’. Existing 
approaches, which either assume a linear relationship between climate change 
and migration or try to separate climate stressors from other factors involved in 
migration decisions, seem to be inadequate. The latter approach is more 
convincing than the former because it acknowledges the multi-causality of 
migration and the complexity of climate change adaptation strategies. 
Nevertheless, this approach does not acknowledge that climate change is likely to 
not only have direct local effects on people’s livelihoods and on agricultural output 
but also in an indirect manner on employment opportunities and global commodity 
prices.  
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Because of the various direct and indirect impacts, as well as the local and the 
global effects of climate change, attempts to separate climate change from other 
elements involved in migration decisions so far have not captured the complete 
picture of the relationship between climate change and migration. A number of 
recent case studies, which have concentrated on the effects of one specific climate 
stressor on migration, have provided useful insights into the current situation at 
specific places and allowed some projections of future scenarios. Yet, so far these 
studies did not offer a holistic understanding of the effects of climate change on 
people’s livelihoods and of the role that migration might play as a response to 
climatic and non-climatic stressors. Therefore, existing empirical results are far 
from being conclusive enough to permit general statements about the current and 
potential future effects of climate change on migration. Nevertheless, existing 
empirical evidence confirms the above theoretical considerations that the 
relationship between climate change and migration is complex and highly context 
specific.  
 
1.2 Contribution of recent major assessments 
As a response to the increasing policy interest and to the lack of theoretical and 
empirical knowledge, two major research projects into the relationship between 
environmental change or climate change and migration have emerged during the 
last four years. The Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios project 
(EACH-FOR) aimed to systematically generate worldwide empirical evidence from 
case studies set in areas, in which environmental stressors and the potential for 
migration were identified. In contrast, the UK Foresight project on migration and 
global environmental change focussed on regions of policy interest for the UK and 
to a lesser extent for global policies. Apart from a few case studies, the latter study 
was mainly based on expert consultations and reviews drawing on existing 
information. The aim of the Foresight project was to conceptualise environment-
migration linkages and to forecast potential future developments. 
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1.2.1 Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR) 
The two-year research project on Environmental Change and Forced Migration 
Scenarios (EACH-FOR)1 was co-financed by the 6th Framework Programme of the 
European Commission and run between 2007 and 2009. As opposed to existing 
single case studies into the relationship between the environment and migration, 
EACH-FOR investigated the effects of different environmental stressors on 
migration in different parts of the world in one project. Some 23 case studies were 
carried out worldwide, using qualitative as well as quantitative research methods. 
The project aimed to contribute to the understanding of the role that environmental 
factors play in forced migration and to build plausible future scenarios regarding 
forced migration under future environmental change, including climate change. 
 
The synthesis report of the project admits that due to time and financial constraints 
only preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the research results (Jäger et al. 
2009). Nevertheless, one of the project’s major contributions was that it raised 
awareness of the complexity of the two phenomena environmental change and 
migration and of their relationship. It contributed to the growing interest in the 
environmental change-migration nexus at scientific events and in the media2. The 
main results of the EACH-FOR project can be summarised in three points. 1) 
Migration decisions are complex and environmental change might be one out of 
many factors to affect them; 2) Environmental change is likely to increase the 
pressure on people to migrate or to alter existing migration patterns; and 3) People 
can only migrate when they have access to financial resources and networks 
(Jäger et al. 2009). The presented case studies show more nuanced and 
sometimes contradictory results, which will be analysed in detail in chapter 2. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 http://www.each-for.eu/index.php?module=main 
2
 http://www.each-for.eu/index.php?module=ef_media 
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1.2.2 Foresight project on migration and global environmental change 
The Foresight project on migration and global environmental change3 is a project in 
the portfolio of the Foresight Programme of the UK Government Office for Science 
within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. It started in October 
2009 and the project report is due to be launched in the autumn of 2011. The 
general aim of the Foresight Programme is to assess the likely future 
developments of issues of major concern for UK and global policies. The Foresight 
project on migration and global environmental change, therefore, concentrates on 
regions and ecosystems, in which the impacts of environmental change on 
migration are expected to be of highest importance for policymakers in the UK and 
worldwide. These focus areas are dryland margins, low elevation coastal zones 
and small island states, and mountainous regions. A workshop was organised in 
each of these focus areas, as well as in the Mediterranean, bringing together 
experts and stakeholders from the region. The reports of these workshops are a 
major part of the project’s outcome and will be published together with the final 
project report in late 2011. The workshop reports and the project report where not 
available yet at the time of completion of this thesis. 
 
1.3 Contribution of this thesis 
This thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of the nexus between 
climate change and migration, using the example of Mexico. It develops a 
conceptual and methodological approach, which acknowledges that climate 
change is likely to affect people’s livelihoods in several ways, and that its 
consequences will manifest at the local and the global level. It argues that people 
are likely to respond to livelihood stressors worsened by climate change in different 
ways and that migration might or might not be one of their chosen strategies. 
Furthermore, the approach acknowledges the multi-causality of migration, and 
argues that many elements play into migration decisions so that in most cases it 
seems unlikely that people migrate only because of climate stressors. The thesis 
also provides long-term field evidence from Mexico to illustrate this conceptual and 
                                                 
3
 http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/current-projects/global-migration 
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methodological approach. This empirical evidence is based on fieldwork in 
Zacatecas and Veracruz, two Mexican states with different migration patterns and 
different climatic conditions.  
 
Empirical fieldwork is based on two sets of guiding research questions. First, it was 
concerned to explore the elements involved in migration decisions in rural 
communities in Mexico. This includes the questions why some people migrate 
while others stay in their home community, what forms of migration can be found in 
rural Mexico, and why some forms of migration are more common in a specific 
village context than others. Thus, fieldwork sought to explore how households, 
under different economic, social, and cultural circumstances, choose the most 
appropriate form of migration, or choose other livelihood strategies instead of 
migration.  
 
It is argued that only once the above questions have been answered can we go on 
to explore the likely effects of the global and local consequences of climate change 
on these observed migration flows. This includes understanding of the differences 
and similarities regarding different migration flows, and of the elements involved in 
different migration decisions at the sending and destination areas, under scenarios 
of future climate change. The fieldwork conducted shows in particular a number of 
alternative livelihood strategies that were observed in the village communities, and 
analyses the circumstances under which people have access to these livelihood 
strategies and consider them appropriate responses to livelihood stressors. 
 
1.3.1 A new conceptual and methodological approach 
It is argued in this thesis that existing approaches to studying the link between 
climate change and migration are conceptually and methodologically flawed and 
unconvincing. In particular, many papers published over the last decade have been 
guided by the assumption of a direct, very strong, linear and positive relationship 
between climate change and migration (Tacoli 2009). In contrast, this thesis argues 
that the academic and policy debate needs to be informed by an understanding of 
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the complexity of the relationship between climate change and migration. Chapter 
3 develops an alternative conceptual model that takes the complexity of both 
migration decisions and the consequences of future climate change into account. 
The chapter shows that the theoretical debate and existing empirical research so 
far have been based on two distinct approaches, which either conceptualise 
climate change as a single cause of migration or as one driver of migration 
amongst many others.  
 
While the assumption of a linear link between climate change and migration is 
conceptually flawed, the conceptualisation of climate stressors as one migration 
driver amongst many others is consistent with the idea accepted in migration 
research, that migration is a multi-causal phenomenon. Chapter 3 shows that 
elements of the Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA) and the New Economics of 
Labour Migration (NELM) can be used to illustrate that 1) migration has different 
drivers, and that 2) perceived livelihood stressors, which can be identified as 
migration drivers, also drive different responses. Furthermore, chapter 3 integrates 
migration theories that acknowledge the importance of networks and institutions 
and the effect of cumulative causation to explain why some people migrate and 
others stay in their home communities. The chapter thus argues that factors 
influencing migration decisions can be found at the macro, the meso, and the micro 
level and that all these factors need to be considered when analysing the potential 
impact of climate stressors on migration. Thus, the conceptualisation of migration 
decisions as a complex as opposed to a linear process is supported in this thesis.  
 
Nevertheless, chapter 3 also argues that the conceptualisation of climate change 
as one factor among many others affecting migration decisions is not sufficient for 
a holistic understanding of the climate change-migration nexus. While this 
approach acknowledges the complexity of migration processes, it does not 
consider the complexity of the potential consequences of climate change. These 
consequences will not only translate into local environmental stressors that might 
directly affect migration decisions but they are likely to also indirectly affect 
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migration decisions in several ways. The local and global consequences of climate 
change might, for example, affect job opportunities in sending and destination 
areas. These consequences might in turn affect the functioning of institutions at the 
meso level, such as recruiters of workers and migrant networks, as well as the 
individual perception of migration as a desirable endeavour. To take these 
considerations into account, climate change is conceptualised as affecting the 
elements involved in migration decisions at the macro, the meso, and the micro 
level, although some elements are likely to be more climate sensitive than others.  
 
The methodological approach presented in chapter 4 builds on this 
conceptualisation. It consists of two parts, first identifying and analysing the 
elements involved in different forms of migration decisions, and second testing 
these factors involved in migration decisions for their sensitivity to climate change. 
Based on the conceptualisation that climate change is likely to affect migration 
decisions in many ways, a qualitative approach was chosen to illustrate how and to 
what extent climate change is likely to affect each element involved in migration 
decisions. Qualitative data for the first part of the methodological approach were 
collected in a total of four rural communities in the Mexican states of Zacatecas 
and Veracruz between January 2008 and March 2009. Fieldwork consisted of 
about 50 semi-structured interviews in each community, participant observation, 
life histories, and interviews with people who know the communities in their 
function as teachers, doctors, nurses, or researchers. Empirical research in the 
communities was completed by visits to local libraries and archives, meetings with 
Mexican researchers working on themes related to migration or climate change, 
and by local climate and population statistics. After returning from fieldwork, 
interviews and field reports were analysed and categories of factors affecting 
migration decisions on the macro, the meso and the micro level were constructed.  
 
The second part of the methodological approach consists of testing the factors 
involved in migration decisions, as identified during fieldwork, for their sensitivity to 
climate change. To this end, the principle of a risk matrix, as presented in chapter 
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4.3, is used. A risk matrix measures the probability that a specific event is likely to 
occur in combination with the impact that this event is expected to have. 
Accordingly, for the purpose of the analysis of the climate sensitivity of factors 
involved in migration decisions, a matrix including two axes with possible values on 
a scale from 1-5 each is constructed. The first axis measures to what extent each 
element involved in migration decisions is likely to be affected by climate change. 
The second axis measures how relevant this factor is in the migration decision-
making process. The product of the two scores for each specific element involved 
in migration decisions indicates the extent to which the effects of climate change 
on this element will in turn affect migration decisions. Factors involved in migration 
decisions that are at the same time highly sensitive to climate change and of high 
importance in the decision-making process for or against migration can be 
expected to contribute most to potential changes to existing migration patterns 
caused by climate change. Possible scores range from 1-5 for each axis, allowing 
product scores between 1 and 25. Calculating the product of the two scores for 
each factor involved in the migration decision-making process, allows identifying 
those factors that, affected by future climate change, have the highest potential to 
change existing migration patterns. Performing this process for different forms of 
migration allows a comparison between the potentially different climate sensitivity 
of each migration flow in rural Mexico. 
 
1.3.2 Long term field evidence from Mexico 
To be able to present a true-to-life picture of the heterogeneous migration profiles, 
a careful selection of the research setting is crucial. Chapter 4 justifies the choice 
of Mexico, and the particular states of Zacatecas and Veracruz, as the research 
setting. While the classic migration states (such as Zacatecas, Durango and 
Michoacán) in the centre-west of the country have been sending international 
migrants for generations, international migration only emerged in the 1990s in the 
southern and south eastern states. Internal migration is a common phenomenon in 
many parts of the country. Furthermore, different local climate stressors such as 
droughts, floods and hurricanes can be found within one country, often 
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simultaneously, so that their potentially different effects on migration decisions can 
be analysed. Zacatecas and Veracruz were selected as the two Mexican states in 
which fieldwork took place because they show distinct migrations patterns and are 
impacted by different climate stressors. While droughts are very common in 
Zacatecas, Veracruz has been hit several times by severe floods and hurricanes in 
recent years. Zacatecas and Veracruz thus allow an analysis of different migration 
flows and also an analysis of the effects of different local climate stressors on 
people’s livelihoods. Furthermore, in each region two rural communities, again with 
different migration and environmental characteristics, were selected to consider as 
many potential local characteristics as possible. 
 
Chapter 5 briefly introduces the regions and the communities in which fieldwork 
took place. This short and mainly descriptive chapter stresses the diversity of the 
different regions of Mexico but also the differences and similarities of rural 
communities within each state of Zacatecas and Veracruz. The chapter starts with 
a brief presentation of geographic, demographic, economic and environmental data 
for each of the two states. Then, the four researched communities Laguna Seca 
and El Tigre in Zacatecas, and Cascajal del Río and Nuevo Renacimiento in 
Veracruz are presented. In addition to demographic and economic data for each 
community, the major climatic stressors that affected people’s livelihoods in the 
past are summarised for each community. The purpose of this short chapter is to 
prepare the context for the three chapters 6, 7 and 8, in which the empirical results 
of this thesis are presented. 
 
Chapter 6 is concerned with the history of migration, current migration patterns and 
the underlying drivers of migration in Mexico and more specifically in Zacatecas 
and in Veracruz. After presenting explanations for migration in Mexico found in the 
literature, the chapter turns to the underlying drivers of migration that were 
identified during fieldwork. These drivers are decreasing employment opportunities, 
a decreasing income-price ratio, the fact that subsistence agriculture and foraging 
have become more difficult, and increased desires as a consequence of cultural 
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change. The last section of the chapter is concerned with the extent to which these 
drivers actually lead to migration as opposed to other responses. Livelihood 
strategies such as micro-businesses, credits, selling land or livestock, and waiting 
for external aid are alternatives to migration. This means that the potential drivers 
of migration that are analysed in chapter 6, do not necessarily lead to migration.  
 
Chapter 7 analyses under what conditions the livelihood stressors at the macro 
level presented in chapter 6 transform into drivers of migration. This chapter 
stresses that migration has many different forms and that the four different 
migration flows that were observed in the communities, in which fieldwork was 
conducted, are illegal international migration, legal international migration, internal 
migration to rural destinations, and internal migration to urban destinations. 
Furthermore, migration can be temporary or permanent and can involve single 
family members or whole families. The chapter presents the factors that influence 
the choice of the preferred form of migration and the decision to migrate or not to 
migrate at all. Determinant factors on the meso level are access to networks or 
recruiters. Crucial factors at the micro level related to human agency are 
perceptions of the usefulness of different forms of migration as a livelihood 
strategy, perceptions of the ability to succeed in the destination area, the 
willingness to leave the community and the degree to which this is accepted by 
family members and fellow village dwellers, and the access to the necessary 
financial resources.  
 
Chapter 8 analyses the sensitivity of these factors involved in different migration 
decisions and of the alternative livelihood strategies identified in chapter 7. The 
chapter starts with an analysis of the climate sensitivity of subsistence agriculture, 
including a critical analysis of existing assessments of the projected effects of 
climate change on agricultural productivity. The fact that these assessments use 
rainfall as a proxy for agricultural productivity is criticised because agricultural 
output also depends on a variety of other factors. Most important of all, these 
studies ignore the influence of human agency on the decision to stop or to continue 
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farming. Rather, they are conceptualised around the idea that climate change will 
gradually decrease yield output, mainly in developing countries, thereby assuming 
that farmers will continue farming under all circumstances. However, high costs of 
farming in relation to low market prices for agricultural produce in combination with 
uncertain yield outputs due to uncertain climatic conditions have already caused 
many farmers to stop farming in the researched communities in Zacatecas and 
Veracruz. Instead they need to rely to a large extent on alternative livelihood 
strategies, which makes them dependent on external sources of income and 
decreases their household income.  
 
The second part of the chapter is concerned with the analysis of the climate 
sensitivity of commercial farming. It shows that uncertain climatic conditions in 
combination with decreasing revenues for agricultural produce might lead to two 
different responses of commercial farmers. First, they might switch to more robust 
crops, which provide lower but more secure revenues and demand less labour. 
This would entail a decrease in employment opportunities in commercial 
agriculture. Second, they might diversify their produce and switch to more 
expensive and labour intensive crops in order to achieve a higher benefit. This, to 
the contrary, would entail an increase in employment opportunities in commercial 
agriculture. Thus, the same consequences of climate change in the same region 
can have opposite effects on farming and employment opportunities, depending on 
the experiences and perceptions of farmers and landowners. 
 
The third part of chapter 8 analyses the climate sensitivity of the different migration 
flows, based on empirical data gathered during fieldwork in the four communities in 
Zacatecas and Veracruz. It shows that internal and international migration are 
likely to become affected by climate change in different ways. While worsening 
local climate stressors have the potential to increase the volume of internal 
migration, they seem to have little effect on international migration. All forms of 
migration from rural Mexico are likely to become affected by a decrease of people’s 
purchasing power as a consequence of rising commodity prices in response to 
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climate change. This might put pressure on people to migrate. Yet, climate change 
can also be expected to decrease people’s access to money, as it is likely to 
decrease the availability of employment opportunities in Zacatecas and Veracruz. 
Furthermore, decreasing employment opportunities at the village level lead to 
decreasing options of access to informal credits on the household level, because 
the number of families that could provide credits is likewise decreasing. As 
international migration is an expensive endeavour, it is likely that fewer families will 
be able to afford international migration. The nexus between climate change and 
migration thus shows many aspects of complexity. The following chapter analyses 
the existing evidence on the relationship between the environment or the climate 
and migration. 
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Chapter 2: Environment, climate change and migration: existing evidence  
This chapter analyses existing evidence on the nexus between climate change and 
migration. It starts with an overview of the ‘environmental refugee’ debate in the 
1990s, and argues that many elements in this debate provided the intellectual 
basis for the current scientific and policy interest in potential linkages between 
climate change and migration. The second part of the chapter then moves on to 
the current debate about the nexus between climate change and migration. It 
analyses three policy areas, where the relevance of this nexus is currently 
discussed: climate change, migration and development; climate change, migration 
and conflict; and international climate protection mechanisms. The third part of the 
chapter discusses existing empirical studies concerned with the potential impacts 
of droughts, tropical cyclones and floods on migration. 
 
2.1 The ‘environmental refugee’ debate 
The potential effects of environmental change on migration have been explored 
theoretically for almost four decades. The concept ‘environmental refugee’, was 
first introduced by Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute in the 1970s (Saunders 
2000), and became more widely known by the work of El-Hinnawi (1985) of the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Another decade later Norman 
Myers and Jennifer Kent (1995) provided estimates of numbers of expected 
‘environmental refugees’ that are still quoted some 15 years later. They suggested 
that there were at least 25 million environmental refugees at the time the text was 
written, which they expected to double by 2010. However, the most widely cited 
quote refers to environmental stressors, which “could eventually cause as many as 
200 million people to be put at risk of displacement” (Myers and Kent 1995:1).  
 
Other scholars have also made the claim that the numbers of ‘environmental 
refugees’ will be immense in their own work. Jodi Jacobsen (1988 as quoted in 
Lonergan and Swain 1998) concluded that, “environmental refugees have become 
the single largest class of displaced persons in the world” (Lonergan and Swain 
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1998:5). John Cairns even expressed fears that all human beings might become 
‘environmental refugees’ one day: 
 
“When countries capable of absorbing environmental refugees are at or beyond 
their carrying capacity, every individual on the planet becomes a potential 
environmental refugee with no place to go” (Cairns 2002:34). 
 
The debate about a possible nexus between environmental degradation and 
migration was mainly led by environmental scientists and ecologists (IOM/RPG 
1992, see Myers and Kent 1995, Lonergan and Swain 1998, Unruh 2004, Myers 
2005). Their major focus of interest was the search for current and future numbers 
of people displaced by environmental problems, while there was hardly any interest 
in understanding the context of this nexus.  
 
2.1.1 Methodological and conceptual issues 
The concept ‘environmental refugee’ and the estimates of numbers of people who 
are expected to become displaced or migrate due to environmental problems were 
challenged by other scholars (McGregor 1993, Suhrke 1994, Kibreab 1997, Black 
1998, 2001) for being over-simplistic and methodologically and conceptionally 
flawed. Most indications of the numbers of expected ‘environmental refugees’ were 
based on population estimates in the regions affected by environmental problems, 
as reliable statistics rarely exist in many of these areas. Although environmental 
stressors often most seriously affect poor people, within a community and on the 
global level (Parry et al. 2007, Yamin et al. 2005), it is generally not the poorest 
people who migrate overseas because international migration is an expensive 
endeavour that demands resources for the journey and for the crossing of borders 
(Castles 2000, De Haan 2000, Skeldon 2002)4. It is thus difficult to imagine that 
people who lost their land and all their other resources will manage to embark on a 
journey to Europe or to North America. 
                                                 
4
 Most authors acknowledge that in exceptional cases, the poorest might become displaced 
because of environmental catastrophes or wars. However, they are not specific about the 
destinations of these people. 
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Furthermore, the reasoning behind the term ‘environmental refugee’ suggests that 
the consequences of environmental change will make people’s living conditions 
unbearable, forcing them to leave their homes. Yet, there is a general consensus 
that migration is a very complex phenomenon which cannot be explained by one 
single reason alone but by a multitude of economic, social, and cultural factors that 
influence migratory behaviour (Kritz et al. 1992, Castles and Miller 1993, Boyle et 
al. 1998, Wood 2001).  
 
This shows that the nexus between environmental stressors and migration is not 
linear and not necessarily positive because different forms of migration have to be 
considered. It is feasible that people become displaced by or migrate after an 
extreme environmental event, most likely over short distances. Yet, it is also 
feasible that material losses after an extreme event render people poorer and 
therefore deprive them from the possibility of making use of migration as a 
livelihood strategy, especially over large distances and across borders.  
 
2.1.2 Definitional and legal issues 
One of the central themes in the context of the 'environmental refugee' debate was 
the call for legal protection for people displaced by environmental change. 
Therefore, there was the need for a definition of ‘environmental refugees’, on which 
this legal protection framework would be based. Attempts to define ‘environmental 
refugees’ were numerous but not conclusive (Black 2001). Furthermore, most 
attempts to define ‘environmental refugees’ were flawed. An example containing 
two contestable elements is the one by the World Foundation for Environment and 
Development and the Norwegian Refugee Council (Trolldalen et al. 1992, quoted in 
Swain 1996): 
 
“First, it should refer to persons who are coerced or forced to leave their homes for 
environmental reasons that threaten their lives. Secondly, it should be limited to 
persons who have crossed an international border (that is, persons who are outside 
their country of nationality or origin)” (Swain 1996:965). 
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The weakness of the first part of the definition is linked to the problem of how 
environmental reasons can be separated from other motives for migration. The 
claim that the classification should be “limited to persons who have crossed an 
international border” in the second part of the definition fulfils part of the 1951 
Geneva Convention on Refugees. Yet, it contradicts Myers’ concept of including 
everybody who has become displaced for environmental reasons, regardless of the 
destination. Thus, the numbers of people who are likely to become displaced for 
environmental reasons and cross an international border – and therefore comply 
with the definition – are likely to be much smaller than the 200 million estimated by 
Myers. 
 
The lack of a clear definition and theoretical framework for the concept 
‘environmental refugee’ has been identified as a major hindrance to the 
construction of a legal protective mechanism for this group of people (Lonergan 
and Swain 1998, Flintan 2001). Partly in response, Hugo (1996) suggests using 
the concept of ‘environmental migrant’ instead. Although he disputes the term 
‘environmental refugee’, he acknowledges that environmental change is a factor 
that drives involuntary migration and should be recognised academically and 
politically as such. He argues that “conceptualizing environmentally induced 
migration as a subset of forced migration draws attention to the neglect of this type 
of movement by researchers and policymakers alike” (Hugo 1996:110-1). Lee 
(1994) also distinguished between the terms ‘environmental refugee’ and 
‘environmental migrant’. However, she provided no further explanation of the 
difference between the two concepts. One argument put forward against the use of 
the term ‘environmental refugee’ is that the 1951 Geneva Convention defines 
‘refugees’ as people who are outside the country of their nationality “owing to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion“ (UNHCR 2006:16). 
Therefore, Black (2001) criticises “that although environmental degradation and 
catastrophe may be important factors in the decision to migrate, and issues of 
concern in their own right, their conceptualisation as a primary cause of forced 
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displacement is unhelpful and unsound intellectually, and unnecessary in practical 
terms” (Black 2001:2). Kibreab (1997) points out that states are not obliged to 
provide asylum to people who have become displaced for environmental reasons. 
 
2.2 The climate change-migration nexus 
The debate about ‘environmental refugees’ in the 1990s thus did not produce any 
results in the form of conclusive empirical evidence, a convincing research design, 
a clear definition, or any form of legal protection for people displaced by 
environmental change. From the second half of the first decade of the 21st century 
onwards, the focus of the debate shifted more and more from the potential nexus 
between environmental degradation and migration to the potential nexus between 
climate change and migration. Yet, one of the major areas of concern was still the 
search for definitions and numbers, with the aim of establishing a legal protection 
scheme for people expected to become displaced by climate change. 
 
2.2.1 Definitions and legal protection 
Potentially as a consequence of the criticism of the ‘environmental refugee’ 
concept as analysed above, more recent attempts to define people displaced by 
environmental or climate change, use the terms ‘environmental migrant’ or ‘climate 
change migrant’. In 2008, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
proposed a definition of ‘environmental migrants’: 
 
“Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of 
sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives 
or living conditions, are obliged to have to leave their habitual homes, or choose to 
do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their territory 
or abroad”(http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/definitional-issues). 
 
Despite this partial shift of nomenclature, claims for the need to change the 1951 
Geneva Convention on Refugees and to include legal refugee status for people 
who have become displaced due to the degradation of their natural environment or 
because of climate change were still numerous at the end of the 2000s. It was 
argued that changes to the legal framework of refugee policies have become 
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necessary because of the changing needs of people. Among others, the Global 
Governance Project (Biermann and Boas 2008), Population Action International 
(2008), the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security 
(Renaud et al. 2007), Christian Aid (2007, 2006), Greenpeace (Jakobeit and 
Methmann 2007), and the New Economics Foundation (Conisbee and Simms 
2003) have included this concern into their agenda.  
 
Williams (2008) discusses the feasibility of installing a protective mechanism for 
people displaced by climate change. She finds that changing the Refugee 
Convention and including environmental stressors as reasons for becoming 
classified as a refugee is not an option because of the UNHCR’s opposition to 
mixing the two categories of refugees and environmentally displaced people, and 
because of the expected resistance of the international community towards the 
implementation of this approach. Analysing 45 interviews she conducted with 
ambassadors and senior diplomats of different United Nations Institutions, 
McNamara (2007) concludes that “policy absence on environmental refugees is an 
outcome of debates and discourses by various actors and agencies at the United 
Nations”. While it seems correct that the UNHCR has opposed use of the term 
‘environmental refugees’, other UN agencies such as UNEP have nonetheless 
used it (ex. El-Hinnawi 1985, UNEP 2007). Nevertheless, a global binding 
protection scheme for people displaced by environmental change does not seem to 
be a feasible option. Williams (2008) argues that the installation of such a scheme 
would imply that all states accepted climate change as a fact and were willing to 
take the responsibility for it, which will most likely not be the case. In a Research 
Brief based on the outcomes of the 2nd Expert Workshop on Climate Change, 
Environment, and Migration, Stal and Warner (2009) stress that the attempt to 
include climate or environmental stressors into global protection schemes is often 
convincing intellectually, yet that such efforts are doomed to fail at the practical 
level because of the authority of the nation states, which are unlikely to adopt 
measures contradicting their own interests. 
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Williams (2008) argues further that, while the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement offer more room to include environmental reasons for displacement, 
protection of environmentally displaced people in this framework would only be 
possible as long as they do not cross an international border. This concern might 
not be of too much practical importance, as it can be regarded as highly likely that 
most environmentally displaced persons will not cross an international border in the 
first place. Next to this practical issue, Williams puts forward an ethical concern 
about including environmentally displaced people into the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement: “There still remains a need for such individuals to be 
recognized and protected based on their own intrinsic value and circumstances 
rather than being manipulated and engineered into a pre-existing framework 
designed for other purposes” (Williams 2008:513). She suggests that regional 
protection schemes, coordinated by the EU, the AU, the OAS, and ASEAN, or by 
smaller regional entities, under the auspices of the UNFCCC would be the most 
feasible approach.  
 
In a background paper for the 2010 World Migration Report, Martin (2010) 
approaches the question about legal protection schemes for people who migrate 
for environmental reason by looking at existing policies at the state level. She 
mentions that the temporary protection scheme, which was established in the USA 
in 1990, includes environmental aspects. This scheme grants temporary protection 
to those people who are already in the USA when their home country is affected by 
an ongoing violent conflict, an environmental disaster, or any other form of 
temporary extreme situation. The definition of environmental disasters include “an 
earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state 
resulting in a substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area 
affected” (Martin 2010:8). Yet, Martin (2010) argues that the potential of the 
scheme as a protective mechanism for people affected by climate stressors is very 
limited because of its temporary nature, and because of the fact that it only applies 
to persons who are already in the USA at the time of the disaster. Canada, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom suspend deportations to countries after an 
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environmental disaster and applied this principle to nationals affected by the 2004 
Tsunami. Finland and Sweden are the only countries who included environmentally 
displaced people into their immigration policies (Martin 2010). In 2006, the Stern 
Review on the Economics of Climate Change suggested that negotiations were 
underway to establish an agreement between New Zealand and Tuvalu, in which 
New Zealand would agree to receive ‘climate change refugees’ from the island. 
This claim was echoed in the media although the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade clarified on its website5 that no such agreement exists. Thus so 
far, claims for policy agreements that protect people displaced by environmental 
stressors have not been successful, even in the form of soft laws and non-binding 
agreements, which were suggested by Stal and Warner (2009) as a more feasible 
alternative to a legally binding approach. 
 
2.2.2 The focus on numbers 
Many policy papers published in the second half of the 2000s follow the arguments 
put forward in the ‘environmental refugee’ debate, sometimes simply replacing 
‘environmental change’ by ‘climate change’. The dominating discourse is the claim 
that climate change will induce the displacement of large numbers of people 
worldwide. Estimates of the numbers of expected ‘climate change refugees’ draw 
on figures put forward by Myers and Kent (1995) in the context of the 
‘environmental refugee’ debate presented above, despite the criticism of the 
concept and the predicted numbers of environmentally displaced persons. These 
figures of up to 200 million climate change refugees in the coming thirty years are 
quoted in a report written on behalf of Greenpeace Germany (Jakobeit and 
Methmann 2007). According to the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change (2006), they are only based on “conservative assumptions”. The report 
goes on to argue that “climate change will lead to hundreds of millions more people 
without sufficient water or food to survive and/or threatened by dangerous floods 
and increased disease” (Stern 2006). Accordingly, a report for the British 
organisation Christian Aid (2007) states in the introduction that one billion climate 
                                                 
5
 http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Pacific/NZ-Tuvalu-immigration.php 
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change refugees should be expected by 2050. However, later on in the report the 
authors admit that as not enough research has been carried out so far, there are 
no recent, authoritative, global figures on the number of people who could be 
displaced from their homes by climate change. Nonetheless, the report calls for 
immediate action to protect those who might become displaced by climate change, 
and stresses the need for attention to those displaced within their own countries 
using case studies from Colombia, Burma and Mali (Christian Aid 2007). 
 
Contradictory statements can also be found in a report by Warner et al. (2009). In 
the first paragraphs of the Executive Summary, the authors claim that forced 
migration will be and already is a negative but unavoidable consequence of climate 
change, especially in developing countries, which in turn entails negative 
consequences for development and human security. Yet, the case studies show a 
more nuanced picture of the climate change-migration nexus. These case studies 
were part of the EACH-FOR project, and include examples from Asia, Central 
America, Western Africa, the deltas of the Ganges, the Mekong, and the Nile, as 
well as the low lying islands of Tuvalu and the Maldives. For instance, a case study 
of Mexico shows that some people affected by climate change might be too poor to 
migrate, whilst a case study in the Sahel shows that migration is a well-established 
livelihood strategy to diversify income. Thus the link between climate change 
related environmental stressors and migration turns out to be complex and case 
specific and far from evident as the first part of the report suggests. 
 
A 2008 report by the Environmental Justice Foundation starts with the statement 
that “climate change is set to create millions of environmental refugees” (EJF 
2008:2), again referring to Myers and Kent’s estimates of 200 million. Yet, unlike 
most other reports, the authors distinguish between 150 million ‘climate change 
refugees’ and 50 million people to be displaced by non-climate related 
environmental problems. The authors admit that the majority of these people are 
likely to become internally displaced but nevertheless, they use the term ‘climate 
change refugees’ without any further explanation. In general, the report holds an 
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alarmist view, presenting selective evidence. It refers to the most recent Fourth 
Assessment Report of the IPCC (2007) for information about the physical science 
related to climate change. However, it quotes the First IPCC Assessment Report 
(1990) about the nexus between climate change and migration: “The gravest 
effects of climate change may be those on human migration” (EJF 2008:4), 
ignoring the more cautious reference to a “potential for population migration” due to 
climate change, mentioned in the 2007 IPCC Assessment Report.  
 
2.3 Policy areas focused on climate change-migration linkages 
The previous section showed that policy reports about the nexus between climate 
change and migration have continued to produce alarming numbers of ‘climate 
change refugees’, despite methodological, conceptual and legal flaws, which mirror 
those identified and expressed more than a decade ago. Brown’s (2008) call for 
“better predictions” of the number of people whose migration decisions will, to a 
larger or smaller extent, be influenced by future climate change might be justified in 
this context. Yet, attempts to construct these numbers, summarized in the previous 
sections, suggest that reliable predictions at a global level are difficult if not 
impossible to obtain because climate change-migration linkages seem to be very 
complex and context-specific. Therefore, better understanding the elements that 
are involved in the climate change-migration nexus seems to be important to move 
the policy debate away from the image of a linear relationship between 
environmental stressors and population displacement. Even if alarming numbers 
are still being produced, there are signs of such an advance in understanding of 
the nuances of climate change-migration linkages in recent policy reports 
concerned with the nexus between climate change, migration, and development; 
climate change, migration, and conflict as well as with migration in the context of 
international climate protection mechanisms, which will be analysed in the next 
sections. A shift towards a more profound understanding of climate change-
migration linkages could be especially useful in the context of development 
policies, which should aim at supporting those displaced, but also those who might 
be forced to stay because of the consequences of climate change. 
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2.3.1 Climate change, migration, and development 
Christian Aid claims in two reports (2006, 2007) that research into the link between 
changing climate and migration should be conducted within the realm of 
development studies. According to these reports, climate change might foil the 
efforts of development assistance, as water and other resources will become even 
scarcer. Another policy paper by Action Aid International (2007) focuses on flooding 
in African cities, which are presented as major destinations for internal migrants 
because of the degradation of rural livelihoods by droughts and floods. One of the 
major arguments of the report is that climate change poses a double threat to 
sending and receiving areas for migrants within Africa. On the one hand, flooding in 
African cities might worsen as a consequence of climate change; whilst on the 
other hand, because climate change is projected to increase the risk of droughts 
and floods in rural areas, more people are likely to migrate to the same cities. The 
report calls for a pro-poor integrative policy approach while criticizing the current 
lack of policy preparedness (Action Aid International 2007). Yet, it remains unclear 
what such pro-poor policies with respect to climate change and migration should 
look like. 
 
The underlying idea of the concept of ‘climate change refugees’, which is repeated 
in policy papers, such as the ones discussed above, suggests that the 
consequences of climate change impoverish people so that these have no choice 
but to leave. Migrants are thus conceptualized as victims of climate change rather 
than actors who make use of migration to diversify their income in times of 
environmental hardship. According to Heine and Petersen (2008), migration is 
generally perceived as “adaptation failure” among policy-makers. The authors start 
their article by saying that “adaptation focuses on reducing [poor people’s] 
vulnerability and thereby preventing both displacement and conflicts over scarce 
resources” (Heine and Petersen 2008:48). Implicitly, they thus make the important 
distinction between ‘displacement’, which should be avoided, and ‘temporary 
migration’, which can be an adaptation strategy. Stal and Warner (2009) explicitly 
say that in some cases, voluntary migration can be an adaptive strategy in 
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responsive to environmental stressors, while in other cases forced displacement as 
a consequence of environmental issues is a sign of a failure to adapt. This view is 
also expressed in a report on disaster risk reduction, climate change adaption, and 
environmental migration by the IOM (2010). Heine and Petersen (2008) argue that, 
therefore, development cooperation should aim at integrating migration into 
adaptation policies rather than trying to limit it. 
 
Laczko and Aghazarm (2009) regret that there are too few studies concerned with 
showing “how migration can be a coping or adaptation strategy or how migration 
can relieve pressure on environmentally degraded areas” (Laczko and Aghazarm 
2009:10). They cite the 2010 World Development Report on climate change and 
development issued by the World Bank, in which the authors fear that this negative 
image of climate change-related migration might entail policies that try to restrict 
migration in cases where migration might be the only option for those affected by 
climate stressors. Even in situations in which migration is not the only option but a 
livelihood strategy among others, policies aiming at restricting climate-induced 
migration are likely to harm people affected by climate change instead of 
supporting them and the livelihood strategies they are making use of.  
 
Yet, such studies are beginning to emerge. In one of the first articles to 
conceptualise migration as an adaptation strategy to climate stressors, McLeman 
and Smit (2006) develop a conceptual model that shows under what circumstances 
communities affected by climate stressors might use migration as a livelihood 
strategy to reduce vulnerability. Similarly, Tacoli (2009) considers a change in 
perceptions of the role of migration in the context of climate change as very 
important for understanding policy needs. She argues that successful policies need 
to support adaptation to climate change and that migration as an income 
diversification strategy is likely to reduce vulnerability to climate and non-climate 
related risks. Often migration is still considered a failure of existing livelihood 
systems and, therefore, policy makers tend to prioritize solutions that restrict 
migration and decrease the number of migrants. In contrast, Tacoli (2009) argues 
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that there should be a shift away from seeing migration as problematic to 
conceiving it as part of the solution to climate related problems. In some cases, the 
potential of migration as an adaptation strategy has already been acknowledged. 
The 2010 IOM Human Migration Report mentions that migration might be “one of 
several adaptation strategies in the face of natural disasters” (IOM 2010:3), the 
frequency and intensity of which is likely to be exacerbated by climate change. 
Furthermore, the potential of migration as a proactive strategy to adapt to changing 
environmental conditions, rather than as a reaction to disasters that already 
occurred, should be taken into account (Bardsley and Hugo 2010). 
 
Yet, so far, policy makers in many cases do not conceptualize migration as an 
adaption strategy to climate change. The UNFCCC database on local coping 
strategies6 does not include any form of migration, not even under the category 
which lists different livelihood diversification strategies. Meanwhile, whilst in the 
National Adaptation Programmes for Action (NAPAs) of some countries, the 
potential of migration for being part of the solution to climate related stressors has 
been acknowledged, few if any NAPAs have to date developed concrete policy 
formulations based on these observations (Sward and Codjoe 2011, forthcoming).  
 
NAPAs7 are strategic processes designed to identify policy priorities to respond to 
the consequences of climate change in Least Developed Countries (LDCs). By 
February 2011, the UNFCCC Secretariat had received NAPAs from 45 countries. 
Martin (2009) analysed the 38 NAPAs that existed at the time when her paper was 
written. She found that many countries are aware that climate change is likely to 
affect migration patterns. Again, in many cases, migration is an anticipated 
negative consequence of loss of habitats and livelihoods, caused by the effects of 
climate change. In turn, adaptive measures need to “reduce migration pressures 
and allow people to remain in their original settlements” (Martin 2009:364).  
 
                                                 
6
 http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/adaptation 
7
 http://unfccc.int/national_reports/napa/items/2719.php 
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A systematic analysis of the 45 existing NAPA’s in February 2011 by the author 
shows that migration is mentioned in four contexts: 1) Migration/displacement as a 
negative consequence of climate change (29 countries); 2) Migration as a 
traditional and/or positive adaptation strategy for people (13 countries); 3) 
Migration/resettlement as a new or planned adaptation strategy for governments 
(13 countries); and 4) Migration causing environmental and other problems (7 
countries). Several countries mention migration in different contexts, and nine 
countries even see migration as a negative consequence of climate change and as 
a positive adaptation strategy at the same time. These countries are Bangladesh, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Comores, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
and Sao Tome and Principe. The NAPA for Yemen mentions that migration from 
areas affected by climate stressors has slowed down because of new job 
opportunities generated as a result of an adaptation project. Mali is the only 
country that mentions that climate change might be a more serious threat to those 
who cannot migrate than to those who have got access to migration as a livelihood 
strategy. Contrary to western policy-making discourses, which are implicitly mainly 
concerned with effects of climate change on international migration, most NAPAs 
mention only internal migration or displacement, or do not specify the form of 
migration at all. Only Mali also considers migration to neighbouring ECOWAS 
countries and to Western countries as an increasingly used adaptation strategy in 
response to droughts. Similarly, middle-income countries such as China, India, and 
Mexico, in their National Action Plans on Climate Change hardly consider migration 
(Martin 2009).  
 
In contrast to the NAPAs, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) only 
marginally mention the nexus between environmental or climate stressors and 
migration. Out of 59 countries that had produced a PRSP until August 2009, only 
those of the Maldives (2008) and Tajikistan (2002) considered the need for 
resettlement policies from areas affected by environmental stressors (Black and 
Sward 2009).  
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2.3.2 Climate change, migration, and conflict 
Another aspect that has received some attention in policy papers is the nexus 
between climate change, migration, and conflict. Christian Aid (2007) suggests that 
climate change might lead to violent conflicts over the ownership of resources, 
which in turn could cause the further displacement of a large number of people 
(Christian Aid 2007). Meanwhile, the United Nations Environment Programme 
identifies environmental factors as “one of three major causes of displacement in 
Sudan” (UNEP 2007:104). The neo-Malthusian argument that environmental 
problems and scarcity of resources cause conflict, particularly in less developed 
countries, is stressed by Reuveny (2007), and like the environmental refugee 
debate cited earlier, also has links back to literature that was published in the 
1990s (Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994).  
 
While Reuveny acknowledges that increasing conflict over resources might cause 
migration, his main argument is that migration entails conflict at the destination 
areas caused by competition about resources, ethnic tensions, and general distrust 
between migrants and residents. Yet, he mitigates his argument by saying that 
migration must not necessarily lead to conflict but can also be beneficial for 
receiving areas by providing additional workforce. Also, governments can play an 
important role in assisting migrants to integrate into society. Nevertheless, he 
presents historical evidence for his argument that migration leads to conflict in 
migrant receiving areas. This evidence includes violence towards migrants from 
the Great Plains in California in the 1930s, tensions between Bangladeshi internal 
migrants and residents leading to an insurgency in the 1980s, as well as violence 
between migrants from Bangladesh and residents in India, also in the 1980s. 
Furthermore, he argues that environmental migrants from El Salvador in Honduras 
caused a war between the two countries. Reuveny goes on to argue that these 
conflicts occur in migrant receiving areas if migration decisions are linked to 
environmental problems or not. Yet, he fears that climate change is likely to 
increase the scope and the speed of migration flows, forcing many people to 
migrate quickly. This in turn would affect receiving areas as they would be unable 
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to cope with the increased number of migrants in a short time, especially in less 
developed countries where people rely on the environment for their livelihoods 
(Reuveny 2007).  
 
However, Raleigh and Urdal (2007) argue that the assumption that environmental 
stressors generally lead to conflict is not supported by empirical evidence, which 
also questions the above link between the environment, conflict, and migration. As 
opposed to Reuveny’s (2007) analysis, which uses historical examples based on 
aggregate date at the state level, Raleigh and Urdal base their conclusions on data 
at the local level, considering geographic rather than political units of analysis. 
They acknowledge that their statistical analysis found some influence of 
demographic and environmental factors on conflict risk, but they argue that these 
effects are outweighed by economic and political factors. They summarise that 
“While population growth and density are associated with increased risks [of violent 
conflict], the effects of land degradation and water scarcity are weak, negligible or 
insignificant” (Raleigh and Urdal 2007:674). 
 
A recent report published by the International Peace Academy also argues that the 
relationship between climate change and conflict on its own is weak, but that mass 
migration can be seen as the linking element (Gleditsch et al. 2007). The authors 
present two different scenarios: 1) environmental stress in the sending area leads 
to migration and then conflict in the receiving area, and 2) environmental stress 
leads to conflict in the sending area, migration, and again conflict in the receiving 
area (Gleditsch et al. 2007). In a report for the Norwegian Refugee Council, 
Kolmannskog (2008) stresses the role of environmental conflict in forced migration. 
He estimates that environmental conflicts over scarce resources caused by sudden 
events such as floods and hurricanes but also by the degradation of water 
resources can be a reason for forced migration. Yet, the potential for environmental 
conflicts should be seen in the context of historical, social, and political factors. On 
the other hand, migration followed by a competition of local residents and migrants 
over scarce resources, may in itself trigger violent conflicts at transit or destination 
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areas. Yet, as McLeman (2011) stresses, conflict can arise over a lack of resources 
(scarcity–conflict scenario) but also over an abundance of resources (abundance–
competition scenario). In the latter scenario, violent conflicts emerge because 
geographically concentrated resources, such as diamonds or oil, enable those who 
have access to them to control others who do not have access. Fairhead (2004) 
argues that in Africa at least, the latter have historically been far more significant 
than the former. 
 
In another paper by Kolmannskog (2009) for the UNHCR, the author uses case 
studies in Somalia and Burundi, two countries which are or were recently involved 
in armed conflict and civil war, to illustrate the different ways in which climate 
change, conflict, and migration can be linked. In Somalia, drought, population 
growth and concentration in some areas of the country in combination with civil war 
caused disruptions to the traditional migratory patterns of pastoralists, who are the 
majority of the population. As a consequence, people were forced to stay in areas, 
where they could not maintain their herds. Many of them lost their animals and 
subsequently migrated to the big cities to join the urban poor. Yet in Burundi, where 
the majority of the population are farmers, major problems arise out of droughts in 
combination with land scarcity and subsequent violent conflicts over land. While 
migration historically is an adaptation strategy in Burundi, many people have 
become too poor to migrate and do not have a place to go to. Thus, the 
relationship between climate stressors, conflict, and migration is complex and 
policy responses are therefore likely to be difficult to conceptualise. Yet, as 
McLeman (2011) stresses, policy responses have the potential to play an important 
role in preventing climatic stressors from translating into motives for violent conflict. 
 
2.3.3 Migration and international climate protection mechanisms 
As the previous sections showed, the link between climate change, migration, and 
development and the link between climate change, migration, and conflict are 
important areas of policy interest. As the summarized policy papers show, this 
interest has emerged in organisations interested in diverse issues including 
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environment, development, human security, human rights, and migration. Most 
recently the international climate change community has become interested in 
including migration into their agenda. In 2009, the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC) published two reports. The first one was a compilation of points 
to be integrated into the successor-agreement to the Kyoto Protocol and was 
considered at the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009. The report 
suggested that more research into the nature of climate change related moves was 
needed as well as more research into the humanitarian consequences of climate 
change in general. Furthermore, it stressed that migration can be an undesirable 
consequence of climate change but also an adaptation strategy and that this 
should be recognised in international policies. In this context, the report argued that 
there is also a need for national adaptation plans to go beyond what is said in 
existing NAPAs. The second report stressed that the nexus between climate 
change and migration is non-linear but that nonetheless a relationship exists. 
Therefore, policies should 1) consider alternative protection schemes for displaced 
people who do not fall under the 1951 Refugee Convention; 2) continue the policy 
dialogue about the nexus between climate change and migration; 3) ensure 
cohesion between existing policies in the field of mitigation, adaptation, 
humanitarian responses, and development; and 4) include forced displacement 
into existing risk management and adaptation schemes, also in all NAPAs.  
 
McLeman (2011) argues that reducing the potential for population displacement as 
a consequence of climate change is to a large extent linked to general efforts of 
agreeing on international agreements to decrease GHG emissions. Yet, he says 
that these efforts are currently stalled as a consequence of the non-conclusive and 
sometimes contradictory statements issued after the Climate Change Summit in 
Cancun. Furthermore, he observes a decreasing interest in climate change policies 
among governments and the general public due to the errors that were found in the 
2007 IPCC Assessment Report and because of the shift in policy priorities after the 
2008 financial crisis (McLeman 2011). However, considerations of migration as an 
aspect that might be linked to climate change have recently been increasing. While 
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the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1998) only contained a paragraph about the need for 
climate change adaptation and did not mention migration, the follow up document 
of COP16, which took place in Cancun, Mexico in December 2010, acknowledges 
migration as an adaptation strategy in its ‘Cancun Adaptation Framework’. The 
report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention (UNFCCC 2010), which includes this framework, gives advice on how 
member states could enhance climate change adaptation. One of the suggestions 
proposes “measures to enhance understanding, coordination, and cooperation with 
regard to climate change induced displacement, migration, and planned relocation, 
where appropriate, at national, regional, and international levels” (UNFCCC 
2010:3). The involvement of migration into international climate change 
negotiations was a contribution by several organizations concerned with migration 
issues, such as the IOM, the UNHCR, the UNU, and OCHA (Stal and Warner 
2009). These organizations are operating under the name of the Climate Change, 
Environment and Migration Alliance (CCEMA)8, which organized side events during 
COP15 in Copenhagen, Denmark and during COP16 in Cancun, Mexico. 
 
2.4 Empirical studies into the environment/climate change-migration nexus 
The previous sections demonstrated that conceptual and policy interest in the 
environment and migration is long-standing and has surged in recent years. This 
section suggests that the growing theoretical and policy interest in the nexus 
between environmental or climate-related stressors has not been followed at the 
same pace by empirical research into this relationship. Nevertheless, the amount 
of empirical studies into environment-migration linkages has also been growing to 
some extent over recent years. Although such studies are not conclusive, results 
so far reinforce the point that the link between climate change and migration is very 
complex, and different forms of migration will likely be influenced in different ways 
by climatic stressors.  
 
                                                 
8
 See: http://www.ccema-portal.org 
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One conclusion from these empirical studies is that there seems to be a difference 
between the effects of slow onset and sudden impact environmental stressors on 
migratory behaviour. For example, Halliday (2006) found in a panel study for El 
Salvador that migration into the USA increased after agricultural shocks such as 
the loss of harvest and livestock, whereas US migration decreased after a major 
earthquake in 2001. Obviously, earthquakes are not a consequence of climate 
change, and the loss of harvest or livestock is not necessarily linked to a lack of 
rainfall. However, what is interesting here is the distinction between a relatively 
slow onset event, such as the loss of a harvest over the agricultural cycle, and a 
sudden disaster that destroys many people’s livelihoods within a few minutes, and 
their opposed effects on international migration flows. Thus, it is conceivable that 
climate change, which is likely to cause slow onset as well as sudden impact 
environmental stressors, will affect migratory behaviour in different ways.  
 
Currently, three major environmental stressors, the effects of which are likely to be 
exacerbated by climate change, can be observed: droughts, hurricanes, and 
floods. Two more, sea level rise and the melting of glaciers, have also been cited 
as likely to affect migration. They are not considered here as their effect is not 
currently measurable. While low lying island states such as Tuvalu are the most 
prominent example for populations at risk for climate change related displacement 
(Gemenne 2010a), Mortreux and Barnett (2009) challenge this assumption by 
analysing people’s perceptions of climate stressors. They conclude that climate 
change is not perceived as a threat to people’s livelihoods and less as a driver of 
migration in Tuvalu. The effects of melting glaciers on migration are equally 
contested. Some cases of forced migration due to melting ice in Alaska have been 
analysed by Bronen (2008). On the other hand McLeman (2011) states that melting 
ice has not yet been a reason for migration out of the arctic, on the contrary melting 
ice might attract migrants from the south to the north as passing by ship through 
ice-free water becomes easier, and natural resources might become accessible as 
a consequence of the melting ice. Thus, the following sections are limited to 
analysing the effects of droughts, hurricanes, and floods on migration, respectively.  
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2.4.1 Drought and migration 
Beyond the historical and archaeological literature, which is not covered here, one 
of the best-known historical examples, in which environmental stress was followed 
by large migration movements is the Dust Bowl in the USA in the 1930s. After a 
series of droughts and dust storms as a consequence of soil erosion, many 
farmers in the Great Plains, mainly in the state of Oklahoma, lost their harvests and 
livelihoods. Large numbers went in search of work to California and other regions 
in the USA. However, although environmental stress was certainly one of the most 
important reasons for these moves, migration from this region had already started 
before the droughts occurred as a consequence of the overall economic and 
financial problems in the USA at the end of the 1920s. Furthermore, those who 
migrated were likely to have pre-existing social connections in California, and 
possessed the required agricultural skills to find work at the destination. Also, they 
often did not possess any farmland or lost it for financial reasons, so that the bonds 
to their land were not that strong anymore (McLeman 2006). 
 
The most prominent contemporary example of the link between drought and 
migration is the Sahel, where the majority of studies into the relationship between 
environmental stressors and migration are set. The historical importance of 
migration as one strategy to adapt to environmental problems in this region should 
be acknowledged. Rain (1999) and Brown (2007) illustrate the seasonal process of 
migrating to nearby agglomerations during times of environmental hardship, which 
among the people in the Sahel is known as “eating the dry season”. Also, the 
seasonal migration of pastoralists traditionally reflects differences in the timing of 
the rainy season as a consequence of climatic variability (Primavera 2005). 
 
One of the first studies to formally examine the relationship between drought and 
migration in the Sahel is Findley’s (1994) research into migration from rural Mali 
during the 1983-1985 drought. She found that long-distance migration – notably of 
male household members – to France decreased. This can be explained by the 
fact that food scarcity leading to increased prices forced people to spend more 
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money on their basic needs. Therefore, they could not afford to invest in migration 
any more. At the same time, short-distance migration to larger agglomerations 
increased because women and children left in search of work to contribute to 
household incomes. In addition, this strategy reduced the number of persons in a 
household and thus the amount of food needed.  
 
Under the comparable circumstances of the 1980s drought in the Sahel, Ezra and 
Kiros (2001) analysed rural out-migration in the drought prone areas of Ethiopia. 
Almost 80% of the people moved to other rural areas. The authors do not specify if 
these moves involved border crossings or not, but it is not likely that long distances 
were covered as the destination of a long distance move is usually a bigger 
agglomeration. Contrary to their expectations, Ezra and Kiros found that the 
percentage of people who indicated reasons for moving that might be related to 
drought9 was very low. Most migration was caused by family formation after 
marriage. A multilevel analysis of their survey data, however, revealed that, next to 
age and gender, the availability of food at the community level was identified as a 
major factor that determined out-migration. 
 
Haug (2002) welcomes the classification of pastoralists in northern Sudan, whose 
livelihoods became affected by the mid-1980s drought, as ‘environmental 
refugees’. Nevertheless, she acknowledges that: 
 
“At the same time, mobility and different kinds of migration have always been part 
of the Hawaweer’s livelihood strategy. In addition, not all the Hawaweer perceived 
the situation as forced. Some people chose to stay behind. Among these, some 
were in a situation where migration was impossible because they did not have 
access to the necessary number of animals needed for migration. For them, the 
reason for staying was not because they chose to but because they were forced to” 
(Haug 2002:76). 
 
Haug thus stresses that the consequences drought has upon livelihood decisions, 
including migration, largely depend on the socioeconomic situation of the people 
                                                 
9
 These reasons are ‘drought’, ‘shortage of land’ and ‘to look for work’. 
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concerned. Accordingly, Meze-Hausken (2004) points out that vulnerability to 
drought alone does not cause migration. In her study in northern Ethiopia, in which 
she surveyed more than 100 farmers, she found that “people in marginal regions 
have developed a great variety of adaptation mechanisms, which strengthen their 
ability to cope with both, slow climatic changes and extreme climatic events” 
(Meze-Hausken 2004:abstract).  
 
Henry et al. (2004) investigated the effect of changing rainfall patterns on migration 
in Burkina Faso using event history analysis. They found no relationship between 
changing rainfall patterns and migration in general when they did not distinguish 
between different types of migration by destination and duration. Individual 
characteristics of people, such as level of education, type of activity involved in, 
and belonging to a particular ethnic group seemed to be the deciding factors for 
migration. Once split up between different types of migration, the study reveals that 
people living in areas with scarce rainfall are much more likely to engage in short 
distance moves than people living in other regions. However, the number of 
migrants does not increase after periods of minimum rainfall in the dryer regions. 
The fundamental conclusion that the authors draw from their findings is that: “long-
term migrations seem to be less related to environmental conditions than short-
term moves...” (Henry et al. 2004:455).  
 
These results are partially confirmed by Gray and Mueller’s (forthcoming) research 
into the effects of environmental stressors on migration in Ethiopia using event 
history analysis based on longitudinal household data. They found that drought 
increases male mobility, especially among the landless poor moving in search of 
work. On the other hand, mobility of women decreases, which the authors link to 
the fact that during times of drought followed by financial hardship, no resources 
are available for marriage or the formation of new households. Gray and Mueller 
(forthcoming) conclude that, under certain circumstances drought increases 
mobility but that ability to migrate remains selective, also in the context of 
environmental pressure on people’s livelihoods. 
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Bassett and Turner (2007) challenge the common assumption that Fulbe herders in 
the Sudano-Sahelian zone are migrating with their herds to the south to escape 
increasing periods of drought in the north. Instead, they show that two new forms 
of migration have developed among the Fulbe as a consequence of droughts. 
Many Fulbe had to sell their livestock and went to the south as labour migrants. 
Moving south with their livestock would have been difficult because most of them 
do not possess any social networks that would protect their cattle from being 
stolen. For the same reason, others refrained from moving south with their cattle in 
one single move to stay there. Instead, they developed a strategy of gradually 
moving south by extending their grazing areas bit by bit. This enabled them to 
create networks of friendships and create the protection they needed to move with 
their cattle. As the examples in the Sahel have shown, drought can either increase 
or decrease migration, but it can also create new forms of migration that were 
uncommon among a group of people before.  
 
The EACH-FOR project funded by the EU is one of the largest efforts to collect 
empirical evidence on climate change and migration in recent decades, involving 
23 case studies. It included three case studies in Africa about drought and 
migration, which show to some extent contradictory results. Afifi (2009) 
summarises the result of his study in Niger: “it is obvious that environmental 
degradation does have a considerable impact on migration patterns in Niger“ (Afifi 
2009:25). Bleibaum (2009) in her Senegal study also concludes that most of the 
migrants she interviewed were forced to migrate because of environmental 
conditions, poverty, and the lack of institutional support. Van der Geest (2009), on 
the other hand, comes to a more complex conclusion for his study in Ghana. He 
investigated the drivers of north-south migration within the country and found that 
in the interviews most of the migrants actually mentioned adverse environmental 
conditions as a cause of their migration decision. However, an analysis of macro 
level data showed that during the droughts in the Sahel during the 1970s and 
1980s, fewer people moved south and more migrants returned from the south to 
the north of the country. Yet, the same study shows that “migration propensities are 
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higher in districts with more scarcity of natural resources, especially in those with 
low annual rainfall, and with higher rural population densities that results [sic!] in 
farmland scarcity” (Jäger et al. 2009:47). 
 
Another EACH-FOR study for Spain shows how the economic situation of a region 
is more important for its migratory situation than its actual environmental 
conditions. The region around Almería became one of the major migrant sending 
areas in Spain in the 1960s, as a consequence of increasing droughts, and in 
combination with the poverty and economic underdevelopment of the region. 
However, due to capital investment, EU subsidies, the development of 
technologies to overcome the problems of water shortage, and the access to new 
markets for the produce, Almería transformed from a migrant sending to a migrant 
receiving region (Fermin 2009). 
 
Two studies into the relationship between decreasing precipitation and international 
migration in Mexico produced contradictory results. Research by Munshi (2003) 
found a negative relationship between rainfall and migration in south west Mexico 
because more people move to the USA when a decrease in rainfall endangers their 
harvests. However, an analysis of migration and precipitation data in Zacatecas 
and Durango showed a positive relationship between rainfall and migration in the 
two states, suggesting that the number of US migrants decreases in times of dryer 
weather (Kniveton et al. 2008).  
 
2.4.2 Tropical cyclones and migration 
The effects of cyclones on migration also seem to depend on the socio-economic 
context before and after the disaster. Paul (2005) investigated the effects of a 
tornado on migratory behaviour in two village communities in north-central 
Bangladesh. He used an approach that combined secondary data on household 
statistics with the results of a survey he conducted himself and some interviews 
with local officials and NGOs. The major finding of his study is that the 2004 
tornado in the region did not cause higher rates of out-migration in the affected 
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villages. His conclusion is thus, that there was no link between the tornado and 
migratory behaviour at all. Paul argues that almost no outmigration occurred 
because of the efficiency of disaster aid.  
 
An earlier study by Smith and McCarty (1996) looked into the demographic 
consequences of Hurricane Andrew that hit parts of Florida in 1994. Smith and 
McCarty surveyed inhabitants of south and north Dade County and asked first 
about their own, but also about their neighbours’ reactions to the hurricane. They 
found that people who lived in the wealthier southern part of the county migrated in 
much larger numbers than people who lived in the northern, poorer part. The 
question of whether this was caused by the fact that the south was more severely 
affected or by the distribution of wealth in the population is left unanswered in the 
study. In general, Smith and McCarty conclude that: “many of the moves caused by 
Hurricane Andrew were short-lived, others lasted for many months, and some were 
permanent” (Smith and McCarty 1996:274). 
 
Some studies investigating the consequences of hurricane Katrina that hit parts of 
the US states of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and destroyed the city of 
New Orleans in 2005 have been conducted. They are mostly concerned with 
changes in the demographic patterns after the hurricane and the nature of return 
migration (Elliott and Pais 2006, Falk et al. 2006, Landry et al. 2007), while few 
studies analyse outmigration patterns after the hurricane. Landry et al. (2007:2) 
only state that following the evacuation order “in New Orleans, 70,000 people 
remained, some by choice, but most without means of escape”. It seems that it 
was mainly the poorer black residents of the city who were unable to leave (Landry 
et al. 2007). Gemenne (2010b) criticises this simplistic victimisation of the poor and 
the black residents of New Orleans, which was mainly transferred by the media. He 
suggests that the impact of hurricane Katrina should instead be analysed in the 
context of the social vulnerability of the population of New Orleans, which already 
existed before the disaster. He stresses the social inequality between the different 
areas but also between the social segments of the city and points out that some 
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segments were more affected by the hurricane than others. The most affected 
parts of the population were also those in which many people could not evacuate, 
and those who did leave, were disadvantaged when they wanted to return and 
rebuild their part of the city. The characteristics of these disadvantaged population 
segments are: “poor, black, female, old, renters, and in poor medical condition” 
(Gemenne 2010b:29). Yet, Gemenne (2010b) also points out that whether people 
owned a car and had friends or relatives to stay with outside of the city determined 
if people were able to evacuate. This private evacuation usually worked quite well, 
while those who depended on transportation and shelter provided by the 
government were often left behind. 
 
The EACH-FOR project also included some research into the effects of hurricanes 
on migration. Alscher's (2009a) study on the island of Hispaniola showed the 
importance of economic and political differences for the vulnerability of people. He 
says that for example hurricane Jeanne in 2004 caused 3,000 deaths in Haiti but 
only 19 in the Dominican Republic. In the Mexican state of Chiapas, one of the 
poorest states of the country, Alscher (2009b) identified hurricanes as a trigger for 
outmigration because they are aggravating the existing agricultural problems. 
 
2.4.3 Floods and Migration  
Although, in policy papers and in the media, the effects of floods on outmigration 
from low lying deltas are often quoted as the most obvious climate stressor that 
might displace people, empirical evidence on this relationship is scarce. The 
EACH-FOR project included studies on floods and migration in Bangladesh, 
Vietnam, Tajikistan, Mozambique, Argentina, and Ecuador, which are considered in 
this section. 
 
In a study in Bangladesh, Poncelet (2009) stresses that many people depend on 
the river for their livelihoods and that, consequently, they have learned how to live 
with floods. This echoes what was said in studies about droughts in the Sahel. 
Nevertheless, Poncelet (2009) argues that climate change is exacerbating the 
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frequency and intensity of floods. One of her most important findings is that 
migration patterns related to floods are complex and that people who suffer from 
the same livelihood stressors make use of migration as a coping strategy in 
different ways, which are not specified in the report. Second, while migration by 
most people is considered the most important livelihood strategy after a flood, 
some people cannot migrate because they lack the necessary resources, others 
who migrate struggle to find employment at their destinations, so that migration 
projects are not always considered successful (Poncelet 2009). 
 
In Vietnam, Dun (2009) analysed the effects of floods on migration. She explains 
that regular flooding of the Mekong delta provides its inhabitants with fertile land, 
so that 40% of Vietnam’s cultivated land is concentrated in this area, known as the 
rice bowl. Yet, variations in flood levels and the annual distribution of floods have 
become problematic for people living in the delta region. Dun (2009) found several 
forms of migration as a response to this increased variability in flooding patterns. 
Some people migrate during the flooding season and return when it is over. 
However, successive events of strong and destructive flooding can force rice 
farmers who depend on their land for their livelihoods to permanently abandon their 
farmland. In addition, the resettlement of people from vulnerable zones has 
become part of the government’s flood management strategy (Dun 2009). 
 
In a third case study, Stal (2009) undertook research into the effects of floods, 
tropical cyclones, and droughts on migration in Mozambique. He found that two 
tropical cyclones in 2000 and 2007 did not displace many people because the 
majority of the affected population managed to rebuild their houses after the storm. 
Yet, floods in the Zambezi River Valley displaced a large number of people 
because they destroyed not only peoples’ houses but also their farmland and 
therefore deprived them from their major means of livelihood. As a consequence, 
local movement away from the river valley is becoming more and more permanent, 
while migration to cities or international migration cannot be observed on a large 
scale yet (Stal 2009). 
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In their studies in Argentina (Álvarez Gila et al. 2009a) and Ecuador, (Álvarez Gila 
et al. 2009b) showed different results regarding the effects of floods on migration in 
each country. In Argentina they identified economic reasons as the most important 
drivers of migration and did not find a relationship between environmental stressors 
and migratory behaviour for both international and internal moves. Only short 
distance moves were to a certain extent affected by the environment (Álvarez Gila 
et al. 2009a). However, in Ecuador, they found that migration is an important 
coping strategy after environmental stressors such as floods occurred. Most 
importantly, however, they show that the El Niño event of 1997-1998 which brought 
about larger and more harmful floods in the coastal regions, in addition to an 
economic and financial crisis in the region, entailed new migration flows from 
Ecuador to Europe, mainly to Spain (Álvarez Gila et al. 2009b). 
 
While floods are often associated with low lying deltas or river valleys, floods in 
mountain regions can also be an important environmental stressor as Khakimov 
and Mahmadbekov (2009) found in Tajikistan. Yet, they conclude that 
environmental stressors in that region are not a driver of migration at the moment 
(Khakimov and Mahmadbekov 2009). Finally, outside the context of the EACH-
FOR project, Hoermann et al. (2010), in a study on labour migration and 
remittances in the Hindu Kush-Himalaya region, found that droughts and floods 
equally impact on agricultural food security, which is a major element in migration 
decisions.  
 
2.5 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of policy debates and empirical results 
regarding the nexus between environmental and climate related stressors and 
migration. It shows that the scientific and policy interest in the subject has grown 
and shifted from an interest in linkages between environmental degradation and 
migration to an interest in linkages between climate change and migration. Many 
policy papers are still concerned with finding a protective mechanism for people 
displaced by climate stressors and with predictions of numbers. The role of 
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migration in the context of climate change and conflict in general is perceived 
negatively. Nonetheless, there is growing acknowledgement of the rising role of 
migration as an adaptation strategy rather than a failure to adapt. As evidence by 
the Cancun Adaptation Framework10 has suggested, there is a need to include 
migration in considerations about development policies under future climate 
change. There also remains some controversy about the importance of linkages 
between the environment, migration and conflict. Meanwhile, all studies agree that 
historical, social, and political factors are important elements, which determine if 
and to what extent migration related to environmental stressors leads to conflicts or 
not.  
 
Yet, despite this growing policy interest, there remain no reliable estimates of the 
number of people who are likely to become displaced because of climate change. 
This causes dissent about the circumstances under which climate change is 
expected to impact on migration. It remains unclear to what extent factors such as 
poverty, scarcity of natural resources, and violent conflicts influence the nexus 
between environmental stressors and migration. Much more empirical evidence is 
therefore needed. Idean Salehyan summarises the issue: “The link between 
climate change and migration has [...] suffered from a lack of systematic evidence 
in support of sweeping claims” (Salehyan 2005:2).  
 
As the last part of the chapter showed, empirical evidence so far is also scarce. 
The results are highly context-specific and show that the link between climate 
change and migration is complex and not linear and that neither climate shocks 
and stresses nor migration are uniform phenomena. Meanwhile, although the foci 
and the research designs of existing empirical studies vary, two general results can 
be identified so far. First, climate stressors seem to cause an increase in the 
number of people who engage in short-term rural to rural types of migration. On the 
other hand, they seem not to affect, or even decrease international, long-distance 
moves. Second, the conceptualisation of vulnerable people as helpless victims 
                                                 
10
 http://unfccc.int/adaptation/cancun_adaptation_framework/items/5852.php 
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who have to flee the consequences of climate stressors seems to be false. 
Depending on their socioeconomic position, people might have the choice between 
a variety of coping strategies, including migration. Yet, other people might be too 
poor to migrate at all, meaning that migration is as unlikely to be a way of escaping 
their situation as any other strategy. Thus some people might be forced to migrate 
while others might be forced to stay as a consequence of climate change. 
 
The most important limitation of most of the empirical studies so far is that, as they 
only analyse the effect of one type of environmental stressor on migration, they do 
not provide the basis for any comparison between different types of environmental 
shocks or stresses. Furthermore, most existing research is concerned with the 
effects of current environmental problems on migration, which can only to some 
extent be used as a proxy for the effects of future climate change on migration. Yet, 
policy interest in climate change-migration linkages as opposed to environment- 
migration linkages is growing. Therefore, alternative methodological approaches 
are needed to design empirical research that responds to current policy needs. The 
next chapter will introduce some ideas about how these approaches might be 
designed and it will discuss the most appropriate conceptual approach to 
answering the research questions of this thesis.  
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Chapter 3: A new conceptual approach to climate change and migration 
The previous chapter illustrated the scientific and policy interest in climate change-
migration linkages, which demands more empirical evidence to answer the 
question how climate change is likely to affect migration in the future. This chapter 
argues that the lack of a convincing conceptual and methodological approach for 
this kind of empirical research is a major impediment to obtaining empirical results 
suited to inform policies. Existing approaches fail to acknowledge the complexity of 
all factors involved in the climate change-migration nexus. This chapter starts with 
an analysis of the complexity of different manifestations of climate change and its 
effects on people’s livelihoods. The second part of the chapter analyses the 
complexity of migration decisions, focusing on the multi-causality of migration, 
acknowledged in different migration theories and approaches explaining migratory 
behaviour. The third part of the chapter argues that migration might be one among 
many responses to external shocks and stresses, and that household’s decision-
making processes in the context of risk are influenced by a variety of factors. 
Finally, the chapter develops an alternative conceptual approach for studying 
climate change-migration linkages, based on the argument that climate change as 
well as people's migration decisions and responses to risk are complex and 
context-specific processes. 
 
3.1 The complexity of climate change 
As the previous chapter showed, a growing amount of recent publications to 
various extents acknowledge the complexity of the nexus between climate change 
and migration. Yet, research into the subject so far failed to consider the complexity 
of climate change and most empirical studies used some form of a local weather 
extreme as a proxy for climate change. However, research using a present or past 
local climate stressor as a proxy for future climate change ignores the difference 
between climatic variability and climate change, as well as the fact that the 
consequences of climate change are likely to occur at the global and at the local 
level. Furthermore, research into the social consequences of climate change, 
including its effects on migratory behaviour, needs to take the uncertainty of 
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climate change predictions and of predictions of people’s future behaviour in 
response to changing climatic conditions into account. 
 
3.1.1 Climate variability and climate change 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change defines ‘climate 
change’ as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human 
activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in 
addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods” 
(UNFCCC 1992:3). A similar but more concrete definition of climate change in the 
Working Group II Report of the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) also stresses that climate 
change refers to changes to the mean or to the variability patterns of the state of 
the climate, which persist over an extended period of time, mainly decades or 
longer. These changes need to be identifiable by statistical tests (Solomon et al. 
2007) or as the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) write about climate 
change11: “In statistical terminology, the curve of the frequency distribution 
representing the probability of specific meteorological events occurring is 
changed”. 
 
Furthermore, the IPCC report distinguishes between internal processes and 
external forcings causing changes to the climate. Atmospheric (internal) processes 
cause a natural variability of the climate system, including variations in 
temperature, precipitation, but also extreme events. In contrast, external 
phenomena include natural disturbances, such as changes to solar radiation and 
volcanism, but also anthropogenic impacts leading to long term changes of the 
climate system (Solomon et al. 2007). 
 
The distinction between natural climate variability and climate change is important 
for researching its impact on migration. Natural climate variability, caused by 
                                                 
11 
http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/wcp/ccl/faqs.html 
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atmospheric processes and natural external phenomena, has affected migration 
patterns for generations. One of the well-known examples is the seasonal labour 
migration in the Sahel during or after droughts (Rain 1999). McLeman and Hunter 
(2010) argue that research into this kind of historical and present patterns of 
climate-migration linkages can be helpful for predicting the effects of future climate 
change on migration patterns. Yet, they also acknowledge the limitations to this 
approach: 
 
“While the specific details of the case examples [...] may not capture the full range 
of possible manifestations of anthropogenic climate change to come, we are 
nonetheless able to identify from them some general dimensions of environmental 
migration that are useful when considering how migration decisions and processes 
unfold in response to conditions and events that may become more common or 
widespread as a result of anthropogenic climate change in coming decades” 
(McLeman and Hunter 2010:454). 
 
Historical and present examples can provide some insights into the future effects of 
climate change on migration, when trying to predict people’s response to different 
types of climate related shocks and stresses, such as droughts, hurricanes or 
floods. Yet, predicted effects of climate change are complex and not limited to 
simple increases of the intensity and frequency of already existing climate 
stressors. Historic examples that parallel these complex consequences of 
expected future climate change do not exist. Therefore, climate change might or 
might not lead to completely new impacts on existing migration patterns, which 
cannot be predicted by only using analogues to past events.  
 
3.1.2 Key elements of climate change relevant to human migration 
The consequences of climate change are thus predicted to be complex and to go 
beyond worsening local weather conditions. Nevertheless, part of the impact of 
climate change on future migration patterns is likely to be caused by the direct 
consequences of climate change such as changing temperature patterns, sea level 
rise, changing precipitation patterns, and extreme weather events. The 2011 Final 
Project Report of the Foresight Project on International Dimensions of Climate 
Change summarises these predicted changes, which are presented in table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Key elements of climate change 
Temperature  Up to about 2040, mean global temperatures 
are projected to increase by approximately 1.3-
1.7°C across the world (relative to the 1981-
1999 global average) under the three 
scenarios12. 
 All regions are expected to experience an 
increase in extreme high temperature events. 
 By 2080, mean global temperatures are 
projected to be around 3.5°C higher than the 
1981-1999 average for the medium emissions 
scenario, and around 1.5°C for the aggressive 
mitigation scenario. 
Sea level rise  Significant increases in sea level are expected 
in many coastal areas by the 2040s. 
 By 2100, average sea level may rise by 0.23-
0.43m under the medium emissions scenario. 
 There will be regional variation in sea level rise. 
Precipitation  Less precipitation in parts of the Amazon 
region, southern Africa and Southeast Asia, and 
more in the high latitudes of Northern America, 
Europe and Central and North Asia is projected 
by the 2040s. 
 By the 2040s, in some regions, annual mean 
precipitation could be 500 mm more or less 
than today. 
Extreme weather events 
(floods, droughts, storms) 
 By 2100, under the medium emissions 
scenario, the Amazon region and equatorial 
West Africa may be almost constantly under 
moderate drought conditions, and frequent 
droughts may occur in the western 
Mediterranean.  
 Severe tropical cyclones may become more 
intense in the future with stronger winds and 
heavier rainfall. 
Source: Foresight International Dimensions of Climate Change Final Project Report (2011) 
 
The 2007 IPCC report projected continuing increases of the global mean surface 
air temperature (SAT) for the 21st century. For the first part of the 21st century, 
                                                 
12 
The Foresight International Dimensions of Climate Change Final Project Report (2011) refers to 
three different emission scenarios: high emissions, medium emissions and aggressive mitigation. 
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existing models roughly agree on the rate of warming, expecting an average 
warming of 0.64°C to 0.69°C for the time period from 2011 to 2030 compared to 
the time period from 1980 to 1999. By mid-century, the magnitude of the projected 
warming rate depends to a large extent on the scenario, varying between expected 
temperature increases of 1.3°C to 1.8°C, while by the late 21st century differences 
between the scenarios become even larger (Solomon et al. 2007). A more recent 
report by the Pew Center (2009) analyses evidence on expected temperature 
increases published after the 2007 IPCC report. It summarises that due to higher 
than expected emission levels at the beginning of the 21st century, expected global 
SAT temperatures for the end of the 21st century are likely to be much higher than 
the projected temperatures by the same model based on more conservative 
emission levels. One climate model showed more than twice as much warming 
using the corrected emission level resulting in an expected temperature increase of 
5.2°C compared to 2.4°C until the end of the 21
st
 century (Pew Center 2009). 
Geographical patterns of global warming show that temperature increases are 
projected to be highest over land and at high northern latitudes and lower over the 
southern oceans and over the North Atlantic. Furthermore, the report considers it 
as highly likely that heat waves will be more intense, more frequent, and longer 
lasting, while cold episodes are projected to decrease significantly, including 
decreases of frost days (Solomon et al. 2007). In an updated review of 
developments since the 2007 IPCC report, Good et al. (2010) specify that extreme 
daily maximum and minimum temperatures have increased by 1°C to 3°C since 
1950, depending on the region. They also indicate that anthropogenic effects have 
doubled the risk of summers as warm as in the year 2003 and that “by the 2040s 
summers over southern England could be at least as warm as 2003 on average 
50% of the time” (Good et al. 2010:13). 
 
On a global scale, sea levels were projected to rise by 20 cm to 60 cm until the end 
of the 21st century, according to the 2007 IPCC report (Solomon et al. 2007). More 
recent studies, however, indicate that the potential for a much higher rise between 
0.5 and 2 metres exists, which might to a large extent be caused by the melting of 
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the Greenland and Antarctic land ice sheets (Pew Center 2009). Yet, other studies 
conclude that there is a low probability of sea level rise significantly higher than 
one metre occurring, while this possibility cannot be completely ruled out (Good et 
al. 2010). Furthermore, there is a potential for abrupt large-scale sea level rise, 
potentially caused by the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet. Also, more 
recent studies found that the sea level is likely to rise higher at the Atlantic and 
Pacific coasts of the USA than in other parts of the world (Pew Center 2009). 
 
The 2007 IPCC report projected increases in precipitation in high latitudes as well 
as in tropical regions, and decreases in precipitation in subtropical regions, which 
in many cases would mean that it might rain less in already dry areas, while it 
might rain more in currently wet areas (Solomon et al. 2007). Recent research 
suggests that precipitation reductions in dry areas of the world are likely to be 
irreversible. It indicates that, for example, a reduction in rainfall of 15-20% is 
projected for the south-western United States, which would make the region dryer 
than it was during the ‘Dust Bowl’ in the 1930s (Good et al. 2010). 
 
These predicted changes to temperature and precipitation patterns also increase 
the risk of more frequent and more severe droughts caused by a decline in 
average rainfall in already dry regions. Additionally, according to the 2007 IPCC 
report, the annual distribution of rainfall is likely to change so that increasingly long 
periods of time without rainfall might be interrupted by heavy rainfalls during a short 
time of the year (Solomon et al. 2007). On the other hand, more and heavier 
rainfall, as predicted for other areas of the world, might lead to an increased risk of 
floods. Human-caused increases of sea surface temperatures are projected to 
cause more intense hurricanes (Good et al. 2010), while evidence about changes 
to the frequency of hurricanes is less clear (Solomon et al. 2007). 
 
3.1.3 Global and local climate effects 
The predicted key elements of climate change shown in the previous section, 
although projected to occur on a global scale, manifest at the local level where they 
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are perceived as shocks or stresses to people’s livelihoods. They are likely to affect 
people in different ways, directly or by destroying key assets of crucial importance 
for their livelihoods. Fast onset disasters, such as floods and tropical cyclones, as 
well as slow onset changes, such as sea level rise, constitute a direct threat to 
people’s lives and destroy their houses, their belongings and their farmland, on 
which many people rely for their subsistence. Drought, as opposed to floods, 
hurricanes and sea level rise, only impacts on a part of people’s livelihoods, mainly 
by destroying crops and by killing cattle and other farm animals. As Section 2.4 
showed, empirical studies exist into the effects of both the fast onset climate 
stressors, such as floods and tropical storms, and relatively slow onset climate 
stressors such as droughts. This existing research is concerned with the direct and 
indirect local effects of these climate stressors, often using crop failures as a proxy 
for the disaster itself.  
 
Although these studies allow insights into the relationship between local 
environmental problems and migration, they can only to some extent be used to 
predict the impact of future climate change on migration. Climate change is likely to 
have severe impacts on people’s local livelihoods but also on global structures and 
systems, changes to which might also negatively affect the livelihoods of many 
people. It is likely that climate change will affect global food production and 
therefore basic commodity and food prices (Foresight 2011a). Recent research 
constructs a more pessimistic scenario than the 2007 IPCC report regarding the 
decline of crop productivity and finds that the effect of CO2 enrichment is likely to 
be smaller than projected in earlier studies (Good et al. 2010). It is also 
conceivable that energy and water prices, or even the availability of water and 
energy in certain areas of the world, might be negatively affected by climate 
change. These global and indirect effects of climate change are predicted to affect 
people’s livelihoods and should therefore be considered when studying linkages 
between climate change and migration.  
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Most case studies into the relationship between climate change and migration in a 
geographical region look at that area in isolation and do not consider that the 
destination areas of migrants might also become affected by climate change. One 
sector, in which many migrants usually work, is commercial agriculture, which is 
highly susceptible to climate change, also in migrant receiving areas. The 
consequences of climate change might force landowners to stop farming or switch 
to alternative crops or production methods, which might affect the need for migrant 
labour. It is uncertain if workers, who might be made redundant as a consequence, 
will find employment in other sectors, or will be able to move to other destinations 
or not. A decline in the need for migrant workers is particularly conceivable in 
regions dominated by commercial agriculture, such as California, where many 
migrants from Mexico but also from Central America go. As a consequence, areas 
in the world, which are currently receiving many migrant workers, might cease to 
be attractive destinations for migrants in the future. Another potential effect might 
be that areas projected to become more attractive for farming due to changing 
temperature and precipitation patterns or a higher CO2 concentration in the 
atmosphere might become new destinations for future migrants. Yet, the question if 
new migrant destinations might open up as a consequence of climate change 
highly depends on the accessibility of these regions for migrants, i.e. favourable 
migration policies, access to recruiters and emerging networks. Furthermore, 
climate change is likely to affect most current migrant sending regions to some 
extent, so that common destinations might become saturated in the case that 
climate stressors stimulate outmigration from many of these areas.  
 
3.1.4 Uncertainty of climate predictions 
In addition to the general level of uncertainty regarding predictions of the future, 
approaches aiming to predict the future relationship between climate change and 
migration should take uncertainties regarding climate change scenarios as well as 
uncertainties regarding the effects of climate change on migration into account. 
The uncertainty of predicted climate change scenarios has been widely 
acknowledged (Kniveton et al. 2009). It is linked to three different sources, the 
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internal natural climate variability, different climate change outcomes due to 
different scenarios about the level of future emissions, and different climate change 
models which do not present the same results for all areas of projected future 
climate change (Foresight 2011a). Furthermore, so-called tipping points, critical 
thresholds at which major elements of the earth system might collapse, bear the 
danger of abrupt changes, the consequences of which are unpredictable. 
Examples for these tipping points include the melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet, 
the Atlantic thermohaline circulation as well as the Amazon forest dieback 
(Foresight 2011).  
 
In addition to the uncertainty of the physical consequences of climate change, 
there is a high level of uncertainty regarding the question of how people will react 
under scenarios of changing climatic conditions. For instance, although dry 
weather conditions might stimulate certain forms of migration in the Sahel, this 
does not mean that less rainfall will stimulate even more migration. Patterns might 
remain the same, destinations might change, or migration flows in general might 
increase or decrease (Tacoli 2010, Black et al. 2011).  
 
3.2 Migration theories and multi-causality 
The projected consequences of climate change can thus be expected to manifest 
at the global and at the local level and are likely to impact directly and indirectly on 
people’s livelihoods. Furthermore, climate predictions have to be considered highly 
uncertain for various reasons. This complexity of climate change, therefore, needs 
to be taken into account when studying the relationship between climate change 
and migration. The idea that migration decisions are complex processes is 
supported by the number of different theories and approaches trying to explain 
migration. Mainly in the second half of the 20th century, various migration theories 
were developed, which seek the causes of migration at the macro, the micro or the 
meso level. The following paragraphs analyse the different explanations for 
migration put forward in these theories, based on an overview of migration theories 
by Massey et al. (1993). 
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3.2.1 Key theories of migration 
One of the best-known migration theories is the macro theory of neoclassical 
economics. It argues that migration is caused by geographic differences in the 
supply and demand of labour. Workers from poor and low-wage countries are 
attracted by higher wages in capital-rich countries, which are in need of labour. As 
a consequence, the supply of labour in poor countries will decrease, which is 
expected to cause wages to rise in these countries. At the same time, the supply of 
labour in rich countries will increase and wages are expected to fall as a 
consequence. According to the neoclassical economics theory, labour migration 
will continue until an equilibrium in the supply and demand of labour will be 
reached. As opposed to this macro theory, which seeks the causes for migration at 
the state level, the micro theory of neoclassical economics argues that migration is 
a consequence of individual rational actors trying to maximise their income. 
According to this theory, prospective migrants calculate the net benefits of 
migration by taking into account its advantages, such as higher wages and more 
jobs, as well as its disadvantages, such as the material costs for the journey as 
well as the psychological costs related to the migrant’s need to adapt to a new 
environment (Massey et al. 1993). 
 
Unlike the neoclassical economics theories, which understand migration decisions 
as individual processes, the new economics of labour migration theory 
conceptualises migration decisions as collective decisions by families or 
households. According to this approach, the purpose of migration is not only the 
maximisation of individual profit, but more importantly, the spreading of the risk that 
a household will be unable to generate sufficient income. These considerations are 
particularly important in societies in which insurance systems and social security 
and welfare programmes by the government do not exist or are not accessible for 
all (Stark and Bloom 1985). 
 
Two migration theories, the dual labour market theory and the world systems 
theory concentrate on explanations for migration linked to the demand for labour in 
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modern capitalist and industrialised societies. The dual labour market theory 
argues that migration is not caused by push factors in migrant sending regions but 
by pull factors, mainly the need for foreign workers in migrant receiving countries. 
The world systems theory argues that companies from capitalist societies, using 
peripheral non-capitalist societies as sources for labour, land, raw materials, and 
as new consumer markets, created disruptions in these societies, which were 
leading to migration (Massey et al. 1993). 
 
Other theoretical approaches stress that migration is facilitated by migrants’ access 
to networks in destination areas and to institutions, which facilitate the legal or 
illegal crossing of borders. Furthermore, it has been recognised that migration 
processes change societies in sending areas as they are often affecting the 
distribution of income and other forms of capital as well as the organisation, and 
social meaning of work. These changes in turn most often facilitate the migration 
decisions of future migrants. This process is referred to as the cumulative 
causation of migration (Massey et al. 1993). 
 
Thus, a number of approaches try to explain migration from different perspectives, 
which are sometimes complimentary (Massey et al. 1993) but also often 
contradictory (Bakewell 2010). So far, no successful attempts to integrate these 
approaches into one universal theory were made. This lack of a universal theory 
explaining migration decisions has been considered a significant problem because 
researchers often need to combine different theoretical approaches to fit their 
research designs into a theoretical framework. Yet, doubts about the feasibility of 
constructing such a universal migration theory, given the complexity of migration 
and the various approaches trying to explain it, have also been expressed 
(Bakewell 2010).  
 
Bakewell (2010) stresses that the most important divide between migration 
theories is the distinction between explanations at the macro or structural level and 
explanations at the micro level or related to human agency. Some approaches also 
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try to combine explanations at the two levels, based on Giddens' structuration 
theory, which stressed the importance of both the aggregate and the individual 
level for understanding social processes, including migration (Bakewell 2010). 
Meanwhile, Faist (1997) stressed the importance of the meso level and of including 
migration networks and institutions into migration theories.  
 
3.2.2 The relative importance of the environment as a cause of migration 
None of the existing migration theories explicitly acknowledges the potential role 
that the environment might play in migration decisions. This is potentially linked to 
the fact that contemporary migration theories in fact are theories explaining 
international migration (King and Skeldon 2010). Yet as chapter 2.4 showed, 
environmental stressors affect, if at all, internal migration to a much larger extent 
than international migration. However, the fact that environmental stressors are not 
mentioned as causes for migration does not mean that they do not have some 
effect on the economic factors at the micro or the macro level, which some 
migration theories acknowledge as causes for migration. Nevertheless, migration 
research so far did not show much concern for climate change or any kind of 
environmental problem as a cause for migration. While each migration theory 
seeks to explain migration processes differently and stresses different aspects of 
its causality, one of the major common aspects of these theories is the multi-
causality of migration, which has been acknowledged for decades within the field of 
migration research (Kritz et al. 1992, Castles and Miller 1993, Boyle et al. 1998). 
Existing migration theories thus oppose the idea of a strong and linear relationship 
between environmental or climate change and migration because they do not 
explicitly include the environment as a cause for migration and they stress the 
multi-causality of migration decisions.  
 
Existing migration theories thus do not acknowledge the environment as a cause of 
migration, while as chapter 2.4 showed, the volume of empirical research into the 
nexus between a specific environmental stressor and migration is growing. Most of 
these studies conclude that this relationship is determined by many other social, 
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economic and cultural factors and that it is highly context-specific. It is, therefore, 
difficult if not impossible to deduct a generalised global pattern of the impacts of 
climate stressors on migration, based on empirical case studies in different parts of 
the world.  
 
Additionally, Tacoli (2011) considers the “high level of uncertainty regarding the 
locally-specific impacts of climate change and the lack of comprehensive data on 
migration” (Tacoli 2011:5) two important obstacles to research into climate change-
migration linkages. She presents empirical evidence into the relationship between 
environmental change and migration from a comparative case study in different 
regions of Bolivia, Senegal and Tanzania. The research compared the effects of 
different slow-onset environmental stressors, such as drought, soil erosion and 
salinization, but also deforestation and land use change on migration under 
different social and cultural contexts. One of the findings of the research is that, in 
line with the results of the case studies summarised in chapter 2.4, migration 
should not be considered in isolation from other factors in the broader context of 
people's livelihoods. Tacoli (2011) thus concludes that migration should be 
understood as a livelihood strategy and a way of diversifying sources of household 
income under the increasing impact of climate change on natural resources. In line 
with this conceptualisation of climate change as a risk, and migration as one 
possible response, this chapter now turns to an analysis of household decision-
making in the context of risk. 
 
3.3 Explaining household decision-making in the context of risk 
Migration is one potential response out of many others to environmental shocks 
and stresses. People affected by environmental stressors often make use of a 
combination of livelihood strategies in response, which might or might not include 
some form of migration. The question how households respond to risks is thus just 
as complex as the question how they take migration decisions. The Sustainable 
Livelihood Approach (SLA) and the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) 
might be useful tools for the understanding of causal linkages between climate 
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stressors and migration (Kniveton et al. 2008). The conceptual underpinning of this 
thesis is informed by many ideas developed in the context of SLA and NELM. The 
thesis is not completely based on these frameworks and, therefore, does not follow 
the requirements of SLA as a methodological approach. Nevertheless, given the 
importance of SLA and NELM for the conceptual framework to be developed in this 
chapter, the following sections turn to a brief review of the SLA and NELM. 
 
3.3.1 The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) 
The SLA is a research framework that has been designed in the context of 
development studies. It builds upon the idea that people take decisions and act 
with the aim of maintaining a socially and environmentally sustainable livelihood 
(DFID 2000). According to Chambers and Conway (1992), “a livelihood is 
environmentally sustainable when it maintains or enhances the local and global 
assets on which livelihoods depend, and has net beneficial effects on other 
livelihoods” (Chambers and Conway 1992:iii). A socially sustainable environment 
can “cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, and provide for future 
generations” (Chambers and Conway 1992:iii).  
 
Different forms of the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach have been developed and 
implemented by a variety of research institutes and donor agencies since the late 
1990s (Brocklesby and Fisher 2003), so that different forms of the concept exist 
(Hussein 2002). The initial purpose of the SLA was to understand people’s 
livelihoods so that development assistance could be tailored according to their 
individual needs. The underlying idea is that families possess a variety of natural, 
physical, financial, human, and social assets, which are all used to maintain a 
family’s livelihood. If one of the assets suffers a loss, it can be compensated for by 
falling back on the other available assets in the so-called asset-pentagon. External 
influences in the form of policies and institutions are also taken into account (DFID 
2000). The SLA is also concerned with the question of how vulnerable livelihoods 
are to shocks, trends, and seasonal developments and what kinds of coping 
strategies are used by people in the case of one of these events (Carney 1998). 
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This approach was for example applied in a study by Ziervogel and Calder (2003), 
in which they assessed the impact of climate variability on adaptive capacity in 
Lesotho. 
 
In 2000, DFID published the DFID Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets, in 
which the Sustainable Livelihood Framework was presented and explained. The 
following paragraphs are based on information provided in these guidance sheets. 
The model of the SLA, as presented by DFID and shown in figure 3.1, is 
constructed around the asset pentagon, which includes human, natural, financial, 
social, and physical capital.  
 
Figure 3.1: The SLA model developed by DFID 
 
Source: DFID 2000 
 
The approach suggests that people make use of different combinations of these 
assets to maintain their livelihoods under precarious conditions. According to the 
SLA, people act in the vulnerability context. They are confronted by different kinds 
of external shocks, which might be related to environmental disruption, violent 
conflicts, diseases, or economic crises. People’s livelihoods are also affected by 
the seasonality of production, employment, and prices, as well as by demographic, 
economic, political, and technological trends on the local and the global level.  
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The combination of different forms of accessible capital in the asset pentagon is 
conceived of as a constantly changing entity depending on the vulnerability context 
described above and on transforming structures and processes. The structures 
and processes caused by changes to the existing governmental and institutional 
context can create assets, e.g. by means of investment in basic infrastructure. 
They can also regulate access, e.g. by means of ownership or access rights, and 
they can influence the rate of asset accumulation, most importantly of financial 
capital, by tax policies. In this context of vulnerability, and affected by changes to 
external structures and processes, people strive to make use of their assets in 
such a way that they achieve the best possible livelihood outcome. Access to a 
variety of assets is therefore crucial as it provides more options to combine and 
switch between different livelihood strategies, and therefore increases the 
likelihood of achieving better and more stable livelihood outcomes (DFID 2000).  
 
One of the main strengths of the approach is its holistic view of the various 
strategies people adopt to maintain their livelihoods. Yet, one of the practical 
disadvantages of the approach is that investigating people’s livelihoods is a very 
time-consuming endeavour. It requires an in-depth understanding of the people 
and their habits, and therefore requires a qualitative approach. Furthermore, the 
Sustainable Livelihood Approach has been criticised on a number of conceptual 
grounds. One of the major arguments is that it neglects inequalities of power at the 
community level and within families. The SLA is based on the assumption that 
households are conflict-free unities and that all household decisions are based on 
consensus between its members. However, inter-generational and gendered 
conflicts and inequalities of power are common within many households 
(Waddington 2003). It has been suggested that the analysis of the influence of 
institutions should be broadened to include community and family structures (Toner 
2002). This change would shift the meaning of a household from a homogenous 
unit to a structured and complex entity.  
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Furthermore, the SLA assumes that people have access to all the knowledge they 
need to make informed and strategic decisions to optimise their livelihood 
outcomes, which is most likely not the case. The concept of the SLA is also based 
on the prerequisite that people always act rationally towards the achievement of 
their maximum economic benefit. Yet, decision making processes are likely to be 
also influenced by emotions, cultural norms and the belief in altruism. Next to the 
criticism of the conceptual simplification of household structures and dynamics and 
of decision making processes, the SLA has also been criticised for some 
methodological difficulties. One of the major challenges of the SLA framework is 
how to compare and measure different forms of assets. Different forms of assets 
seem to be linked to each other and the possession of one kind of assets might 
entail the access to others. For example, social capital is likely to facilitate or hinder 
access to other forms of assets (Toner 2002). 
 
Despite this criticism, the Sustainable Livelihood Approach is a useful tool that can 
contribute to the development of a conceptual framework and research design for 
studies into the nexus between climate change and migration. It suggests that 
people respond to external shocks and stresses by making use of different assets. 
This idea is crucial for the development of the conceptual framework of this thesis 
because this perspective supports the idea of non-linearity in the climate-migration 
context. Under the situation of climatic stress, people can choose from a variety of 
responses, or make use of a combination of responses, and migration, in its 
different forms, might or might not be one of these strategies. Furthermore, the 
SLA acknowledges that people’s livelihoods are affected by a variety of external 
shocks that can be related to climatic stressors but are also caused by factors that 
have nothing or very little to do with a changing climate. The recognition of different 
livelihood stressors affecting people’s livelihoods again supports the 
conceptualisation of the non-linearity of climate-migration linkages. These two 
arguments supporting the perspective of the non-linearity of the nexus between 
climate change and migration are linked to the migration theory of the New 
Economics of Labour Migration, to which this chapter now turns.  
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3.3.2 The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) 
The theory of the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) was introduced by 
Oded Stark and David Bloom in 1985. It was developed in response to neo-
classical migration theories, which claim that individuals decide to migrate in order 
to maximise their income. NELM can be interpreted either as a criticism or as an 
improvement of neo-classical theories. The two approaches have in common that 
they conceive of migrants as rational agents who try to increase their financial 
situation (Arango 2000). The difference between them is that the New Economics 
of Labour Migration approach assumes that “[m]igration decisions are often made 
jointly by the migrant and by some group of nonmigrants” (Stark and Bloom 
1985:175). It is usually assumed that these groups are families and that 
remittances are a way of improving the household income. Migration is thus not a 
strategy used to maximise individual income but a means to diversify sources of 
household income. The risk that household income will decline is spread, as 
financial resources are generated by different forms of activities such as local 
employment, agriculture, and migration (Arango 2000). Massey et al. (1993) 
compare the function of these risk-minimising strategies in developing countries to 
systems of insurance or social welfare in the developed world. If local markets fail 
for some reasons, some family members can compensate these losses by 
providing money they earned in systems that are not linked to the local market 
(Massey et al. 1993). Boyle et al. (1998) summarise the features of the New 
Economics of Labour Migration: 
 
“For this school, migration can be interpreted as being guided by a family-based 
risk-reduction strategy rather than as an individual income-maximising action” 
(Boyle et al.1998:74). 
 
The New Economics of Labour Migration challenged the former understanding of 
economic migration theories that claimed that wage differentials between countries 
are the trigger for migration, and that people will continue to migrate until the gaps 
between wages in sending and receiving countries will be closed. 
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NELM has been criticised on the other hand for searching the reasons for 
migration only in the source areas. Most migration decisions, however, also include 
considerations of the situation in the destination area, as Piore already argued in 
1979 in the context of the Dual Labour Market migration theory (Massey et al. 
1993). Furthermore, migration decisions need to take obstacles such as border 
protection policies as well as lack of resources needed for the journey into account. 
Originally, NELM had been tailored to societies in which migration is an established 
livelihood strategy. Developed in a Mexican village in the 1980s, it takes the 
specific situation of this place and point of time into account. It might therefore not 
be applicable to societies in which migration is not that common, in which whole 
families migrate, or in which migrants decide to leave their families for individual 
reasons (Arango 2000). Like the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach, NELM is 
based on the assumption of a consensual household, and therefore neglects 
conflicts and power inequalities at the household level (Faist 1997). Furthermore, 
NELM is a micro-level decision model, which is like the SLA based on the 
assumption of a rational actor (Massey et al. 1993) and assumes that migration 
decisions are always taken by well-informed families seeking to optimise their 
economic situation.  
 
3.3.3 Contributions and limitations of SLA and NELM 
Despite the shortcomings of the two approaches, the main ideas of the New 
Economics of Labour Migration theory, in combination with the Sustainable 
Livelihood Approach, form the basis of the conceptual approach of this thesis. 
Section 3.3.1 stressed that one of the important arguments of the SLA is that 
people respond to external shocks and stresses by making use of different assets. 
Thus they rely on a variety of responses to climatic stressors. As this section 
shows, this idea is supported by a major argument put forward in the context of 
NELM. NELM is based on the idea that migration should be conceptualised as one 
source of household income among others. Internal or international migration and 
local income generating activities are not mutually exclusive but complementary 
livelihood strategies of different household members (Massey et al. 1993). 
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Figure 3.2: Different potential responses to climate stressors 
 
Source: author 
 
Thus migration can be used by households to spread the risk of having no income 
in case that one of the other income generating activities of household members 
experiences difficulties. Similar to the SLA, NELM thus suggests that families tend 
to rely on different sources of income to minimise potential risks. If climatic 
stressors can be considered as constituting a risk to a family’s livelihood, both SLA 
and NELM suggest that families or other social units use migration as one strategy 
among others in response to the risk of climate stressors. Figure 3.2 shows how 
migration can be conceptualised as one potential response to climate stressors. 
 
Another underlying idea of the SLA is that livelihoods are subject to various types 
of internal and external shocks and stresses. Climate related shocks and stresses 
are affecting people in combination with economic, social, cultural and other 
stressors. Different forms of migration are potential responses to these different 
kinds of shocks and stresses. While NELM limits the reasons for migration to 
economic drivers, it acknowledges the multiple sources of risks, which might 
negatively affect a household’s income stability. Figure 3.3 depicts different forms 
of migration as a potential response to different livelihood stressors.  
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Figure 3.3: Migration as a potential response to different livelihood stressors 
 
Source: author 
 
The two diagrams above thus single out and illustrate two important aspects of the 
climate change-migration nexus. First climatic stressors are likely to lead to a 
variety of different responses, potentially including migration. Second, different 
forms of migration can be caused by different livelihood stressors and aspects 
affecting people’s livelihoods. These livelihood stressors might include climate 
related stressors among many others. This illustrates that the conceptualisation of 
a linear relationship between climate change and migration is wrong because of 
the multiple responses to climate related stressors and because of the multi-
causality of migration.  
 
The previous sections showed that SLA and NELM are useful tools to explain why 
gradual climate change is unlikely to entail unprecedented migration flows. Yet, the 
relationship between climate change and migration is more complex than the 
previous sections outlined and goes beyond the aspects that SLA and NELM can 
explain. The conceptual approach of this thesis acknowledges that factors 
influencing migration decisions can be found at the macro, the meso, and the micro 
level, and that they interact with each other. While neo-classical migration theories 
and also NELM focus on the macro or the micro level, more recent approaches 
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such as network theories and the theory of cumulative causation are concerned 
with the important effects of structures and institutions at the meso level on 
migration decisions (Faist 1997). Kandel and Massey (2002) showed by using the 
case of Mexico how people’s perceptions of migration as a normal part of adult life 
or even a rite of passage for transition into adulthood affects people’s livelihoods. 
Migration has thus a long history in many parts of the world and has in many cases 
become an important and institutionalised part in people’s lives. This argument 
counters the often implicit assumption that most migration flows caused or affected 
by climate change are new. 
 
3.4 An alternative conceptual approach 
This chapter so far has demonstrated the importance of taking the complexity of 
climate change, migration decisions, as well as different responses to risk into 
account when studying the nexus between climate change and migration. In this 
section, a new conceptual approach is developed, based on the main arguments 
presented in the previous sections. Existing studies, while sometimes partially 
acknowledging the complexity of migration decisions and of the relationship 
between climate change and migration, in most cases fail to acknowledge the 
complexity of people's responses to risk related to climate stressors and the 
complexity of climate change. Jónsson (2010) divides the conceptual frameworks 
of these existing empirical studies into ‘push factor type studies’ and studies on 
‘multi-level contextual drivers’, as shown in figure 3.4. In Jónsson’s terminology, 
‘push factor type studies’ assume a strong direct, linear and positive link between 
environmental or climate stressors and migration. The conceptual framework of 
these studies is based on neo-Malthusianism and on a push-pull framework of 
migration, which ignores influences on the meso- and on the macro-level (Jónsson 
2010). In contrast, studies on ‘multi-level contextual drivers’ acknowledge the 
complexity of the relationship between the environment and migration. They are 
conceptualised around migration theories such as the New Economics of Labour 
Migration (NELM) and around sustainable livelihood approaches (SLA). They are 
also often informed by social constructionism and political ecology (Jónsson 2010). 
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Figure 3.4: Conceptual approaches to the environment-migration nexus 
 
Push factor type studies: 
 
Climate change  Migration 
 
Studies on multi-level contextual drivers: 
 
Social factors  
Demographic factors 
Environment  Migration 
Political factors  
Economic factors 
 
Source: author, adapted from Jónsson (2010) 
 
Section 3.2.1 showed that different migration theories explain decisions for or 
against migration by factors at the micro, meso, and macro level. It is thus unlikely 
that migration will be caused by climate change alone, and the multi-causality of 
migration should be acknowledged. Furthermore, migration has different forms as 
migrants, alone or with their families, move over short or long distances, internally 
and internationally, legally and undocumented, and to rural or urban destinations. 
As, for example, international, long-distance migration seems to require more 
resources than internal migration over a short distance, it is also likely that the 
factors which influence decisions for different forms of migration are not the same. 
Thus, push factor type studies, which, as shown in figure 3.4, depict climate 
change as a single reason for migration, are conceptually unconvincing.  
 
Studies on multi-level contextual drivers acknowledge the complexity of migration 
and argue that environmental or climate stressors might affect migration decisions 
in combination with social, demographic, political, economic and other factors. 
While this approach is more convincing than the approach that ignores the multi-
causality of migration, it also does not capture all the elements involved in the 
potential relationship between climate change and migration. Section 3.3 in this 
chapter showed that the decisions households take when faced by shocks or 
stresses are as complex as migration decisions. Just as environmental or climate 
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stressors are not the only driver of migration, migration, in turn, is not the only 
response to external stressors. Households facing stressors to their livelihoods can 
often choose between various responses and different forms of migration might be 
one potential response among many others. Sustainable Livelihood Approaches 
and the New Economics of Labour Migration suggest that households spread the 
risk of loss of income by making use of various adaptation strategies at the same 
time. A conceptual approach, which tries to explain the nexus between climatic 
stressors and migration, thus needs to acknowledge the multi-causality of 
migration as well as the multiple potential responses to different livelihood 
stressors. 
 
Section 3.1 stressed the complexity of climate change and the uncertainty of 
predictions of future climate change. It showed that climate change can be 
expected to affect people’s livelihoods directly and indirectly at the local and at the 
global level. While, for example, changing precipitation and temperature patterns at 
the local level are likely to affect agricultural output and the livelihoods of people 
who depend on farming, climate change at the global level might increase global 
food prices and most severely affect the livelihoods of poor people worldwide. 
Furthermore, climate change might render some rural destinations unattractive for 
migrants if it affects the agricultural productivity of these areas and the need for 
migrant workers decreases as a consequence. Yet, most existing empirical 
research into the nexus between the climate and migration simply uses some form 
of a local environmental stressor as a proxy for climate change and does not 
consider the potential indirect and global effects of climate change on people’s 
livelihoods. Most existing research also ignores the fact that climate change is 
likely to affect – in various ways and to different extents – the many factors 
involved in migration decisions.  
 
An alternative approach to studying climate-migration linkages thus needs to take 
into account the complexity of migration decisions and of people’s responses to 
livelihood stressors. Furthermore, it should acknowledge that most elements 
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involved in migration decisions are likely to be sensitive to the consequences of 
climate change. The conceptual approach, on which the research presented in this 
thesis is based, therefore suggests that a mix of various social, demographic, 
environmental, political, economic and cultural factors triggers a mix of different 
responses, potentially including different forms of migration. In turn, these factors 
involved in migration decisions and in decisions for alternative responses are likely 
to be affected by climate change. Figure 3.5 presents a simplified scheme of this 
conceptual model.  
 
Figure 3.5: Conceptual model acknowledging the complexity of climate change impacts on 
migration decisions 
 
                                                    Social factors    Micro business 
                                                    Demographic factors  Credits 
Climate change                                Environment   Migration 
                                                    Political factors             Government aid 
                                                    Economic factors   Sell assets 
                                                    Cultural factors    
    
Source: author 
 
It has to be acknowledged that interlinkages between different livelihoods stressors 
and between different responses are likely to exist, which the diagram does not 
capture. Several livelihood stressors might affect people at the same time and 
people might make use of a combination of different responses. Furthermore, the 
diagram does not show that also individual preferences and experiences are 
involved in decisions for or against migration. Nevertheless, the diagram shows the 
main contribution of this alternative conceptual approach for studying the nexus 
between climate change and migration. It underlines that the relationship between 
climate change and migration is not linear and not necessarily positive. It also 
shows that climate change is not one element, which can be separated out of 
many other drivers of migration. In contrast, it shows that climate change is likely to 
affect stressors to people’s livelihoods, which might lead to migration as well as to 
other responses.  
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3.5 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter argued that existing conceptual approaches for studying the 
relationship between climate change and migration do not completely acknowledge 
the complexity of climate change, migration decisions, and people’s responses to 
risks. Therefore, an alternative conceptual approach is needed, which was also 
developed in this chapter. 
 
The first part of the chapter showed that climate change is very complex and that 
predictions of the consequences of future climate change are very uncertain. 
Furthermore, the predicted future effects of climate change can be expected to 
manifest at the global and at the local level and will be likely to directly and 
indirectly affect people’s livelihoods. Therefore, the use of local climate 
phenomena, such as droughts or floods, as a proxy for future climate change is 
conceptionally unconvincing. The second part of the chapter argued that migration 
decisions, for different forms of migration, are also complex and include many 
elements at the macro, the meso and the micro level. This multi-causality of 
migration, which is acknowledged in many different migration theories and in 
approaches, which try to explain migration, shows that the relationship between 
climate change and migration is likely not to be linear and not necessarily positive. 
The third part of the chapter showed that different forms of migration are only one 
potential response to people’s livelihood stressors, depending on people’s access 
to assets and on individual decision-making processes in the context of risk. 
 
The last section of this chapter developed an alternative conceptual approach, 
based on the idea that climate change can be expected to affect social, 
demographic, environmental, political, economic, and cultural factors involved in 
migration decisions. Yet, these factors might also drive responses other than 
migration, such as micro-businesses, credits, selling assets or relying on external 
aid. The next chapter shows how this conceptual approach translates into the 
methodological approach of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4: Methodological approach, choice of research setting and research 
methods 
The previous chapter developed the conceptual approach, on which this thesis is 
based. This chapter presents the methodology, the research settings and the 
research methods, which were chosen to illustrate this conceptual approach by 
analysing the case of Mexico. Consistent with the logic behind the 
conceptualisation of the research presented in this thesis, the methodological 
approach of this research consists of two steps; 1) understanding the nature of 
migration flows in Mexico as well as alternative livelihood strategies, and 2) 
understanding the climate sensitivity of all factors involved in decisions to migrate 
at the local and the global level. Therefore, in a first step, the factors involved in 
different migration decisions as well as the decisions in favour of alternative 
livelihood strategies are identified. Then, in a second step, these factors and the 
alternative livelihood strategies are analysed and tested for their climate sensitivity.  
 
The first part of the research is therefore concerned with answering the following 
set of research questions: 
 
 What are the elements involved in migration decisions in rural communities in 
Mexico?  
 Why do some people migrate while others stay in their home community?  
 What are the different forms of migration that can be observed in rural Mexico, 
and what are the reasons why some forms of migration are more common in a 
specific village context than others?  
 How do households choose the most appropriate form of migration for their 
prospective migrant household member?  
 What are alternative livelihood strategies and under what circumstances are 
they made use of? 
 
Empirical data answering these questions are analysed and categorised, leading to 
a conceptual model of all elements involved in decisions for or against different 
forms of migration or for or against alternative livelihood strategies. 
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The second part of the research is concerned with analysing the climate sensitivity 
of the elements in this conceptual model. It answers the following set of research 
questions: 
 
 What are the likely effects of the global and local consequences of climate 
change on the observed migration flows?  
 What are the differences and the similarities regarding different migration 
flows?  
 How will the elements involved in different migration decisions at the sending 
areas, at the destination areas and livelihood strategies that might be used as 
an alternative to migration likely be affected by the consequences of local and 
global climate change? 
 Which elements are likely to be most severely affected by future climate 
change? 
 What are the policy implications of the results? 
 
4.1 The methodological approach 
As the analysis of empirical research into the climate change-migration nexus in 
chapter 2 showed, many existing studies seem to be methodologically flawed. 
Methodological approaches usually start by analysing the climatic stressors and 
their effects on people’s migratory behaviour. Qualitative studies try to gain insights 
into the questions of how different groups of people respond to different kinds of 
climate-related shocks and stresses and to what extent different forms of migration 
are part of these responses. Qualitative work also often concentrates on 
understanding people’s perceptions of climate-migration linkages (Jäger et al. 
2009). Quantitative studies, on the other hand, try to establish a statistical 
relationship between an extreme climatic event and changes to the number of 
outmigrants before and after that event. Often, correlations between precipitation 
levels and the number of outmigrants are established (Munshi 2003, Kniveton et al. 
2008). Alternative approaches analyse the usefulness of conceptual models in 
discovering climate change-migration linkages (Perch-Nielsen 2006) or suggest 
agent based modelling (Kniveton et al. 2008, Smith et al. 2008). 
 
All of these approaches provide some valuable insights but results on the climate 
change-migration nexus are not conclusive yet. It is likely that one of the reasons 
for this lack of conclusive results is that existing studies try to isolate climate 
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stressors as one factor among many other factors that influence migratory 
behaviour. This is a methodological problem, which both qualitative and 
quantitative studies face. Chapter 3 argued that conceptualising climate change as 
a factor that can be isolated from migration decisions does not do justice to the 
complexity of climate change. Therefore, research designs need to overcome this 
methodological problem by conceptualising climate change as a complex 
phenomenon affecting the global and local factors involved in different migration 
flows.  
 
4.1.1 A qualitative methodology 
Qualitative approaches are better suited than quantitative approaches to explain 
complex relationships and contexts. Yet, as Flick (1998) stresses, results of 
qualitative approaches are often less considered by policy makers or society as a 
whole, because of a lack of generalizability of findings and less standardized 
research methods. Similarly, the results of this thesis are not generalizable in a 
quantitative sense. The thesis does not make an attempt to quantify results and 
therefore does not provide estimates of numbers of people expected to migrate 
because of future climate change. Instead, it seeks to generate new knowledge by 
which the policy and public debate might be informed in two ways. It presents a 
conceptual and methodological approach, which might influence the way of 
thinking about the nature of the relationship between climate change and 
migrations. Furthermore, it uses a qualitative methodology to illustrate this 
approach for the case of Mexico. This methodological tool can also be applied in 
different geographical contexts.  
 
A qualitative approach is used to generate profound knowledge about the 
character of existing migration patterns in Mexico and about the question of how 
these patterns of different migration flows are likely to change under future climate 
change. To understand how migration decision-making functions, all elements 
involved in migration decisions, including livelihood stressors at the macro level but 
also people’s involvement in networks at the meso level as well as their decision 
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making processes at the micro level, are considered in this analysis. To 
understand how migration processes are likely to be affected by future climate 
change, all potential consequences of climate change at the global and the local 
level need to be considered, and the effects they might have on different migration 
decisions must be judged. This means that different kinds of knowledge are 
needed, including empirical data, histories, statistics, secondary data, and 
predictive climate models and assessments. The generation of this knowledge 
requires different tools and methods. The concept of ‘bricolage’ as found in 
qualitative research allows this mix of different strategies, tools, techniques, and 
research methods as well as the use of all available empirical materials to generate 
the knowledge that is needed to answer a specific research question (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2011).  
 
Another important feature of qualitative research is the fact that it allows integrating 
and stressing the perspective of the people concerned by the studied 
phenomenon. Denzin and Lincoln (2011:3) stress that “…qualitative researchers 
study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, 
phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them”. To ensure an in-
depths understanding from an emic perspective, the research design is built 
around a holistic approach, involving many different aspects of people’s 
livelihoods. The research also seeks to understand people’s perceptions of 
livelihood stressors and of the usefulness of different forms of migration as a 
response. Bryman (1988) defines qualitative research as “...an approach to the 
study of the social world which seeks to describe and analyse the culture and 
behaviour of humans and their groups from the point of view of those being 
studied” (Bryman 1988:46). Understanding decisions for or against different forms 
of migration from the perspective of the people concerned permits insights into 
their perceptions and reasoning. Qualitative fieldwork is conducted to gather data 
about the elements involved in migration decisions because people’s perceptions 
and opinions play an important role.  
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4.1.2 A comparative methodology 
Another important element of the research design is that it acknowledges that 
climate change-migration linkages are likely to be heterogeneous due to local or 
regional characteristics, for different migration flows, and under the condition of 
different local climatic stressors. In order to illustrate the differences and similarities 
caused by this heterogeneity, instead of focusing on one single case alone and 
doing an ethnography in one village community, a comparative approach was 
chosen. Bryman (1988) puts forward three strategies that can avoid the danger of 
research results turning out to be idiosyncratic: 1) study more than one case, 2) 
involve more than one researcher, and 3) select a typical or a ‘deviant’ case. 
Making use of the second strategy is not feasible because of the nature of this 
DPhil project. A priori knowledge about the characteristics of villages in different 
parts of Mexico is not available, which means that the third option cannot be 
chosen either. Choosing more than one case, however, is considered a feasible 
option, which is adopted in this thesis.  
 
Lamnek (2005) stresses the importance of choosing the right cases in comparative 
research. Therefore, before starting fieldwork, two regions in Mexico with different 
migration patterns and affected by different local climate stressors were selected. 
One classic migration state suffering from drought, Zacatecas, and one state in 
which international migration is more recent and which is suffering from floods and 
hurricanes, Veracruz, were selected. Once this choice was made based on 
secondary data, both regions were visited and local researchers were asked for 
help in choosing the most appropriate communities for fieldwork. Again, to avoid 
idiosyncrasies as much as possible, two communities were selected in each of the 
two states. It has to be acknowledged that the choice of the research setting has 
been limited to rural communities because the effect of local climate stressors was 
considered to be likely more visible in rural than in urban areas. Nonetheless, cities 
are likely to suffer the consequences of climate change, and migration to and from 
urban areas is also likely to be affected by these consequences. Yet, in the context 
of this study, choosing another selection criterion or variable and selecting more 
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cases would have gone beyond what one single researcher in one study can do 
and might have affected the quality of the research as a whole. 
 
A total of four communities in Mexico, two in Zacatecas and two in Veracruz, were 
thus selected. Empirical research started in January 2008 in Zacatecas. Each time 
after three to four weeks the village was alternated until the end of fieldwork in 
Zacatecas in July 2008. Furthermore, short visits to other communities in 
Zacatecas were made during the time of the fieldwork. This strategy enables a 
better understanding of the factors that play into the relationship between climate 
variability and migration, because some of these factors might be found on the 
state level, others in both communities, some might exist in certain groups in both 
communities and some might be characteristic of one community and not found in 
the other. Alternating research between the two communities can therefore help to 
distinguish between features that are particular to one community, features that are 
particular for a group of people that share certain characteristics, and features that 
seem to be more universal in the region. This strategy also helps to understand 
behaviour in one community by comparing it to what other people do in a similar 
setting. This reduces the danger of bias and therefore increases the external 
validity of the study. After a break from fieldwork, in which a first analysis of the 
empirical data collected in Zacatecas was made, the second phase of fieldwork in 
Veracruz started in September 2008 and lasted until March 2009. Fieldwork in 
Veracruz followed the same strategy as fieldwork in Zacatecas, with alternating 
stays of three to four weeks in the researched communities as well as additional 
short visits to other communities in the state of Veracruz. After making a case for a 
qualitative and a comparative approach, the following section explains in detail why 
Mexico, the two regions in Mexico and the two village communities in each region 
were selected as research setting. 
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4.2 The choice of the research setting: Mexico 
As chapter 2.4 showed, most empirical research into the nexus between 
environmental stressors and migration is set in the Sahel and concerned with the 
effects of droughts on migration. Another example of interest for the effects of 
climate stressors on migration is the relationship between migration and floods in 
low lying areas and river deltas such as the coastal regions of Bangladesh. While 
these studies provide valuable results, they do not allow for a comparison between 
the effects of different environmental stressors on migration because of socio-
economic, political, and cultural differences in different countries. Mexico is an 
interesting research setting because different environmental stressors can be 
found in one country. 
 
Droughts mainly occur in the northern and central part of Mexico, while the coastal 
regions and especially the southern and south-eastern states of Tabasco, 
Veracruz, Chiapas, and Oaxaca are prone to floods and hurricanes. Furthermore, 
different migration patterns can be observed in Mexico. While the classic migration 
states in the centre-west of the country have been sending international migrants 
for generations, international migration only emerged in the 1990s in the southern 
and south-eastern states. Furthermore, seasonal internal migration as well as 
international labour migration to the USA is a common phenomenon in many parts 
of the country13. Mexico thus offers the opportunity to observe the direct effects of 
different climate stressors on different forms of migration within one country. 
Although, especially in a country of the size of Mexico, the socio-economic, 
cultural, and political conditions vary from region to region, they are likely to be 
more similar between the different Mexican states than between different countries. 
 
As mentioned above, fieldwork was conducted in the two states of Zacatecas and 
Veracruz. These regions with different migration histories and patterns, which are 
suffering from different climate stressors, were chosen to allow a broader insight 
into the various climate and non-climate related stressors affecting people’s 
                                                 
13
 A more detailed analysis of these different migration patterns can be found in chapter 5. 
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livelihoods, different livelihood strategies, as well as different migration decision-
making processes. Two communities in each region were selected to reduce the 
risk of idiosyncrasies and to follow the comparative approach presented above. 
 
4.2.1 Zacatecas 
Zacatecas was selected as one of the research settings because of its long history 
of international migration, and because drought is an important stressor to many 
people’s livelihoods in the state. The state of Zacatecas lies in the centre-north 
region of Mexico, with the state capital Zacatecas situated 500 km to the north of 
Mexico City and 1,400 km south of the border between the state of Sonora and the 
USA, which many migrants from Zacatecas cross. Zacatecas is surrounded by the 
states of Jalisco, Aguascalientes, San Luis Potosí, Coahuila, and Durango. 
 
Figure 4.1: The state of Zacatecas in Mexico 
 
Source: INEGI 
 
The population of Zacatecas rose from 1.35 million inhabitants in 2000 (INEGI 
2000) to 1.5 million in 2010, of which a bit less than 10% live in the state capital of 
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the same name (INEGI 2010). Yet, with 20 inhabitants per km2 it remains one of 
the less densely populated states of Mexico, compared to the national average of 
57 inhabitants per km2 (INEGI 2010). As the low population density suggests, the 
state is dominated by rural areas and small villages, which are politically divided 
into 58 municipalities.  
 
In the 2010 Mexican census14, 5.8% of the economically active population of 
Zacatecas indicated that they were unemployed. While this rate of structural 
unemployment is relatively moderate, seasonal fluctuations in the need for day 
labourers should be considered. In 2006, about 29% of the economically active 
population was employed in the primary sector (INEGI 2007), which is high above 
the national average of 16% and 13% in 2000 and 2010, respectively (INEGI 
2010). Due to the average altitude of 2,100 metres above sea level, and the related 
periods of frost and low temperatures, agriculture is not possible between October 
and February. Therefore, many people do not have work during these months and 
the lack of secure and permanent employment opportunities is one of the major 
livelihood stressors, mainly among the rural population in Zacatecas. 
 
While the choice of the state as a research setting was based on information found 
in the literature, the selection of the two researched village communities was based 
on visits to different parts of Zacatecas. These visits showed that the state is not 
homogeneous as far as both the degree of the impact of drought and migration 
rates are concerned, which is unsurprising given the size of the state with a north-
south extension of about 500 km. 
 
The north of the state is considerably poorer and the climate is dryer than in the 
rest of the state. As a consequence, fewer people can afford to migrate 
internationally, and internal migration is the dominant form of migration. Yet, while 
the municipality of Mazapil in the extreme north of Zacatecas is one of the poorest 
                                                 
14
 The Mexican National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI) carries out a population 
census every ten years; the last one was completed in 2010, and some preliminary results were 
published at the end of 2010. 
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and driest regions in the state, it started to attract migrants in 2004, when a 
Canadian company opened a mine. Many of those who had left the region to work 
in Monterrey, Ciudad de Juárez, and Saltillo returned, and workers from other 
regions in Zacatecas as well as from other states came to work in the mine. Thus, 
although the mining activities are using a lot of groundwater and contaminating the 
fields, so that agriculture has become even more difficult, migration ratios have 
shifted from high outmigration rates to even higher immigration rates. 
 
Figure 4.2: Map of the state of Zacatecas 
 
Source: Google maps (accessed on 23 March 2011) 
 
The extreme south of Zacatecas is less dry than the north and the soil is more 
fertile. Although agriculture would be more feasible in this region than in the north, 
only a very small part of the land is cultivated because commercial agriculture does 
not exist and only a few people are farming for subsistence. Production of mezcal, 
a strong alcoholic beverage, has been growing in the region over the last years so 
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that some people started to farm the maguey plant, from which mezcal is distilled. 
The plant can be cultivated without irrigation systems because the amount of 
precipitation in the region is sufficient for it to grow. Cattle raising is the most 
important form of land use, but maize that is used to feed the animals is also 
grown. Next to cattle raising, international outmigration to the USA is the most 
important income generating strategy.  
 
This heterogeneity in the state was considered for the choice of the two village 
communities in which fieldwork took place. Two communities with different 
migration patterns where chosen to allow for a later climate sensitivity analysis of 
distinct migration flows. The first selected community, Laguna Seca, in the 
municipality of Pánuco, is situated in a zone of low international migration but 
shows high rates of internal seasonal migration. According to the population count 
by the local health centre in 2007, 1,008 inhabitants lived in 347 households. 502 
of the inhabitants are male and 611 are younger than 30, so the population profile 
is different to the one in communities with high permanent outmigration rates, in 
which mainly men and young people leave. 
 
The second rural community, which was selected for fieldwork, consists of the 
three villages El Tigre, El Nuevo Tigre and Ojo de Agua del Tigre. They are 
situated within walking distance between each other in the municipality of 
Villanueva. Fieldwork shows that in many villages in this part of Zacatecas 
international migration is very high and internal migration hardly exists, which is 
also the case in the three studied villages. According to the 2006 census of the 
health service provided by ‘Programa Oportunidades’, in El Tigre 1,039 inhabitants 
lived in 298 households, in El Nuevo Tigre 89 inhabitants lived in 27 households, 
and in Ojo de Agua del Tigre 37 inhabitants lived in 9 households. Out of this total 
of 1,165 inhabitants, 377 were younger than 30 and a total of 344 were male. Thus 
the population on average is older and more women live alone in the villages than 
is the case in Laguna Seca. 
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4.2.2 Veracruz 
The second Mexican state, in which fieldwork was conducted, is Veracruz de 
Ignacio de la Llave, commonly referred to as Veracruz. It was selected as an area 
that contrasts the migration patterns observed in Zacatecas. Veracruz became an 
international migrant sending state only in the 1990s, so that it does not possess 
any history of migration that dates back over several generations. 
 
Figure 4.3: The state of Veracruz in Mexico 
 
Source: INEGI 
 
The state of Veracruz extents over more than 1,000 km along the coast of the Gulf 
of Mexico, and borders on the state of Tamaulipas in the north and on the state of 
Tabasco in the south. In the south-west, towards the inland, lie the states of San 
Luis Potosí, Hidalgo, Puebla, Oaxaca, and Chiapas. Due to its proximity to the sea 
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and because of the many river deltas, mainly in the north and the centre of the 
state, floods and hurricanes are serious livelihood stressors in Veracruz.  
 
Data provided by the INEGI census and population counts, which take place every 
five years, show that the population of the state of Veracruz constantly rose from 
6.2 million in 1990, to 6.7 million in 1995, to 6.9 million in 2000, to 7.1 million in 
2005, and finally to 7.6 million in 2010 (INEGI 2010). Thus while the population 
growth rate decreased between 1995 and 2005, it shows a tremendous increase 
between 2005 and 2010. One potential explanation for this demographic 
development is the increase in international migration during the second half of the 
1990s followed by return migration during and after the financial crisis at the end of 
the 2000s. These data also show that the severe hurricanes and floods, which hit 
Veracruz in 2005 and 2007, as well as in 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively were 
not followed by large waves of outmigration. Internal migration from the state of 
Tabasco, which was also affected by floods and hurricanes, to the relatively 
wealthier state of Veracruz should be considered. Yet, it cannot account for the 
total of the population increase in Veracruz, because the population of Tabasco 
also increased between 2005 and 2010 (INEGI 2010). Thus, the effect of 
international economic stressors in this case seems to be stronger than the effect 
of local environmental stressors.  
 
Covering 71,820 km2, Veracruz is a medium sized state in Mexico. It is politically 
divided into 212 municipalities, which show an unequal population distribution and 
more urban areas than Zacatecas, considering the larger number of municipalities 
in Veracruz. The highest population concentration can be found in the state capital 
Xalapa, as well as in Boca del Río, Veracruz City, Coatzacoalcos, Minatitlán, and 
Poza Rica. Many migrants from rural communities move into these cities in search 
of work. Veracruz possesses a variety of resources leading to different economic 
activities, such as the refinement of oil, activities in the freight harbours of Veracruz 
City and Coatzacoalcos, tourism, as well as agriculture, cattle raising and fishing. 
Its share of the national GDP is 4.3%, which is the 6th place of all Mexican states. 
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However, 6.8% of the total population of Mexico live in Veracruz, which makes it 
the third largest state of Mexico regarding population size (INEGI 2010). This 
suggests that the GDP contribution per capita is not that high on a national 
average. As fieldwork showed, the socio-economic status of many village dwellers 
in the studied communities in Veracruz is below the standard in Zacatecas.  
 
Figure 4.4: Map of the state of Veracruz 
 
Source: Google maps (accessed on 23 March 2011) 
 
The selection of two village communities as research settings was again based on 
the intention of finding two places with different migration profiles. Yet, as 
consultations with researchers at the University of Veracruz in Xalapa and at 
CIESAS Golfo revealed, this selection criterion was unlikely to be useful in 
Veracruz. Unlike in Zacatecas, where migration profiles are determined on a village 
level, access to migration networks in Veracruz depends on family connections so 
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that common migration profiles on the village level do not exist. Nevertheless, there 
are village communities, which hardly send any migrants, while others send 
internal and international migrants. One of the selection criteria for the fieldwork 
setting was thus the fact that migration played an important role in the village. 
Furthermore, to examine the potential direct effects of floods and hurricanes on 
migration decisions, villages were selected that had both suffered from at least one 
flood and one hurricane over the last ten years. Like in Zacatecas, several villages 
were visited, which showed the diversity of the state regarding the importance of 
migration, as well as the degree to which people reported that they were affected 
by floods and hurricanes.  
 
The first village which was selected as a research setting is Cascajal del Río in the 
municipality of Acayucan, in the south of Veracruz. When fieldwork started in 
September 2008, a flood of the river San Juan, which borders Cascajal del Río had 
just inundated the region so that access to the village had been cut off for several 
days. Next to regular inundations of the fields and part of the village caused by 
floods during the rainy season, Cascajal del Río lies in a zone prone to hurricanes. 
The most recent and most severe hurricane which hit the village was hurricane 
Stan in October 2005. As in many parts of Veracruz, migration patterns are 
heterogeneous. 2007 census data provided by the local health centre show that 
out of the total of 1,438 inhabitants, 892 were older than 30 and 422 were younger 
than 15. This means that the share of the population between 15 and 30 years of 
age is unproportionally low, which is linked to the fact that over the last years many 
young men and women have left the village after they finished school. 
 
The second selected research community in Veracruz is Nuevo Renacimiento in 
the municipality of Gutierrez Zamora at the estuary of the river Tecolutla. It is 
situated between the geographical centre and the northern border of Veracruz. 
Nuevo Renacimiento differs from the other three research settings because its 
inhabitants were resettled from seven village communities after the big flood of the 
river Tecolutla in 1999. In 2007, the resettled community was hit by the two 
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hurricanes Dean and Lorenzo within two months. Although the two villages are 
very different in many aspects, migration patterns are very similar in Cascajal del 
Río and Nuevo Renacimiento. Access to the only village census data managed by 
the local health centre could not be obtained in Nuevo Renacimiento. Yet, the 
official documentation of the resettlement plan shows that 240 houses were 
constructed after the flood in 1999. Estimating an average of 4 inhabitants per 
house, the village should count about 960 inhabitants. Given the fact that migration 
patterns in Nuevo Renacimiento are similar to migration patterns in Cascajal del 
Río, it is likely that the age distribution in the two villages is also comparable.  
  
4.3 Research methods 
Most of the information on which this thesis is based, was obtained during a total of 
about one year of fieldwork in the four villages described above. This time-frame 
permitted gaining intensive knowledge of the livelihood situations in the studied 
communities. An important way of understanding people’s livelihoods was the 
physical stay in the house of one family in each village. In the two villages in 
Zacatecas and in Nuevo Renacimiento, the host families were found with the help 
of local scientists who knew the communities and some of its members. In 
Cascajal del Río, such contacts did not exist, so here the central shop was the first 
contact point in the village. From there, several options for renting a room were 
explored until the host family was found. It was also considered very important to 
interact directly with the village dwellers, which is why the help of an interpreter 
was not sought. Although communication during the first weeks was difficult 
because of language problems and having to get used to the local dialect, all 
interviews were conducted in Spanish. Adapting to the local form of Spanish as 
well as to local customs enabled the interaction with the village dwellers beyond 
formal interviews and was very helpful for the understanding of people’s 
livelihoods. 
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4.3.1 Data collection 
Fieldwork consisted of semi-structured interviews, participant observation, life 
histories, and interviews with people who know the communities in their function as 
teachers, doctors, nurses, or researchers. Semi-structured interviews were the 
most important research method. In each community about 50 interviews were 
conducted. The number of inhabitants in the four communities lies between 1,000 
and 1,500 persons, including children. Interviewees were family members of 
migrants, families who did not send migrants, and migrants who had returned on a 
temporary or permanent basis. It was considered important to select respondents 
from all social and economic backgrounds. Members of poorer and wealthier 
families, with higher and lower social status, landowners and dependent workers, 
young and old people, and women and men were interviewed because it is 
conceivable that wealth, social status and landownership, as well as age and 
gender are factors that influence the process of migration decision-making.  
 
The profiles of the community dwellers were obviously not known in the beginning. 
One way of getting information about the socio-economic status, the gender and 
age distribution, and the potential involvement in migration processes of 
households is conducting a small survey at the beginning of fieldwork. Bernard 
(1995) describes how such a survey, used as a first step after entering the field, 
can help finding informants that possess the attributes and qualifications the 
researcher is looking for. Yet, such a survey is time consuming and requires that 
people trust the researcher enough to reveal this information in an honest way. It 
was found during the first days of fieldwork that this trust to village dwellers had to 
be built up first before people would be willing to talk. In all four communities, the 
local health centres conduct a yearly population count, which includes some 
information that would have been interesting for the identification of potential 
respondents. Yet, data of the population counts are only available in aggregate 
form, which made them a valuable source for retrieving population statistics but not 
for the selection of respondents.  
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Therefore, the first semi-structured interviews were conducted with people who 
were already known, members of the host family and their acquaintances and 
relatives. Snowball sampling was started with these people. After the interview, the 
interviewees were always asked if they might know anybody who had any form of 
migration experience and who might be willing to talk about it. This form of 
snowball sampling also allowed the application of selection criteria to make sure 
that not all respondents belong to the same socio-economic group of people. 
Selecting a sample which is not representative for the community is one of the 
major risks of convenience sampling (Bernard 1995), which had, therefore, to be 
avoided. After several interviews, a new snowball system was started to make sure 
that not only one group of people who interact with each other or are friends was 
explored. Several new snowball systems were started by visiting shops, doctor’s 
waiting rooms, schools, church, or social and sports events in the village. During 
these occasions, people who were willing to talk were identified, a date and place 
for the interview was agreed upon and at the end of the interview the interviewee 
was again asked to provide the name of one or more potential new interviewees.  
 
It is believed, that this method allowed approaching as many different people in the 
village as possible. Some of the interviews were recorded, which was considered 
important especially during the first weeks when language problems did not allow 
for asking questions and writing up the answers at the same time. Yet, later it was 
discovered that respondents sometimes became more talkative when the recorder 
was not switched on. Migration, especially when it is illegal, is a sensitive issue 
among most village dwellers in the studied communities. Furthermore, people were 
not used to the presence of a stranger or even a foreigner in the village. 
Speculations about the purpose of fieldwork included, therefore, work for the U.S. 
immigration service or the police, as well as the preparation of a terrorist attack. 
 
Although empirical research does not follow the methodological approach of an 
ethnography, participant observation was a very important element during 
fieldwork. It helped gaining insights into people’s lives next to the interviews and 
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also allowed knowing more potential interviewees. Furthermore, after some time a 
relationship of trust could be established to several members of each community, 
which increases the chance that these informants tell the truth. Outside the formal 
interviews, during participant observation, notes were not taken immediately in 
order to avoid creating a formal atmosphere. Instead, every evening a summary of 
the events of the day, places visited, people met, and interesting remarks and 
observations, was written down in a diary. Another form of recording information 
was a reflective log, which included logistical information regarding fieldwork, but 
also preliminary thoughts and ideas that had to be explored during the time in the 
field. A reflective log can have different forms and fulfil different purposes. Bernard 
(1995) stresses that, during fieldwork, a log is an essential account of how the 
researcher plans to spend time and how s/he actually manages to follow that time 
plan. According to Bernard, the main purpose of a reflective log is to force the 
researcher to “think hard about the questions you really want to answer in your 
research and the data you really need” (Bernard 1995:394). It is thus a means of 
organising work in an efficient manner and of getting the most out of the research 
time available. 
 
Life histories, especially of older residents of the community, were found to 
contribute to gaining a more elaborate picture of how the effects of climate 
variability might have changed migratory behaviour in the course of a lifetime. 
Sabatés (2005) used life histories in his study into the evolution of the labour 
market in the Mexican city of Léon. He stresses that “...individuals are more likely 
to correctly recall their own labor histories than to remember what happened in 
their working careers in any given year“ (Sabatés 2005:525). Interviewees were 
identified during visits to the weekly gatherings of the elderly residents, which exist 
in each community. In each village between three and five life history interviews 
were conducted. Because they are time consuming and often exhausting for the 
informants, these interviews were always divided into several sessions and some 
life history interviews included up to seven meetings with the interviewee. 
Information gathered during the life history interviews was mainly useful to provide 
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the context of village life. The interviews showed how villages and the livelihoods of 
people in the villages developed over the last decades. They also showed how 
migration patterns developed, when the first outmigrations took place, and what 
had changed since then. 
 
Focus groups, groups of people gathered to discuss a particular topic, are often 
said to have the potential of providing results that go beyond what can be grasped 
from individual interviews (Bernard 1995). Yet, as Lamnek (2004) points out, focus 
groups can have advantages and disadvantages. The two major advantages are 
that in a relaxed and open atmosphere, a group discussion can generate ideas that 
would most likely not have emerged in the quieter and isolated situation of an 
individual interview. Furthermore, group discussions reveal inconsistent opinions 
and allow participants to debate on conflictive issues. Yet, one of the major 
disadvantages of group discussions is that people have to reveal their ideas in a 
semi-public setting if they want to participate in the debate. Fieldwork showed that 
people in all four villages were not willing to discuss what they considered a 
sensitive issue, such as their migration decisions, in this form. Although people 
turned up for the focus group discussion, they did not talk a lot, switched subjects 
frequently, and generally wished to leave the exercise as soon as possible. Focus 
groups thus were not a research method that worked well for this research.  
 
Primary data gathered in the studied communities was completed by information 
from local archives about the history of the villages. Furthermore, several ‘expert’ 
interviews were conducted. The purpose of these interviews was to gather the 
ideas of people who know the community well but are outsiders. Interviews were 
conducted with teachers, doctors, and nurses working in the communities but also 
with researchers and some politicians working at the state level. Village census 
data were provided by the health centres in the communities in Zacatecas and in 
Cascajal del Río. Research on secondary data also included library work in Mexico 
City, Zacatecas and Veracruz, as well as visits to meteorological stations and 
institutes to obtain local climate statistics. 
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4.3.2 Data analysis 
Data gathering and data analysis should not be perceived as separate stages of 
the research but as processes that inform each other and that are interlinked with 
each other (Lamnek 2004). Therefore, the analysis of data obtained in the 
interviews, and out of participant observation and secondary resources, started in 
the field. Every evening when possible, interviews were typed and files created for 
every person that was interviewed during the day. Due to a strong involvement in 
family and village life, and because priority was always given to writing the daily 
fieldwork diary entry, not all interview notes could be typed during the time in the 
field. Therefore, the break between fieldwork in Zacatecas and fieldwork in 
Veracruz was very useful to type up the missing interview notes and to transcribe 
the interviews that were taped. Furthermore, strengths and weaknesses of the 
existing data could be identified, which was helpful to determine potential needs for 
changes during fieldwork in Veracruz. Immediately after the second phase of 
fieldwork in Veracruz, interview notes were typed and taped interviews were 
transcribed. 
 
The next months were spent reading through interview summaries and field diaries 
and listening again to the recorded interviews. Following up on the first 
categorization of information in the field, each interview was saved in a file. In a 
second step, categories of information were created according to what people had 
said, and these categories were saved in different files. According to Bernard 
(1995), the analysis of qualitative data is “based on the search for patterns in data 
and for ideas that help explain the existence of those patterns” (Bernard 1995:360). 
The psychologist and sociologist, Paul Lazarsfeld, whose work laid the foundations 
for empirical social research, stressed the importance of the identification of types 
of answers for empirical research. Several types of behaviour can thus be 
constructed by contrasting individual cases with one another (Flick 1998). Boudon 
(1993:8) specifies that “[e]ach type [...] should be described by a combination of 
convergent features”. 
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In the concrete example of this study, this means that each element involved in 
different forms of migration decisions constitutes a different type. The different 
types are constructed based on combinations of certain aspects that people 
mentioned as affecting their migration decisions. These aspects might include the 
economic situation, the availability of other coping strategies, the social networks in 
the Mexican communities, and the links to Mexican communities at the destination 
areas. Based on these constructed categories, a conceptual model of migration 
decisions was drafted, including elements involved in migration decisions at the 
micro, meso and macro level, as well as alternative livelihood strategies. Chapters 
6 and 7 present the analysis of the empirical data and chapter 7 concludes with the 
conceptual model of migration decisions in Mexico. 
 
The second part of the methodological approach consists of testing the factors 
involved in migration decisions, as identified during fieldwork and summarised in 
the conceptual model, for their sensitivity to climate change. To this end, the 
principle of a risk matrix is used. A risk matrix measures the probability that a 
specific event is likely to occur in combination with the impact that this event is 
expected to have. Accordingly, for the purpose of the analysis of the climate 
sensitivity of factors involved in migration decisions, a matrix including two axes 
with possible values on a scale from 1-5 each is constructed. The first axis 
measures to what extent each element involved in migration decisions is likely to 
be affected by climate change. The second axis measures how relevant this factor 
is in the migration decision-making process. Each factor is attributed a score for 
the question of how important it is for migration decision-making and for the 
question how much it is likely to be affected by future climate change on the local 
and on the global scale. The product of the two scores indicates to what extent a 
specific element involved in migration decisions is likely to cause changes to 
existing migration patterns when affected by some consequence of climate 
change. The analysis of the products of scores for all elements involved in 
migration decisions makes it possible to identify these elements with the highest 
potential to cause changes to existing migration patterns under future climate 
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change. The potential differences between the effects of climate change on 
different forms of migration can also be identified. 
 
4.4 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter presented the methodological approach, the research settings and the 
research methods and methods of data analysis that were used to illustrate the 
conceptual approach developed in the previous chapter. The first section of the 
chapter argues that quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches used 
so far to study the climate change-migration nexus are flawed, mainly because 
existing studies try to separate climate change from other factors involved in 
migration decisions. To overcome this methodological problem, and following the 
conceptual approach of this thesis, the methodological approach suggested in this 
chapter consists of two steps. During the first step, the elements involved in 
different migration flows are identified and analysed. During the second step, these 
elements are tested for their sensitivity to climate change.  
 
This chapter makes a case for a qualitative methodology to illustrate this 
conceptual approach by using the example of Mexico. Qualitative research is also 
chosen because of the importance of the emic perspective and of people’s 
perceptions. Furthermore, the research design requires different approaches to 
gather and analyse different kinds of quantitative and qualitative data. Therefore, 
the concept of ‘bricolage’, as used in qualitative research is a helpful tool to select 
the methods and methodologies best-suited to obtain the results that are needed to 
answer the research questions of this thesis. The chapter also makes a case for a 
comparative methodology as opposed to an ethnographic study. The heterogeneity 
due to different migration flows, different local climate stressors, as well as regional 
and local particularities of the relationship between climate change and migration in 
Mexico is acknowledged.  
 
Therefore, two Mexican states with different migration profiles and suffering from 
different local climate stressors, Zacatecas and Veracruz, were selected as 
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research settings. In each of the two states, fieldwork took place in two rural village 
communities to avoid idiosyncrasies as much as possible. The choice for Mexico, 
the two regions and the two communities within each region is explained in the 
second part of this chapter. 
 
The third part of this chapter is concerned with the research methods used during 
empirical fieldwork and with the analysis of the data. It shows that semi-structured 
interviews were the most important research method; about 50 interviews were 
conducted in each village. The importance of staying in the village and conducting 
all interviews in Spanish is also stressed. Participant observation is shown to have 
been an important informal source of data as well as a means to get to know more 
potential interviewees. The few life history interviews conducted in each village 
mainly contributed to the general understanding of the history of the village and of 
the history of migration patterns. The section also stresses the importance of typing 
interview notes or transcribing taped interviews as soon as possible and of keeping 
a field diary and a logbook. Data analysis is considered to be linked with data 
gathering and not as a separate step. Nevertheless, much of the data analysis took 
place after fieldwork. Data analysis aimed to identify the factors involved in 
different migration flows and resulted in a conceptual model of migration decisions 
in Mexico. In a second step, these factors involved in different migration decisions 
are analysed for their climate sensitivity. The assessment of climate sensitivity is 
based on the principle of a risk assessment but measures to what extent each 
element involved in migration decisions is likely to be affected by climate change 
and how relevant this factor is in the migration decision-making process. This 
analysis allows the identification of those elements through which the effects of 
climate change translate most severely into changes to existing migration patterns. 
Furthermore, this analysis allows a comparison of the extent of the effect of climate 
change on different migration flows. 
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The following chapter presents the research setting and people’s livelihoods in 
these villages. It also introduces the climate stressors people are suffering from 
and shows how their perception of climate change differs from meteorological data. 
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Chapter 5: Livelihoods and climate change in the researched communities  
After presenting the reasons for the choice of the research settings in the previous 
chapter, the first part of this chapter introduces the communities in which fieldwork 
was conducted in more detail. The second part of the chapter analyses the 
predicted local effects of climate change for Mexico, and particularly for the two 
Mexican states of Zacatecas and Veracruz, and compares them to people’s 
perceptions of climatic stressors and changes to climate variability patterns. In this 
context, the chapter shows the differences between measured climatic variability in 
the past and people’s perceptions of this variability. 
 
5.1 The researched village communities 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, to better illustrate the factors involved in the 
relationship between different forms of migration and climate change four village 
communities were selected for fieldwork, two in Zacatecas and two in Veracruz. 
The following sections present these communities in detail and describe the socio-
economic conditions in each village. 
 
5.1.1 Zacatecas 
The first village in Zacatecas is called Laguna Seca and is situated in the 
municipality of Pánuco. The majority of people in Laguna Seca depend on some 
form of agriculture for their livelihood. The three dominant forms of agriculture, in 
which people in Laguna Seca are involved in, are rain-fed agriculture, which is 
mostly used for subsistence, irrigated commercial agriculture, and greenhouses, in 
which cash crops are produced. Some greenhouses are owned by local large scale 
farmers, while others are owned by international companies which export crops. 
These forms of land use reflect the legal distribution of the land.  
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The majority of the families living in Laguna Seca are allowed to farm their share of 
the ‘ejido’,15 the communally owned land, which is about 5 hectares per family. As 
in most parts of Mexico, land was confiscated from rich hacienda owners after the 
revolution in 1910 and distributed among the village communities in the 
neighbourhood in the form of ‘ejidos’. Many village communities, including Laguna 
Seca then equally distributed the available land among the resident families. Yet, 
the current distribution of land is not that equal anymore for several reasons. 
Families, that came to live in the village after the land was distributed, do not have 
the right to farm land. 'Ejido' land is inherited to the next generation and, according 
to Mexican agrarian law, the use rights are not supposed to be divided but to be 
transferred to only one heir. Landholders are allowed to choose an heir within the 
family, which might be their partner or one of their children (Nuijten 2003). Yet, as 
Nuijten (2003) shows, communities developed their proper application of ‘ejido’ law, 
so that plots are often divided among descendants. This is also the case in Laguna 
Seca, where people were ambiguous about the question if daughters could inherit 
‘ejido’ land. While some village dwellers said that this is the case, others thought 
that it is only sons who can make use of that right.  
 
Customary law in Laguna Seca thus entails that plots are getting smaller when 
they are passed from one generation to the next and that people who have got 
more siblings will inherit a smaller share of land to farm. Also, young people whose 
parents are still alive usually do not own land, although they work in the fields of 
their fathers or fathers in law. Since 1991, selling and letting of plots of 'ejido' land 
is allowed. Therefore, part of the land around Laguna Seca is owned by local large 
scale farmers and external investors who produce a variety of cash crops, such as 
beans, maize, potatoes, tomatoes, onions, garlic, and cauliflower. Crops produced 
in subsistence agriculture are less varied and often limited to beans, maize, and 
                                                 
15
 In the 1917 Constitution of the Republic of Mexico, large land holdings and haciendas were 
abolished and the landowners were expropriated. The land was given to a group of people, usually 
the inhabitants of a village or of several villages. After some time, many communities decided to 
divide the land into allotments, giving a piece of land to every head of family. These allotments 
stayed in the families as they were inherited to the children. According to the wishes of the parents 
all the land could go to one child or the land could be divided amongst the children. A change in the 
law in 1992 allowed selling the allotments, which were by then de facto privatized again.  
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sometimes some chilli. Yet, fieldwork showed that many people do not farm their 
plot anymore because they do not consider it productive. The circumstances of this 
perceived decrease in productivity of subsistence agriculture will be analysed in 
detail in the following chapters.  
 
Because employment opportunities are scarce, the majority of the village dwellers 
are working in commercial farming. Both men and women and in some cases also 
children, are employed as day labourers without an official contract. This means 
that they do not possess any rights regarding pension or insurance derived from 
their work. Another major problem with this type of work is the fact that it is usually 
only available between the end of February and October. People earn between 100 
and 120 Mexican Pesos per day, which is more than twice the 2011 general 
minimum salary for Zacatecas of 56.7 Mexican Pesos16 but still difficult to make a 
living on. The situation is aggravated by the fact that most people do not work 
every day, and in the winter there is no work available at all in commercial farming. 
About 40 village dwellers work in a brewery in Calera, a small town near Laguna 
Seca. Transportation to and from the factory is provided by the company and takes 
about half an hour one way. People working in the brewery are considered lucky 
because they earn 200 Mexican Pesos per day, receive an annual premium of 
5,000 Mexican Pesos, and benefit from paid holidays and health insurance. 
Furthermore, there is work available all year round. Fieldwork showed that the 
brewery is the only company, which is formally employing village dwellers, although 
there are some more bottling plants and small factories based in the vicinity. Some 
men make use of temporary employment opportunities during periods of road 
construction near the village.  
 
As opposed to the three other researched villages, many female interviewees in 
Laguna Seca said that they were working for a salary. On average less than 38% 
of all employees in Mexico are women (INEGI 2004). Fieldwork suggested that this 
rate might be considerably lower in rural communities. The relatively high female 
                                                 
16
 http://www.conasami.gob.mx/pdf/tabla_salarios_minimos/2011/01_01_2011.pdf 
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labour market participation in Laguna Seca might to some extent be explained by 
the fact that it is often the only option to generate a family income, as men are not 
accepted in some jobs. Close to Laguna Seca, there is a clothes factory, which 
employs only women. Salaries are considerably lower than for men in the region, 
as the female workers are paid 500 Mexican Pesos per week, for 6 days of work. 
Yet, women who work in commercial farming report that they earn about the same 
as their male co-workers. Some women commute daily to the city of Zacatecas, 
which takes about one hour and costs 40 Mexican Pesos for a return ticket. These 
women work as maids in the houses of the middle class urban population. Their 
salaries can amount to up to 1,000 Mexican Pesos for five or six days of work, 
depending on the family that employs them. 
 
The second village community in Zacatecas consists of the three communities El 
Tigre, El Nuevo Tigre and Ojo de Agua del Tigre in the municipality of Villanueva. 
El Tigre was a hacienda until the 1940s, when the land became ‘ejido’ land as in 
Laguna Seca. In Nuevo Tigre and Ojo de Agua del Tigre, the struggle for land to 
construct houses and to farm continued until the 1970s. Nowadays, all three 
villages are ‘ejidos’. Agriculture is not as important for people’s livelihoods in El 
Tigre17 as it is for people in Laguna Seca. Cattle raising is used as a form of 
generating income by some families, whose socio-economic status is often above 
the average in the communities. In general, measured by the material 
circumstances in which most people live, the socio-economic status in El Tigre is 
higher than in Laguna Seca. In El Tigre houses are mainly built of brick with a brick 
roof, while houses in Laguna Seca are often made of adobe with corrugated metal 
sheets as a roof. Also, while in Laguna Seca many houses have got dirt floors, 
floors in most houses in El Tigre are tiled. Also, the furniture and the electric 
appliances in many cases hint to relatively higher affluence in El Tigre as 
compared to Laguna Seca. As many people in El Tigre explained, they constructed 
and furnished their houses bit by bit with the remittances they received or earned 
themselves over the years. 
                                                 
17
 From here on ‘El Tigre’ refers to ‘El Tigre’, ‘El Nuevo Tigre’ and ‘Ojo de Agua del Tigre’. 
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The only form of agriculture that is made use of in and around El Tigre is rain-fed 
subsistence agriculture. The few irrigation systems which exist are not used 
because equipment and electricity needed to operate and to maintain them are too 
expensive for the farmers. Like in Laguna Seca, older men are most likely to own 
land and farm it, while mainly young men between the age of 15 and 35 migrate. 
This means that farmers and migrants do not belong to the same demographic 
group of people. The usual stages in the life cycle of male village dwellers are 
childhood and adolescence followed by several trips to work in the USA until they 
consider themselves too old to migrate and take over the farming of the land they 
inherited. This is an important aspect that has to be considered when analysing the 
relationship between the decline of agricultural productivity and migration. Although 
usually in El Tigre, and likely in most Mexican villages, parts of the harvests are 
shared within extended families, a decline in agricultural productivity most often 
does not directly affect the core family of the potential migrant. 
 
Subsistence farmers in El Tigre mainly farm maize and some beans, although, for 
the same reasons as in Laguna Seca, harvests in general have been declining 
over the last years. Some people, therefore, stopped farming and either tried to sell 
or rent their plot or let it lie fallow. Yet, others continue farming for several reasons. 
Current research in other parts of Mexico shows that often those who continue 
farming under adverse circumstances do not depend on agriculture for their 
livelihoods, while those who live off their farmland are more likely to discontinue 
farming when harvests decline18. Explanations for this phenomenon are linked to 
the different perceptions of the role that farming plays in people’s lives. Those who 
do not depend on farming for a living do not have much to lose if they continue 
farming. They can invest as little as possible and see what they get out of their 
effort. In some cases, when the main source of income is remittances, such as in 
El Tigre, farmers do not have any alternative occupation. One of the major 
differences between Laguna Seca and El Tigre is that in Laguna Seca many 
people depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, while in El Tigre this is not the 
                                                 
18
 Appendini – personal communication, 9 March 2011 
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case. In Laguna Seca, people discontinue farming their own fields in order to have 
more time and energy to invest into working in commercial farming because the 
anticipated return is likely to be higher. In and around El Tigre there is no 
commercial farming and commuting to the nearest fields is not considered 
worthwhile, because people think that the available jobs would be assigned to the 
people coming from the villages nearby. The few jobs that might become 
seasonally available in road construction close to El Tigre would be taken by young 
village dwellers who do not possess any farmland yet. Thus the opportunity costs 
of farming are low for those who hold the right to a plot of the ‘ejido’ land. 
Furthermore, fieldwork shows that many people feel attached to their land and do 
not want to see it abandoned. One farmer, who was 62 at the time of the interview, 
answered the question why he continued farming under the precarious 
circumstances he had previously described by saying: “because it is my land”. 
 
5.1.2 Veracruz 
The first village which was selected as a research setting is Cascajal del Río in the 
municipality of Acayucan, in the south of Veracruz. The village is only accessible 
via a dirt road, and although it is situated only a few kilometres away from the 
capital of the municipality, the bus ride usually takes more than one hour. Village 
dwellers think that the bad road connection to Acayucan is a major hindrance 
restricting access to employment opportunities and to secondary schools in the 
town. Therefore, agriculture as well as cattle raising close to the village is very 
important for many people’s livelihoods. Cascajal del Río, like the two research 
settings in Zacatecas is an ‘ejido’. After three decades of communal management, 
it was divided into plots in 1973. Every family which lived in Cascajal del Río at the 
time, received two pieces of land, one close to the river and one further away from 
the river, to ensure an equal distribution of soil quality but also of the flood risk. Yet, 
nowadays, after many plots were passed on to the next generation and some plots 
were sold, the distribution of land is not that equal anymore. Several families own 
larger plots of land, on which they farm mainly sugar cane as a cash crop. Cattle 
raising is an important source of income, although very few people own cattle, and 
119 
 
 
if they do they only possess two or three cows. The majority of people take care of 
the animals of large scale cattle-breeders in return for the right to sell the milk and 
to keep one of the calves every year. Selling milk for industrial processing is thus 
one of the major sources of income for poor people in Cascajal del Río. Some 
subsistence farming is also done although, like in Zacatecas, it is in decline. The 
main crop, which is farmed, is maize, followed by beans and chilies. Depending on 
the time of the year, fishing and foraging for subsistence is used to complement the 
diets of people willing to spend their time on these activities.  
 
The socio-economic level of Cascajal del Río is average in comparison to other 
rural communities in the region. Many houses are built of natural material such as 
adobe for the walls and palm leaves for the roof. While some people said that they 
do not have the resources to buy construction material, others indicated that they 
prefer the traditional houses because it is cooler inside. During the time of 
fieldwork, the last houses of the community were connected to the electricity 
network so that each house now has got access to electricity. Tap water is 
available but not every household is connected yet, the major source of freshwater 
are wells, while the river is still used for washing the laundry by the poorer 
inhabitants. On the other hand, several households own automatic washing 
machines. Different socio-economic levels can thus be observed in the village. 
Remittances from international migration, which started in the early 1990s, have 
led to a change in demographic and socio-economic structures in the village. While 
the number of inhabitants is decreasing and the average age is rising because 
mainly young people and families leave, some of the traditional houses made of 
adobe were replaced by larger brick houses built by people who brought or sent 
remittances to their home village. 
 
Cascajal del Río was severely affected by hurricane Stan in October 2005. Parts of 
the street that connect the village with Acayucan had been completely destroyed 
so that access to the town was impossible for several weeks. Many houses were 
also completely or partially destroyed, mainly the roofs made of palm leaves were 
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blown away. The river San Juan, which is normally about 50 metres away from the 
nearest houses, flooded half of the village. Village dwellers keep a very strong 
memory of that event and many are traumatized and fear that another hurricane 
might destroy their house again. Yet, they are also thinking in a very practical way 
about the consequences, focusing on rebuilding their houses and on re-
establishing the infrastructure in the village.  
 
The second selected research community in Veracruz is Nuevo Renacimiento in 
the municipality of Gutierrez Zamora. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Nuevo 
Renacimiento is the result of the resettlement of seven village communities after 
the big flood of the river Tecolutla in 1999. This flood, caused by heavy rainfalls in 
combination with mistakes in water management, was much stronger than the 
inundations that often occur in this region. It washed away whole villages, 
destroyed the farmland and the orange plantations in the region and killed almost 
all livestock. Official statistics do not exist but, according to people who survived 
the disaster, hundreds of people who lived in the villages close to the river as well 
as in the town of Gutierrez Zamora drowned in the flood.  
 
For those who lost their houses and their belongings in the flood, the government 
of the state of Veracruz offered to construct 240 houses, for which people in the 
affected villages were entitled to apply. Houses include two bedrooms, a toilet and 
a space for washing, a kitchen and a small piece of land around the house to sit 
outside and to do some gardening. In return, people are officially not allowed 
anymore to return and to farm their traditional ‘ejido’ plots because the land is now 
owned by the government. Yet, in practice in many cases this rule is not followed, 
and many people still visit their land. Nevertheless, in general people said that they 
could not farm their land anymore as they did in the past, because they cannot 
access it easily anymore. The distance between Nuevo Renacimiento and the 
communities of origin of its inhabitants is only a few kilometres. Yet, public 
transportation into the communities often does not exist or is very unreliable, so 
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that people either have to walk for hours or pay one of the few people who own a 
car in Nuevo Renacimiento to drive them there.  
 
Interviews in this research setting were not only conducted in Nuevo Renacimiento 
but also in the origin communities. Several families still live in the villages because 
they did not want to leave their land or because they did not receive a new house 
in the resettled community. Fieldwork thus allowed insights into the question how 
people coped with the situation of losing their complete livelihood after a disaster, 
why some did not want to leave their land and others did. Furthermore, the region 
was touched by the hurricanes Dean and Lorenzo in 2007. Thus, people in a 
resettled community again lost part of their livelihoods. Yet, unlike people in 
Cascajal del Río, people in Nuevo Renacimiento in general were not very 
impressed by the hurricanes. They said that some roofs were blown away, which 
they repaired but that most of the damage occurred in agriculture. 
 
Although, most of the resettled people cannot farm their land anymore, agriculture 
remains an important factor for people’s livelihoods. Most employment is available 
in commercial agriculture, although most jobs are limited to the planting and 
harvesting periods of vegetables or to the orange harvest twice a year. Oranges 
and other citrus fruits are the major crops farmed around Nuevo Renacimiento. 
People who remained in their villages still continue farming although they are 
aware of the threat of losing their investment, should the river Tecolutla rise and 
flood their land. The phenomenon that people voluntarily stopped farming their land 
is less common in the villages around Nuevo Renacimiento than it is in Cascajal 
del Río or in the studied communities in Zacatecas. This is because those who did 
not want to leave their home villages after the 1999 flood took this decision mainly 
because they did not want to abandon their land.  
 
Nuevo Renacimiento was also chosen as a research setting because outmigration 
rates are high. Like in Cascajal del Río, mainly young people, both male and 
female, leave the village after they finish secondary school. Also like in Cascajal 
122 
 
 
del Río, destinations of migrants are diverse, including cities within the state of 
Veracruz and within Mexico, border cities in the north of Mexico as well as the 
USA. Unlike in Cascajal del Río, legal international migration based on recruitment 
for temporary employment in the USA or in Canada is an important form of 
migration. Recruiters have been looking for workers in Nuevo Renacimiento for 
several years and often contract the same people every time they visit the 
community. The fact that recruiters come to Nuevo Renacimiento and not to 
Cascajal del Río is likely to be related to the easy accessibility of the former. Nuevo 
Renacimiento lies in walking distance from Gutierrez Zamora or can be reached by 
car in a few minutes from there via a paved road. 
 
5.2 Climate change and climate change perceptions 
The previous sections introduced the research settings in more detail, while the 
previous chapter already explained why Mexico, Zacatecas and Veracruz, as well 
as the studied villages in the two states were selected. The presentations of the 
village communities included some information on the major climate related 
stressors and how these are affecting people’s livelihoods, which will be analysed 
in more detail in the remainder of the chapter. After a short summary of the 
predicted effects of climate change in Mexico follows an analysis of how and to 
what extent observed climate data are congruent with people’s perceptions of 
climatic variability. This section also presents people’s perceptions of the linkages 
between climatic stressors, impacts on their livelihoods, and their migration 
decisions.  
 
5.2.1 Predicted climate change for Mexico 
Climatic stressors in Mexico are mainly related to precipitation extremes including 
meteorological droughts as well as heavy rainfalls leading to floods. Droughts most 
severely affect the north, west, and centre of the country in which a semi-arid and 
arid climate dominates. However, also in the southern states droughts have been 
observed during the previous years. One of the most severe droughts in Mexico 
occurred in 1997/1998 and caused tremendous losses for farmers (Magaña et al. 
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2007). Of similar impact was the 2005/2006 drought, which the Mexican media at 
that time called the worst drought since 50 years and which affected about 500,000 
people in Zacatecas alone19. However, 2007, 2009, and 2010 were also years of 
severe droughts, especially in the north of Mexico. In general, over the last decade, 
more years than average were classified as drought years in many parts of Mexico 
(Seager et al. 2009). 
 
This accumulation of droughts affecting Mexican agriculture is linked to changes to 
the distribution of precipitation over the year. A World Bank paper on the future of 
climate change in Latin America and the Caribbean demonstrates how climate 
change is likely to lead to anomalies in both summer and winter precipitation over 
Mexico (Vergara et al. 2007). Furthermore, the increasing number of drought years 
seems to be closely linked to recent occurrences of El Niño Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO). Looking into different effects of ENSO on precipitation at different times of 
the year, it seems that during the winter El Niño leads to more rainfall in northern 
Mexico, while southern Mexico becomes drier. However, although during El Niño 
years winters in the northern and central parts of Mexico are wetter than on 
average, precipitation in the summer months, when rainfall is needed for farming, 
tends to be below average. Ruiz Barradas and Tejeda Martínez (2008) observe for 
the state of Veracruz that, while during El Niño events annual precipitation actually 
increases over most of the state, El Niño can also lead to multiannual droughts. 
This seemingly contradictory observation can again be explained by the annual 
distribution of rainfall mentioned above. La Niña, on the other hand, in combination 
with a warm subtropical north Atlantic, decreases precipitation over northern 
Mexico and increases it in the south (Seager et al. 2009). Furthermore, La Niña 
years are associated with an increase in North Atlantic Hurricane activity20. 
 
Scientific evidence about a potential increase or decrease of the frequency of 
tropical storms and hurricanes under future climate change scenarios is not 
                                                 
19
 See http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2005/11/10/042n1est.php 
20
 http://www.magazine.noaa.gov/stories/mag184.htm 
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conclusive. While the 2007 IPCC report does not find a clear trend in the annual 
occurrence of tropical cyclones (Parry et al. 2007), the Pew Center on Global 
Climate change observes an increase in the frequency of tropical storms and major 
hurricanes for the period between 1998 to 2007, as compared to the period 
between 1850 to 1990. They attribute this development to a rise in the North 
Atlantic Sea Surface temperature, which in turn has been linked to climate change 
in recent studies. However, fewer hurricanes tend to occur over the Gulf of Mexico 
during El Niño years and La Niña causes the opposite effect. There seems to be 
more scientific agreement about the fact that future hurricanes will be more 
intense, including both an increase in wind speed and precipitation associated with 
the storm. Again this development is linked to increasing North Atlantic Sea 
Surface temperatures21. 
 
In 2008, the government of the state of Veracruz initiated a research project 
(Programa Veracruzano ante el Cambio Climático - PVCC22) with the aim of 
summarizing existing climate change scenarios for Veracruz, and to understand 
how climate change is likely to affect the economy, different ecosystems, human 
health, as well as people’s livelihoods in the state. Palma Grayeb et al. (2008) 
modelled temperature and precipitation changes under different emission 
scenarios for the state of Veracruz. While their models in general suggest that 
yearly rainfall is most likely to decrease rather than increase over most of the state, 
there is a lot of uncertainty as far as the amount of the decrease in rainfall and the 
change of temperatures is concerned. Palma Grayeb et al. (2008) also stress that 
the outcome of future climate change related changes to the hurricane activity in 
the Gulf of Mexico is very uncertain.  
 
5.2.2 Local climate stressors and people’s perceptions 
In the summer of 2010, several extreme climatic events occurred simultaneously in 
Mexico. While a drought between July and September destroyed much of the 
                                                 
21
 See http://www.pewclimate.org/hurricanes.cfm 
22
 See http://portal.veracruz.gob.mx/portal/page?_pageid=1945,4435384 
&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 
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maize harvest in Zacatecas and in other states of the centre, west and north of the 
country, heavy rainfalls and several hurricanes flooded large parts mainly of 
Veracruz but also parts of the states of Tabasco, Oaxaca, and Chiapas. At the end 
of September 2010 the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture announced that 80,000 ha 
of land were affected by the inundations induced by hurricane Karl which made 
landfall in Veracruz on 18 September 2010. In comparison, the 2009 drought in the 
north and centre of Mexico destroyed more than one million hectare of farmland, 
while results for the 2010 drought were not available at that time (SAGARPA 2010).  
Obviously, while droughts affect more agricultural land and are a threat for cattle as 
well, hurricanes and floods affect people’s livelihoods more severely because in 
addition to agriculture and cattle, they also destroy houses and other belongings, 
depriving many people from the option of finding alternative livelihood strategies 
when they cannot live off agriculture anymore. The impact of different extreme 
climatic events on agricultural productivity can thus have different consequences 
for people’s livelihoods. Furthermore, the same event can have different effects on 
people’s livelihoods in different regions. While the production of sugar cane in 
Veracruz suffered a lot from the consequences of the hurricane and the 
subsequent floods, sugar cane production in other states with more favourable 
weather conditions such as Jalisco, Sinaloa and Nayarit was very profitable. 
Therefore, at a national level sugar cane production increased as compared to the 
previous year (SAGARPA 2010).  
 
In the context of the PVCC, the effects of climate change on agriculture in Veracruz 
were analysed using the examples of maize and oranges. The authors found that 
areas in which cultivation of maize is possible are likely to decrease in size in those 
regions in which annual precipitation is projected to increase. However, in regions 
where a decrease of annual rainfall is projected, some areas are likely to shift from 
the category 'not adequate' to the category 'medium adequate' for maize 
cultivation. These changes are likely to mainly affect the autumn and winter 
agricultural cycle, while fewer effects are expected for the spring and summer 
agricultural cycle. Projected temperature increases are unlikely to affect the 
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farming of maize because the plant can grow at temperatures between 20°C and 
30°C. To the contrary, the decrease of adequate areas for the cultivation of 
oranges is mainly linked to projected rising temperatures and less to changes of 
precipitation patterns. These effects are most likely to mainly occur in the centre 
and in the south of the state (Palma Grayeb et al. 2008). 
 
Environmental stressors were also noticed by many people in the researched 
communities. In Zacatecas, all respondents who were asked about the climate said 
that they noticed a change, that it had become drier and that annual patterns of 
precipitation and temperatures had changed over the last decades. Statistics also 
show that the most important local climate stressor in El Tigre is the permanent 
lack of rainfall.  
 
Figure 5.1: Yearly rainfall (in mm) for the Estación Climatológica Villanueva 
 
Source: Author, rainfall data provided by the Departamento de Hidrometeorología, 
Guadalupe, Zacatecas 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the development of yearly rainfall (in mm) between 1963 and 
2007 in the municipality of Villanueva, which is the closest meteorological station at 
about 10 km to the south-east of El Tigre. The graph shows a high variability 
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without a clear tendency of increasing or decreasing rainfall over the last 45 years. 
Yet, according to people’s perceptions, annual rainfall has decreased over the last 
two to three decades. These perceptions could to some extent be explained by the 
fact that people refer to the relative high amounts of annual precipitation in the 
second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s (except for 1989) and take 
these levels as the “normal” situation. With the exemption of the peaks in 2003 and 
2004, the annual amount of rainfall between 1995 and 2005 was lower than 
between 1985 and 1995. 
 
However, the fact that people think that the annual amount of rainfall has 
decreased over the last two decades could also be attributed to a change in the 
annual distribution of rainfall. While people say that the annual rainy season 
normally starts in May or June, rainfall tends to come later in the year, in July or 
August, in recent years. These observations correspond to what interviewees said 
in Alscher's (2009) study into the effects of climate change on migration in Western 
Tlaxcala. The seasonal distribution of rainfall is important for two reasons. First, as 
yields have to be harvested before the cold period starts in October or November; 
rainfall for farming is needed in June at the latest for the agricultural cycle to be 
completed before October. Second, water holes for cattle usually dry out in May or 
June so that rain is needed to fill them again. 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the sum of annual rainfall for May and June as compared to the 
sum of annual rainfall for July and August. As opposed to people’s perceptions, in 
most years it rained more in July and August than in May and June. However, 
since the end of the 1990s the variability of rainfall in May and June, the crucial 
months for agricultural activities, has increased, including some years of very high 
levels of precipitation but also several years of rainfall below 50 mm. People in El 
Tigre thus notice the climatic variability that is affecting their livelihoods, in this case 
the rainfall patterns in May and June, and assign these changes to a general 
decline in precipitation. 
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Figure 5.2: Comparison annual rainfall May/June and July/August (in mm) for the Estación 
Climatológica Villanueva 
 
 
Source: Author, rainfall data provided by the Departamento de Hidrometeorología, 
Guadalupe, Zacatecas 
 
Like in El Tigre, in Veracruz, different perceptions of climate stressors also tend to 
depend on the degree to which people's livelihoods are affected by these 
stressors. In the two communities in Veracruz about half of the respondents 
noticed a rise in the frequency of floods and hurricanes and in annual rainfall 
patterns while the other half have not noticed any climate related changes. 
Fieldwork in Cascajal del Río showed that in general those who are directly 
affected by floods - people living close to the river or farmers whose fields are on 
the bank of the river -, think that the regular floods of the river have become more 
frequent and more severe. However, those who live further away from the river and 
do not own land close to it, mainly think that floods have always occurred and that 
they are just stronger in some years than in others.  
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There was greater consensus among interviewees regarding the question how 
environmental stressors affect their livelihoods and their migration decisions. 
People in the researched communities often perceive environmental stressors as 
stressors to their livelihoods. Yet, in general, they do not think that environmental 
stressors affect their migration decisions. Only one interviewee out of all in the four 
communities directly linked his future intentions to migrate to an environmental 
problem. He had lost his complete harvest after the flood of the river San Juan in 
Cascajal del Río in September 2008. 
 
“I will go and look for work somewhere, now the maize is all gone. Maybe just go 
and come back soon. We will try and farm maize again next year. If another flood 
comes, we cannot live here anymore. Then I have to leave. “ 
“Where will you go?” 
“My brother lives in New York, another brother lives in Monterrey. It depends… the 
jobs, the money. But not Veracruz, my brother just lost his job there.” 
“Will you go alone?” 
“I cannot take them23. How? The food, the rent, the electricity, I need to pay 
everything. For all? How?” 
(Roberto, 25 October 2008 – translation author) 
 
In both studied communities in Zacatecas, people said that droughts did not affect 
migration decisions in any form. They said, similar to the tenor found in the 
Mexican migration literature, which will be analysed in the next chapter, that 
migration was driven by economic necessity but that nobody migrated because of 
failed harvests as a consequence of dry weather. This perception might to some 
extent be explained by the fact mentioned above, that farmers and migrants belong 
to different groups of people. Agriculture seems less important to potential migrants 
than employment opportunities. Nevertheless, many interviewees considered 
climatic stressors and failed harvests a threat to their livelihoods. Yet, they do not 
link these livelihood stressors related to environmental problems to their migration 
decisions.  
 
                                                 
23
 He is referring to his wife and his 3 year old grandson as well as to his parents. He had explained 
earlier in the interview that he feels responsible for taking care of his parents because he is the only 
son still staying in the village. 
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Perceptions in the researched villages in Veracruz are very similar. People who 
became displaced after the 1999 flood of the river Tecolutla in Gutierrez Zamora 
almost all returned to their villages or resettled in the new community Nuevo 
Renacimiento. Interviewees did not remember that anybody had left the region 
because of the flood. Again, this perception does not exclude the possibility that 
people migrated because of some indirect consequence of the flood, which was 
perceived as an economic livelihood stressor. 
 
Meanwhile, according to the interviewees, the main reason for people not leaving 
was the lack of networks in other parts of the country or abroad. Also, it was stated 
that people did not have any money to leave and that they did not know where they 
should go. Similarly, interviewed people in both communities in Veracruz do not 
think that hurricanes are affecting their own or other people’s migration decisions. 
Nuevo Renacimiento and the surrounding villages were affected by hurricanes 
Dean and Lorenzo in 2007 and Cascajal del Río by hurricane Stan in 2005. Many 
houses and the harvests of people who own land were destroyed. Rebuilding the 
houses and the infrastructure of the village was considered the most important 
priority after the hurricane in both communities. Also here, outmigration was not 
linked to any environmental stressors but to economic motives. One woman said 
when asked about the relationship between the hurricanes and outmigration from 
the village: 
 
“Many young people are leaving but not because of the hurricanes. It is because 
they cannot live here. There is no work here.” 
“How did the hurricanes affect you?” 
“It was scary. When it is raining I still cannot sleep. First the flood and then the 
hurricanes.” 
“Have you ever thought about leaving the region?” 
“No, where would I go? The children are going to school, I don’t want them to drop 
out. Maybe once they will be older. Who knows, we might leave. But for the five of 
us we cannot afford it.” 
(Asunción, 26 February 2009 – translation author) 
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5.3 Chapter conclusion 
The first part of this chapter analysed in detail the livelihood situation of the four 
studied village communities in Zacatecas and Veracruz after the previous chapter 
had already explained why they were selected for fieldwork. By stressing the most 
important and distinctive characteristics of these villages, it showed the complexity 
of different natural, political, socio-economic and cultural structures. By this means, 
the chapter empirically supported the idea of the non-linearity of environment-
migration linkages, which was theoretically elaborated in the previous chapter. The 
previous chapter had already suggested that the effects of climate stressors on 
people’s livelihoods as well as migration decisions are complex processes by 
themselves. The nexus between those processes is likely to be even more 
complex.  
 
This chapter also demonstrated that people’s perceptions of climatic variability and 
of recent changes to the climate are not necessarily congruent with data retrieved 
from climatic monitoring. Often, people only observe changes which directly affect 
their livelihoods. Examples are the perceived decrease of rainfall during the time 
when rain is needed for farming in Zacatecas, as well as the different perceptions 
of an increased frequency and intensity of floods, depending on people’s proximity 
to the river in the two communities in Veracruz. People’s perceptions of a changing 
climate thus seem to be crucial for understanding their adaptation strategies. 
Grothmann and Patt (2005) stressed the importance of risk perception and 
perceived adaptive capacity. They developed a model of private proactive 
adaptation to climate change (MPPACC) around these two factors. This model 
demonstrates the importance of understanding the psychological component of 
climate change adaptation, which has so far received little attention. People’s 
perceptions of their adaptive capacity, and of the risks they are exposed to, are 
also important for a holistic understanding of the nexus between climate change 
and migration. Empirical evidence, to be presented in chapter 7.1, has shown the 
importance of perceptions and human agency related to the question if livelihood 
stressors translate into migration decisions or not.  
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Another interesting result, derived from the second part of this chapter, is the fact 
that most people say that climate stressors are affecting their livelihoods but that 
almost nobody considers climate stressors a driver of migration. In combination 
with the fact that environmental perceptions do not always mirror realities, it 
becomes questionable if affected people always consciously consider the 
complexity of their decision-making processes. It has to be acknowledged that 
people’s actions depend on people’s perceptions, so that perceptions might be 
more important than reality itself for decision-making. Yet, research into 
environment-migration linkages, which only considers people’s perceptions, such 
as the study by Mortreux and Barnett (2009) for Tuvalu, seems to miss the point 
that environmental stressors might in turn affect the motives that people indicate 
they are migrating for. Again, these ideas had already been theoretically 
considered in the previous chapter. This chapter put them into a practical context in 
the research settings in Mexico. Thereby it created the basis for the empirical 
analysis of migration decisions and their sensitivity to climate change, which will be 
presented in the next three chapters.  
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Chapter 6: Migration and its drivers in Mexico 
Chapters 3 and 4 presented the conceptual and methodological approach of this 
thesis, which consists of two steps, 1) analysing the potential drivers of migration 
and the factors that are involved in migration decisions with respect to the 
destination and to the form of migration, and 2) testing these potential drivers of 
migration as well as other factors involved in migration decisions for their sensitivity 
to climate change. This chapter as well as chapter 7 are concerned with the 
analysis of the factors that are involved in migration decisions, based on the 
empirical data obtained during fieldwork in Zacatecas and Veracruz, the two 
Mexican states in which fieldwork was set and which were presented in the 
previous chapter. After the analysis of migration flows in and from rural Mexico, 
chapter 8 will then focus on the climate sensitivity of these different migration flows.  
 
This chapter starts with an overview of migration patterns in Mexico, and more 
specifically in Zacatecas and Veracruz and in the researched communities. After 
this introduction to the history, development, and forms of current migration in 
Mexico, a synopsis follows of key explanations of migration in the Mexican context 
as they are presented in the migration literature. These are then compared to the 
drivers of migration that have been identified during fieldwork in the four 
researched communities.  
 
6.1 Migration patterns in Mexico 
Migration from Mexico to the USA has a long history, at least in some parts of the 
country. After the revolution that ended the ‘Porfiriato’24 in 1910, the economic and 
political climate in the country stimulated migration to the United States. Moving 
north had been facilitated by the construction of a railway network that connected 
major cities between the capital and the US border states of California, Arizona and 
Texas (Sánchez 1993, Canales 2003). The industrialisation of agriculture, 
particularly in the south-west of the USA, created the need for a large workforce 
and led to the installation of the ‘Bracero’-programme in 1942. This guest worker 
                                                 
24
 The regime of the dictator Porfirio Diaz from 1876 to 1910 (Sánchez 1993) 
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agreement between the USA and Mexico allowed Mexican nationals to temporarily 
live and work in the USA. The programme officially came to an end in 1964, but the 
dependence of the US-American agro- and construction industry on cheap 
Mexican labour has survived (Sánchez 1993). Nowadays, most border crossings of 
labour migrants between Mexico and the USA are illegal. However, in many parts 
of Mexico, recruiters are still looking for workers who want to legally work in the 
USA for several months. Ten years after the end of the guest worker agreement 
between the USA and Mexico, Canada established in 1974 a temporary migrant 
workers scheme, which has yearly recruited Mexican workers until today (Verduzco 
Igartúa 2007). In 2004, almost half of Mexico-born migrants in the United States 
originated from the traditional migrant sending states in the Central Western part of 
the country: Aguascalientes, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, 
Nayarit, San Luis Potosi, and Zacatecas25. In these states, migration has been a 
livelihood strategy for generations (Kandel and Massey 2002). In contrast, the 
southern and south eastern states of Guerrero, Puebla, Veracruz, Oaxaca, and 
Chiapas only started to send migrants to the USA much more recently. 
 
According to Massey et al. (2005) migration from Mexico to the USA is by far the 
largest flow in the North American migration system. As most of these border 
crossings are illegal, the exact number of Mexicans entering the USA is unclear, 
and estimates provided in different reports vary substantially. The OECD 
International Migration Outlook 2007 identified Mexico as the country with the 
second largest number of international migrants after China. According to the 
report (OECD 2007), Mexican out-migration decreased from 175,000 to 164,000 
people between 2000 and 2005 but it is still larger than of countries such as the 
Philippines or India. The OECD International Migration Outlook 2008, however, 
estimates that about 315,000 people per year migrate illegally into the USA (OECD 
2008).  
                                                 
25
 Mexico-US migration started after the revolution in 1910 and boomed again during the 
guestworker agreement Programa Bracero between 1942 and 1964 (Sánchez 1993). 
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The UN International Migration Report 2006 states a net out-migration rate of 
400,000 people per annum for Mexico (UN 2006). In July 2009, the Pew Hispanic 
Centre published a report based on Mexican and US immigration data and border 
apprehension statistics. It states that migration from Mexico to the USA began to 
decrease in the mid-2000s and that this decrease has continued until 2009. 
Between March 2008 and March 2009, an estimated 175,000 people migrated 
from Mexico into the USA, which is the lowest number in this decade and only 
about half of the average of the previous two years (Passel and Cohn 2009).  
 
As figure 6.1, based on data by the Mexican Migration Project (MMP)26, shows, the 
probability of a Mexican taking a first trip to the USA decreased for both female and 
male documented and undocumented migration from the beginning of the 21st 
century on. Furthermore the graph shows the significantly higher importance of 
male as compared to female migration. Also, it shows the significant dominance of 
illegal over legal migration from Mexico into the USA. 
 
Figure 6.1: Probability of a Mexican taking a first US trip 
 
Source: Mexican Migration Project (MMP)27 
                                                 
26
 http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu 
27
 http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/009firsttrip-en.aspx 
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Although it has received less academic and policy attention than international 
migration, internal migration in Mexico is also a very important phenomenon, which 
is diverse regarding the destinations and the motives for the moves. Escobar 
Latapí (1997) points out that in the 1980s international migration gained 
importance in comparison to internal migration. However, in 1990 still 77.6% of the 
Mexican population that lived outside their state of birth lived in another Mexican 
state as opposed to the remaining 22.4% living abroad (Escobar Latapí 1997). 
There are different forms of internal migration motivated by various life situations 
and involving different groups of people. Fieldwork showed that mainly better off 
families move from rural communities to nearby towns or cities to offer their 
children a better formal education. Sometimes older children and adolescents are 
sent from rural communities to relatives living in urban areas to attend school or 
university. Furthermore, it is very common that women move from one rural 
community to a town or to a neighbouring rural community to join the family of their 
husbands after marriage. 
 
Next to these family related moves, internal migration in Mexico is also often 
motivated by the search of employment opportunities. There are a number of 
different destinations for single migrants or families from rural communities who 
move internally in search of work. The role of the capital as a destination for 
internal migrants in Mexico has been changing over the last decades. After the 
Second World War, Mexico City attracted many residents of rural areas because of 
its fast economic development, while the last two decades of the twentieth century 
brought a change to this pattern. According to data provided by the Mexican 
Statistics Institute (INEGI) and analysed by Izazola (2006), in the 1980s more 
people moved away from Mexico City than moved to the capital from other 
Mexican states. This was a consequence of the social, economic, political and 
environmental problems of Mexico City. However, at the end of the 1990s, after 
living conditions in the city had improved to some extent and the economic crisis 
had weakened the Mexican periphery, Mexico City became a more frequent 
destination for migrants from rural parts of Mexico again (Izazola 2006).  
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Other metropolitan areas in Mexico such as Monterrey and Guadalajara also 
attract labour migrants. Many migrants also move to the border cities to work in the 
‘maquiladora’28 industries, some of them cross the border into the USA at a later 
stage. As the majority of village dwellers in rural communities are accustomed to 
agricultural labour, many of them also move to regions in which they can work in 
commercial agriculture such as the state of Sonora in the North of Mexico. 
 
6.1.1 Zacatecas 
Zacatecas is a classic example of a Mexican state dominated by migration. The 
first migrants were contracted by the USA to build railways and to work in 
agriculture and mining more than a century ago. During the ‘Bracero’ Programme 
from 1942 to 1964, more than 4.5 million Mexicans worked in the USA. Most of 
them originated from the four states of Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato and 
Zacatecas (Massey et al. 1987). Nowadays, Zacatecas is still one of the most 
important international migrant sending states in Mexico. According to the 2000 
Mexican census, 4.9% of the population in Zacatecas migrated to the USA, which 
is the highest rate of all states and far above the Mexican average rate of 1.6 
percent29. Data presented in Table 6.1 indicate that after a decrease of migrants 
between 1995 and 2001, migration from Zacatecas to the USA increased again 
between 2002 and 2008, almost reaching the numbers of 1995. 
 
Table 6.1: Flow of migrants from the state of Zacatecas into the USA by year (in 1,000) 
 
1995 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
25.5 
 
20.4 16.0 12.0 18.7 17.8 17.8 19.7 24.4 22.3 24.2 
Source: Data elaborated by the USEG of ‘El Colegio de la Frontera Norte’ based on the 
longitudinal study ‘Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México’. SEGOB: 
INAMI and CONAPO, STPS, SRE and El Colegio de la Frontera Norte30 
                                                 
28
 Maquiladoras are factories in the Northern Mexican border cities, mainly operated by US-
American investors, that assemble products or parts of products destined for the US-American 
market. The factory owners benefit from the lower salaries in Mexico and the exemption of import 
duties for the USA. Maquiladoras attract migrants from all over Mexico to the Northern border. 
29
 INEGI. XII Censo General de Población y Vivienda 2000, see www.inegi.gob.mx. 
30
 For further information consult the website of the Colegio de la Frontera Norte www.colef.mx or 
the publication ‘Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México’. 
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However, the state of Zacatecas is not homogenous with respect to the intensity of 
international migration. As Delgado Wise et al. (2004) point out, while 23 of the 57 
municipalities in the state of Zacatecas show a very high international outmigration 
rate, seven of the municipalities show a low or very low international migration 
rate31. In general, international migration to the USA is more frequent in the 
wealthier south than in the poorer north of the state. 
 
Indeed, fieldwork in the two communities Laguna Seca and El Tigre has shown that 
migration patterns in the two villages differ significantly although they are less than 
two hours by car away from each other. Although its importance has not been 
widely acknowledged, migration within Mexico is also an important livelihood 
strategy in Zacatecas. The population of the state of Zacatecas only accounts for 
1.4% of the population in Mexico (own calculation with data of the 2000 INEGI 
census) but internal migrants originating from Zacatecas account for 3% of the total 
number of Mexican internal migrants (Pimienta Lastra and Vera Bolaños 2005). 
The following paragraphs will show the importance of different forms of migration in 
the two researched communities in Zacatecas, El Tigre and Laguna Seca. 
 
In El Tigre the rate of illegal international migration is very high. The vast majority 
of migrants go to Chicago where a large migrant community is established, 
although some families also have access to migrants networks in California. In the 
1950s, contractors invited the first migrants from El Tigre to Chicago and after the 
official recruitment had stopped, people continued to go there. In the 1980s, the 
first women crossed the border illegally but nowadays it is again almost exclusively 
men who migrate from El Tigre to Chicago. Many interviewees said that the border 
crossing has become too dangerous for women for several reasons. One important 
reason is that the increased border protection measures, including the wall, make 
the border crossing physically more difficult. People also commented that the 
                                                 
31
 See CONAPO 2001 for a list of all Mexican states and the levels of international out-migration per 
community. 
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violence in border regions and particularly the violent behaviour of smugglers has 
increased, which renders illegal border crossing more dangerous. 
 
Although recruiters from the USA and Canada are still looking for legal migrant 
workers, the majority of migrants prefer to migrate illegally. Interviewees said that 
they can earn more money as an undocumented migrant than as a legal migrant. 
Furthermore, the work contracts of most legal migrants are limited to a few months 
in which they cannot earn enough money to cover their costs of living. It is also for 
financial reasons that village dwellers in El Tigre do not consider internal migration 
to be an option. Several people said that, although they could also find work in 
other parts of Mexico, they prefer to go to the USA because the salaries are much 
higher there.  
 
One interviewee answered my question if he preferred to live in Chicago or in 
Mexico like this: 
 
“I prefer the village over Chicago but one has to make a living somehow. You can 
also find work in Mexico but they do not pay you. You will earn ten dollars a day. On 
the other side32 I can earn that in an hour. I will leave very soon. To send money to 
my wife and to my parents so they can buy something else to eat than tortillas with 
beans. Ten dollars a day… do you want me to leave my family for ten dollars a 
day?” 
(Juan, 6 March 2008 – translation author) 
 
The perception that internal migration is not worthwhile because of the low salaries 
in Mexico shows how the social dynamic in the village influences migration 
patterns. In El Tigre, very few of the interviewees had any internal migration 
experience or knew anybody who had migrated internally, except for some women 
who went to live in another village after they married and some young people who 
temporarily stayed in the city of Zacatecas. Yet, in a village close to El Tigre also in 
the municipality of Villanueva, three different internal migration flows to Mexico 
City, to a border village, and also to the state capital Zacatecas could be observed 
from the 1960s on. Unlike international migration flows, internal migration also 
                                                 
32
 Many people use the term ‘al otro lado’ – ‘on the other side’ to refer to the USA. 
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included women and whole families who migrated either temporarily or 
permanently (García Valle 2011). 
 
In the second research setting in Zacatecas, Laguna Seca, it is interesting to look 
at why people do not migrate internationally because only very few people do so. 
The most important reason is the lack of networks because Laguna Seca does not 
have a history of migration. Most people said they do not migrate because they are 
afraid of the unknown situation or because some negative previous migration 
experiences shaped their opinion about international migration. Several stories of 
people who tried to cross the border and disappeared are told in the village.  
For example, a woman told me about her family: 
 
“I have got seven sisters; they are all married and have got their families. Only one 
of them is living again with my mother. She lost her husband…”  
“What happened?” 
“He tried to cross as a ‘mojado’33. 14 years ago. He called us from the border to tell 
that everything was going well. After that nothing, for 14 years.” 
“Did he go alone?” 
“Yes, he went alone, nobody knows what happened.” 
(Lucia, 2 February 2008 – translation author) 
 
People also expressed their fear of being unable to organise their lives in a new 
environment because of a lack of formal education. According to the 2007 village 
census34, 28% of the adult population in Laguna Seca did not finish primary 
education or did not attend school at all. A direct comparison with the situation in El 
Tigre is not possible because census data about the level of schooling in the village 
do not exist. However, according to teachers in both El Tigre and El Nuevo Tigre, 
the level of education in the community is low. It might thus not be the objective 
lack of formal education that deters people from migrating but people’s low 
perceptions of their educational level as compared to others.  
 
                                                 
33
 ‘Mojado’ means wet. It is the colloquial expression for undocumented US migrants that was used 
by the majority of village dwellers in all four researched communities. It refers to the fact that 
undocumented migrants get wet when they cross the Rio Grande walking or swimming. 
34
 The local health centre carries out a yearly census of the village ‘Cedula de microdiagnóstico 
familiar’. 
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Furthermore, the socio-economic conditions in Laguna Seca suggest that most 
people do not possess the financial means for border crossing. Poverty is also a 
reason why only the wealthier part of the village population responds to the offers 
of recruiters who are looking for legal labour migrants who want to go to the USA or 
Canada. Although transportation, the US visa, and lodging in situ are provided, 
potential migrants have to pay for their passports, which is often unaffordable for 
them. Unlike in El Tigre, internal migration to the agricultural regions at the coast of 
Jalisco and in Sonora is a common livelihood strategy during the winter months. As 
chapter 5.1.1 showed, commercial agriculture is the main source of employment in 
Laguna Seca and during the months without employment opportunities in 
agriculture many people move to search for similar jobs elsewhere. 
 
6.1.2 Veracruz 
The state of Veracruz shows a very different migration pattern compared to 
Zacatecas. Unlike Zacatecas, Veracruz has only a very short history of labour 
recruitment by companies from the USA. International migration started only in the 
1990s, which means that people do not possess long-established migration 
networks on which they can rely. Del Rey Poveda (2007) describes a change in 
migratory behaviour caused by the economic crisis in Mexico in the 1980s, the land 
reform, and NAFTA and the new neoliberal policies, which entailed a shortening of 
subsidies for agricultural produce. He says that as a consequence more families 
had to send migrants while at the same time regional migrant receiving centres 
were saturated. Córdova Plaza et al. (2007) describe how changes in the labour 
market led to a loss of about 20,000 jobs forcing people to start looking for other 
options, including migration to the northern border and into the USA.  
 
As a consequence, current migration patterns in Veracruz are heterogeneous. 
Because of a lack of long and shared migration histories within the village 
communities, destinations of migrants vary, whereas in Zacatecas, as the example 
of El Tigre shows, very often the vast majority of migrants from a village move to 
one particular city in the USA. Nevertheless, international migration from Veracruz 
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increased significantly in the 1990s. The proportion of migrants from Veracruz of 
the total Mexican migrant population rose from less than one per cent to five per 
cent between 1992 and 2000 (Canales 2003). Between 1995 and 2007 the 
absolute number of people migrating from Veracruz to the USA rose from about 5.5 
thousand migrants to more than 80 thousand migrants. Yet, this rate decreased 
again in 2008 to a bit over 56 million people (see table 6.2). The trend that less 
people migrated in 2008 could also be observed during fieldwork in Cascajal del 
Río and Nuevo Renacimiento. Many people feared that employment opportunities 
might be very scarce in the USA because of the economic and financial crisis. 
Therefore, they reasoned that the investment and the risks entailed by a border 
crossing are not justified by the decreased probability of finding a well-paid job in 
the USA. It is thus unclear if this downward trend will continue, or if after the crisis 
the number of migrants will start rising again and continues to increase. 
 
Table 6.2: Flow of migrants from the state of Veracruz into the USA by year (in 1,000) 
 
1995 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
5.6 
 
15.0 9.0 8.3 22.7 31.6 31.1 41.8 61.1 80.4 56.2 
 
Source: Data elaborated by the USEG of ‘El Colegio de la Frontera Norte’ based on the 
longitudinal study ‘Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México’. SEGOB: 
INAMI and CONAPO, STPS, SRE and El Colegio de la Frontera Norte35 
 
Although table 6.2 shows that international out-migration in Veracruz in general is 
increasing, as in Zacatecas, not all communities send international migrants. In the 
2000 INEGI population census, some 122 out of the 210 municipalities in Veracruz 
showed a very low international migration rate while 5 municipalities did not send 
any international migrants at all (CONAPO 2001). 
 
Regional labour migration has existed for a very long time, although only people 
with scarce resources used it as a livelihood strategy (Del Rey Poveda 2007). In 
                                                 
35
 For further information consult the website of the Colegio de la Frontera Norte www.colef.mx or 
the publication ‘Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México’. 
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general, internal migration within Mexico is a very common strategy in Veracruz. In 
2000, Veracruz was the second largest sending state of internal migrants in Mexico 
with 1.3 million persons migrating internally (Pimienta Lastra and Vera Bolaños 
2005). Migrants from Veracruz account for 7.6% of the total internal migrants in 
Mexico (ibid.) However, Veracruz is also the state with the second largest number 
of inhabitants, accounting for 7.1% of the total Mexican population (own calculation 
with data of the 2000 INEGI census). Fieldwork showed that the destinations of 
internal labour migrants from Veracruz are as diverse as the destinations of 
international labour migrants. Thus there is a major difference between internal 
migration from Laguna Seca, Zacatecas and internal migration from rural 
communities in Veracruz. People from Laguna Seca almost entirely move to 
regions in which they can work in commercial agriculture. Migrants from the 
researched communities in Veracruz mainly move to urban destinations, such as 
cities at the Northern border, the metropolitan areas of Mexico City, Guadalajara 
and Monterrey, and the bigger agglomerations within Veracruz, such as the state 
capital Xalapa and the harbour cities of Veracruz and Coatzacoalcos.  
 
Despite their very different historical, socio-economic, and cultural background, 
migration patterns in the two research settings in Veracruz, Cascajal del Río and 
Nuevo Renacimiento, are very similar. Other than Laguna Seca, which does not 
possess a historical migration network in the USA either, both villages show 
international illegal outmigration and its importance is growing. However, illegal 
migration to the USA from El Tigre on the one hand and from Cascajal del Rio and 
Nuevo Renacimiento on the other hand shows two major differences. First, as was 
mentioned above, the majority of people from El Tigre move to Chicago, whereas 
migrants in the two communities in Veracruz do not have any particular destination. 
Second, using the example of the state of Sonora, Castro Luque et al. (2006) 
distinguish between migrants from other states who arrive with the intention to 
cross the border immediately and those who want to stay in the border region first. 
Migrants from El Tigre belong to the first category, while migrants from Veracruz 
can be found in both categories. Some leave their villages with a clear idea of 
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where they want to cross the border, who will help them and where they want to go 
in the USA. Others leave their village with the intention to go to the USA but they 
stay in the border region, sometimes for years, to earn money for the smugglers 
and to establish networks that facilitate the crossing and the arrival. 
 
The choice of the destination of potential migrants does not – as in Zacatecas – 
depend to a large extent on the migration history on the village but mainly on 
personal contacts and financial resources. All interviewees who were asked about 
their plans to migrate said that they will go to a destination where they will be 
received by a relative or a close friend. Many go to the border cities of Matamoros, 
Nogales, and Reynosa, others move directly to the USA and those with the 
smallest resources stay within the state and go to Xalapa or to the Harbour City of 
Veracruz. Some respondents said that they had several options and that they still 
had to decide where they wanted to go depending on their financial resources for 
the journey and on the perceived job opportunities in the different potential 
destination areas. Another important difference between migration patterns in the 
researched communities in Zacatecas and Veracruz is the fact that the majority of 
young people, both male and female, have left or plan to leave their village after 
they finish school at the age of 14 to 16 years. This showed both in Cascajal del 
Rio and in Nuevo Renacimiento. A 20 year old woman in Nuevo Renacimiento, 
who did not want to leave her community, said that she lost all the friends she 
knew at school because they all migrated. “Women or men, it does not matter, they 
all left” (Lisa, 27 February 2009 – translation author). 
 
This means that gender does not seem so much a factor that influences the 
likelihood of becoming a migrant, as it is the case in the Zacatecan villages. 
However, age is an important factor that distinguishes between different forms of 
migratory behaviour. The majority of young people in both communities who want 
to go to the USA prefer to cross the border illegally. In Cascajal del Rio, people 
from about the age of 35 onwards do not migrate at all or do not migrate anymore, 
if they had done so before. Older people sometimes follow their children who 
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migrated to destinations within Mexico but they do not cross the border. However, 
in Nuevo Renacimiento, where many recruiters from Canada are looking for 
migrant workers, people from the age of 35 onwards often choose to go to Canada 
or also sometimes to the USA legally.  
 
6.2 Drivers of migration in Mexico as identified in the migration literature  
The previous section summarised the historical development of migration and the 
existing current migration patterns in Mexico, and particularly in Zacatecas and in 
Veracruz. This section explores the explanations for migration in Mexico in the 
migration literature. In the following section they are compared to the drivers of 
migration identified during fieldwork. This section is divided into two parts. The first 
part summarises the economic drivers and the second part the social and cultural 
drivers that have been mentioned as explanations for migration in Mexico. 
Environmental factors are not considered drivers of migration in the Mexican 
migration literature.  
 
6.2.1 Economic drivers 
In migration theory, economic reasons are the classic explanation for large 
migration movements between countries with an unequal distribution of wealth. 
This is also the case in the Mexican context. The two important aspects of 
economic drivers of international Mexican migration are 1) the lack of sources of 
income in Mexico and the availability of work in the USA; and 2) the wage 
differentials between the two countries. Looking at the Mexican labour market first, 
three problems can be identified: the high level of unemployment, the low salaries 
or sometimes no payment at all when people are working in family businesses and 
the instability and temporary character of many jobs, especially unskilled labour 
(Corona Vázquez at al. 2007). Santibáñez Romellón (2007) is convinced that if 
quality and quantity of employment offered on the local labour market were 
sufficient, migration would not be a problem and the management of international 
migration would not be that complex.  
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Although the conceptualisation of migration as problematic is questionable, it 
seems that economic drivers are an important element in the migration decisions of 
Mexicans. An increase of the number of international migrants is associated with 
currency devaluations and economic crises in Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Martin 1997). Also, shifts in the numbers of internal migrants going to the 
metropolitan areas of Mexico have been associated with economic reasons. As 
described in more detail earlier in this chapter, after a decrease of the number of 
migrants moving to Mexico City in the 1980s, the capital became a more frequent 
destination for migrants from rural parts of Mexico again in the mid-1990s. The 
devaluation of the Mexican Peso by the recently elected Zedillo administration in 
December 1994, as a response to the negative government budget, caused an 
economic crisis. This crisis was worsened by political instability in the country 
brought about by the assassination of the presidential candidate Donaldo Colosio 
and the uprising of the Zapatista movement in Chiapas (Dropsi 1995). However, 
these were not the only problems. “The crisis in Mexico reflects long-term structural 
problems including employment generation, low productivity per worker, a large 
external debt, a highly skewed income distribution and inadequate investment in 
infrastructure” (Peach 1995:375). Izazola (2006) suggests that as a consequence 
of the 1994 economic crisis and the problems linked to it more people from the 
Mexican countryside moved to Mexico again because the size of the city and its 
economy offered more opportunities than the Mexican periphery in this precarious 
situation. 
 
However, not only the economic situation in Mexico but also the situation of the US 
labour market should be taken into account. Already in 1989 Cornelius criticized 
that “Mexican migration to the USA has usually been analysed and debated from a 
‘supply-side’ perspective. There has been much less attention paid to the demand 
side of the migratory phenomenon” (Cornelius 1989:25). The 2008 global 
economic crisis affected employment opportunities both in Mexico and in the USA. 
Instead of an increase of the number of migrants leaving Mexico because of the 
worsening economic situation, it entailed a decrease of the number of Mexican 
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migrants who went to the USA because people feared not finding a job in the weak 
US economy. Return migration also decreased because even those who suffered 
from the economic downturn in the USA assumed that in Mexico it would be even 
more difficult to find work (Passel and Cohn 2009). However, as Hanson (2006) 
remarks, when looking at the effects of economic shocks on migratory behaviour, a 
distinction between legal and illegal international migration should be made. 
Hanson (2006) found that legal Mexico-US migration appears to be more or less 
insensitive to fluctuations of the economy because of the time-lag between the 
application and the actual issuing of the papers, whereas geographic proximity and 
migration networks allow undocumented migrants to respond to economic changes 
relatively quickly. 
 
An aspect that is often ignored when economic drivers of migration are discussed 
is the fact that changes in the national economy do not necessarily affect individual 
wealth. A boom of the Mexican economy is not likely to be beneficial for poor 
people in rural areas where employment opportunities are insufficient and salaries 
are low, with or without an economic crisis. Those people might at most benefit 
from an increase in the resources that are available for government aid 
programmes, such as ‘Oportunidades’36 and its predecessor ‘Progreso’ in Mexico, 
with a time-lag of several years. Escobar Latapí’s (1997) analysis of the 
interrelation between economic and social conditions and international migration in 
Mexico shows that Mexico-US migration increased during a period of relative 
economic prosperity in Mexico between 1988 and 1994. One might think that the 
explanation of this could be that growing affluence among the population enabled 
more people to find the financial resources for their migration projects. However, 
Escobar Latapí (1997) concludes that some of the reforms intended to improve the 
Mexican economy in fact created rural instability and worsened the situation of the 
urban labour market. As a consequence, although the Mexican economy 
performed better as a whole, the financial situation of many people became more 
                                                 
36
 For further information about the ‘Oportunidades’ programme see Juárez Bolaños and López 
Estrada (2008). 
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difficult. Furthermore, he found that some objective improvements of the quality of 
people’s lives, such as a rising life expectancy, and better education and housing, 
did not necessarily satisfy people in such a way that they decided to stay. 
Therefore, Escobar Latapí argues that assessments of the welfare of a society 
“should include, notably, the relationship between a population and work and 
income, and also an evaluation of what makes people decide which jobs and living 
conditions are desirable and will lead to their long-term welfare” (Escobar Latapí 
1997:39) . 
 
In the context of an analysis of economic drivers of migration, a distinction should 
also be made between people who migrate to earn money that is needed to cover 
the basic needs of their families and people who migrate to maintain or to improve 
their standard of living. The Mexican rural exodus, as a consequence of the 
agricultural crisis in the 1990s, was the result of many people temporarily or 
permanently leaving rural areas and searching to maintain their livelihoods 
elsewhere. The majority of these migrants left to earn money for food and basic 
consumer items. Another group of migrants moved to maintain or improve their 
current lifestyle although they could have made a living without migration. Del Rey 
Poveda (2007) describes this phenomenon by using the example of Veracruz. He 
acknowledges that in Veracruz some people also migrate out of a necessity to 
survive but he argues that many want to accomplish a project, such as building a 
house, opening a shop, or paying for the higher education of their children.  
 
6.2.2 Social and cultural drivers 
Before the role of social and cultural factors as drivers of migration will be 
analysed, a distinction is made here between social and cultural factors that to 
various extents cause migration, such as the social pressure on young people to 
migrate, and social and cultural factors that facilitate migration processes, such as 
networks. In this chapter only the former will be discussed, while the latter will be 
analysed in more detail in chapter 7.  
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As opposed to the neo-classical approaches that seek the drivers of migration in 
the economic situation of the migrants only, more recent studies investigated the 
social and cultural aspects of migratory behaviour. Social pressure and cultural 
change have also been identified as drivers of migration in the Mexican migration 
literature. There are two ways in which social and cultural aspects stimulate 
migration: 1) in some communities the fact that the majority of young people start 
to migrate at a certain age obliges individuals to follow this example; and 2) 
increased material desires as a consequence of changing values and norms, as 
well as rising personal and general living standards in the community force people 
to seek sources of income elsewhere. 
 
In regions in which migration is an important livelihood strategy, such as in many 
parts of Mexico, it often has become a part of people's lives. People are expecting 
and expected to migrate in their young adulthood, a phenomenon that Kandel and 
Massey (2002) refer to as the ‘culture of migration’. Moctezuma Longoria (2005) 
quotes several authors who perceive migration as a rite of passage for the transfer 
into adulthood. Young men move to the USA to become part of the migrant 
community and to fulfil their home community's expectations about the values and 
the behaviour of its members. 
 
“Migration to the United States has become a tradition and a way of life that obliges 
all young people to migrate. Going north has, during the last years, become a rite of 
passage” (Alarcón 1988:349-350, quoted in Moctezuma Longoria 2005:98 – 
translation author). 
 
Social drivers of migration have thus been interpreted as a form of social pressure 
'forcing' especially young men to migrate in order to establish conformity with the 
expectations of the village community. Other authors, however, stress that also 
changing expectations of the individual about his or her own life create a need to 
migrate and to raise more money to meet these expectations. Changes to 
consumption patterns, and the influence of different cultural aspects that migrants 
encounter during their stay in the USA, increase the need for more material goods 
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(Cordero Díaz 2007). In many cases, these needs can only be satisfied by means 
of migrating or by means of the remittances sent by relatives. 
 
As this review of the Mexican migration literature has shown, the discourse is 
dominated by those who name economic, social and cultural, or both (Cordero 
Díaz 2007) as the predominant drivers of migration. Environmental stressors are 
not mentioned in the literature as drivers of migration, neither alone, nor in 
combination with other drivers. As discussed in chapter 5, empirical results in the 
four researched communities show that people also do not perceive any linkages 
between climate or environmental stressors and migration. The following section 
examines what the people in the researched communities in Zacatecas and 
Veracruz indicate as potential drivers of migration. 
 
6.3 Potential drivers of migration in the researched communities 
This section summarises the livelihood stressors and potential drivers of migration 
that were identified by respondents in the four researched communities. These 
livelihood stressors might drive migration but they might also drive other 
responses. The livelihood stressors that were mentioned in the interviews and that 
were observed during fieldwork point to differences and similarities between the 
four communities. Chapter 4 showed that most of the information on which this 
thesis is based comes from semi-structured interviews, participant observation as 
well as life histories. This empirical material was searched for references about 
problems and difficulties that people say they are facing in their home 
communities. For analytical purposes, these problems threatening people's 
livelihoods identified during fieldwork have been divided into four categories 1) lack 
and decrease of employment opportunities, 2) decreasing purchasing power, 3) 
small-scale and subsistence agriculture and foraging more difficult, and 4) 
increased desires and aspirations. It has to be acknowledged that the categories 
overlap and that they are linked to each other to a certain extent. However, they 
are believed to reflect, in the best possible way, a summary of the opinions that 
were expressed in the researched communities.  
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The purpose of this section is to introduce the stressors to people's livelihoods that 
will in chapter 8 be tested for their climate sensitivity. As chapter 5 showed, 
although the climate is perceived to be changing by many people in the researched 
communities, people in general do not perceive these changes as directly 
threatening their livelihoods and even less as affecting their migration decisions. 
Therefore, environmental shocks and stresses, do not form a fifth category of 
livelihood stressors in addition to the four categories mentioned above, although 
they might be directly or indirectly linked to the first three of the categories. The 
following sections present the four categories of livelihood stressors as found in the 
four researched communities, in the order of frequency in which they were 
mentioned.  
 
6.3.1 Lack and decrease of employment opportunities 
The lack of employment opportunities was perceived as the major threat to 
people's livelihoods and the most important driver of migration in all four 
researched communities. The majority of interviewees mentioned that one of the 
most serious problems they are personally facing is the fact that it is difficult to find 
and keep paid work in or close to their home community. All interviewees said that 
the lack of employment is in general a serious problem for people living in the 
village community. Also, those who had migrated before indicated the lack of 
employment opportunities in and close to their village as one of the most important 
reasons to migrate. Similarly, when people who had not migrated before were 
asked why their family members or fellow village dwellers decided to migrate, all 
interviewees indicated that they could not find employment close to their home and 
therefore decided to leave. In the two communities in Veracruz, people also 
commented that employment opportunities have significantly decreased over the 
last decades.  
 
In Cascajal del Río people link the decrease of employment opportunities to a 
decrease in the number of large cattle ranches and large scale farmers who used 
to recruit many day labourers in the village and also permanently employed some 
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of the people. González-Montagut (1999) describes the rising and falling numbers 
of livestock in Veracruz since the colonisation in the 16th century. The rising number 
of cattle after the Mexican revolution in 1810 was accelerated by the growing 
demand for meat and dairy products in Mexico City. A century later, the introduction 
of different breeds, improved disease prevention and technologies, as well as the 
clearance of forests for pasture stimulated the development of large scale cattle 
ranches in Veracruz. Political support to expand cattle activities in Veracruz 
attracted migrants from Mexico City and from other regions in Mexico. Territory for 
cattle ranches was created by transforming forests and agricultural land into 
pastures, and in the 1970s many small-scale farmers rented their fields to cattle 
farmers. After a slight decrease of the number of livestock in the early 1980s, it 
grew again until the early to mid-1990s. Under the presidency of Salinas, 
subsidies, including the support for cattle ranches were shortened, and Mexico’s 
entry into NAFTA forced cattle ranches in Veracruz to compete with foreign meat 
production. These developments required an intensification and modernisation of 
livestock production, which large cattle ranches in northern Veracruz could comply 
with, while many cattle ranches in southern Veracruz had to turn to alternative 
forms of land use. Labour extensive monocultures, including Eucalyptus 
plantations, replaced pastureland in many parts of southern Veracruz from the 
1990s on (González-Montagut 1999). Thus, while Veracruz at the end of the 1990s 
still was the largest producer of livestock in Mexico (Sánchez-Gil et al. 2004), the 
southern part of the state experienced a substantial decline of cattle ranches and 
many people who used to work on these ranches lost their jobs, as mentioned by 
many interviewees in Cascajal del Río. 
 
In general, changing market conditions for agricultural produce throughout Mexico 
forced many landowners to close down their businesses. Neoliberal policies, 
initiated in the 1990s, reduced subsidies and eliminated minimum prices for 
agricultural produce. These developments can also be linked to Mexico’s opening 
to the international market, which many commercial farmers were not prepared for. 
Husted and Serrano (2002) argue that in the past, Mexican companies, including 
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agrobusinesses could count on government support in case they were 
unsuccessful. These policies changed with the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which came into force in January 1994 and facilitated the 
import of subsidized agricultural produce from the USA. As a consequence, many 
Mexican farmers could not compete with the prices anymore and stopped 
producing. Therefore, a large number of people lost their jobs and had to find new 
sources of income elsewhere (Márquez Herrera 2008)37. 
 
Empirical evidence from Casjacal del Río has shown that, although some migrants 
still go to the industrial and petrol processing centres of Coatzacoalcos or to the 
harbour of Veracruz, others think that these destinations are saturated and 
employment opportunities there are too scarce to justify a move. These people 
prefer to envisage long distance migration, either to the cities at the northern 
border or into the USA. In Nuevo Renacimiento, the majority of village dwellers are 
employed in commercial agriculture, which is mainly based on producing citrus 
fruits. Harvesting citrus fruits is a seasonal work by its nature with two annual crop 
cycles leading to two periods of about two months every year in which most of the 
work is available and the rest of the year in which people have to find other kinds of 
employment. During these periods many people work in other forms of commercial 
agriculture, such as weeding the fields and harvesting vegetables, or in the 
construction industry. Some people also use the money they earned during the 
times of the harvest to live through the months with fewer work opportunities.  
 
In Laguna Seca, Zacatecas, the majority of the village dwellers are also employed 
in commercial agriculture, which is seasonal because no farming is possible during 
the cold winter months. Due to a lack of other employment opportunities on a large 
scale, some people migrate seasonally to agricultural regions within Mexico, while 
others stay and live off their savings, as the people in Nuevo Renacimiento do. 
Many elderly people in Laguna Seca think that the number of employment 
                                                 
37
 For an extensive overview of the decline of productivity of the Mexican agricultural sector by 
using the example of the state of Zacatecas, see Márquez Herrera 2008. 
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opportunities in general has decreased in Laguna Seca because some landowners 
decided not to farm anymore or to farm less for the same reasons that can be 
observed in Cascajal del Río. As alternative employment opportunities hardly exist, 
the majority of people are forced into the circle of working in commercial agriculture 
in the summer and migrating to areas of commercial farming elsewhere in Mexico 
during the winter months. 
 
In El Tigre the situation is different because almost no employment opportunities 
are available in the close proximity of the village. There are some jobs in 
restaurants, hotels, shops, and in the construction industry in the municipal town of 
Villanueva about 15 km away from El Tigre. However, according to many people 
interviewed in the village, those jobs would likely already be taken by the 
inhabitants of Villanueva. Furthermore, there is no public transportation that 
connects El Tigre with Villanueva. Therefore, people would have to rely on the 
privately run bus shuttle that leaves El Tigre early in the morning and returns in the 
early afternoon, invest in private transportation, or walk. Linked to these 
transportation problems, people in El Tigre who were asked about their intentions 
of finding a job in Villanueva said that the low salaries they could earn if they were 
lucky enough to find a job at all would not justify the effort.  
 
There is some commercial farming between Villanueva and the city of Zacatecas. 
However, again, people in El Tigre assume that those jobs are already taken by the 
people who live close to the fields and that the small revenues do not justify the 
effort of commuting there. Furthermore, unlike in Laguna Seca and Cascajal del 
Río, there are no recruiters looking for agricultural day labourers to work in the 
neighbouring villages of El Tigre. The land around El Tigre is community-owned 
‘ejido’ land and many families in the village dispose of some hectares to cultivate 
what they need for their own consumption or what they want to sell on a small 
scale. The land used to be a large land holding (hacienda) owned by a single 
family. In the 1960s (El Tigre) and in the 1970s (El Nuevo Tigre), people started an 
uprising to fight for land, which they finally won. Therefore, there are no large land 
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holdings anymore around the village today. This fact might be linked to the long 
history of international migration of El Tigre. It is likely that recruiters were 
successful in El Tigre in the 1950s in the first place because it was a welcome way 
of escaping the status of a landless day labourer.  
 
The lack or the decrease of employment opportunities, which is the most important 
stressor of people's livelihoods, has thus two forms. It can be permanent as in 
Cascajal del Río and in El Tigre, or seasonal as in Nuevo Renacimiento and in 
Laguna Seca. This distinction is not clearly made in most of the Mexican migration 
literature that was reviewed in the previous section. Only Corona Vázquez et al. 
(2007) mention the problem that employment in rural Mexico, especially of 
unskilled labourers, is often temporal. In combination with the tendency of a 
decreasing number of employment opportunities in general, formal sources of 
income are becoming more and more insecure. People do not only have to 
maintain themselves during periods, in which employment is seasonally not 
available but they also cannot rely on finding work once the difficult season in the 
labour market is over.  
 
6.3.2 Decreasing purchasing power 
The problem of decreasing purchasing power has two forms in rural Mexico. First, 
people's purchasing power is decreasing because market prices are rising while 
wages are remaining the same or sometimes are even decreasing. Rising prices of 
food items and basic consumer goods are caused by several factors including the 
global food crisis, the world financial and economic crisis, and government policies 
that favour international trade agreements over the needs of the local population38. 
Secondly, farming, especially on a small scale, is not profitable anymore because 
prices for the products needed to farm such as seeds, fertilizers, and agricultural 
machines are rising, whereas prices for agricultural produce are decreasing. 
Furthermore, intermediate traders seem to enjoy a very strong position on the 
                                                 
38
 Again, see Márquez Herrera 2008 for a description and an analysis of these policies. 
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Mexican market, which enables them to buy for very small prices and to sell for 
very high prices to shops, markets or to the consumers.  
 
These two problems were found in all four researched communities and there does 
not seem to be a difference between the two states. The aspect that the wages that 
are paid for unskilled labour are usually insufficient for a family to survive, was 
perceived as being as important a problem as the actual lack of employment 
opportunities. Surprisingly, low wages were perceived as being even more 
problematic than the lack of sources of employment in El Tigre. As mentioned 
above, in and around this community almost no employment opportunities exist 
and people do not migrate internally to find work within Mexico. The vast majority 
of people thus do not have any experiences on the Mexican labour market. Yet, 
many respondents claim that they could find employment in Mexico if they wanted 
to but that they do not want to try because it would not be worthwhile due to the 
low wages they could earn. This argument is used by many as an explanation of 
their intention to migrate internationally.  
 
6.3.3 Small scale and subsistence agriculture and foraging more difficult 
In many rural communities in Mexico, people used to live mainly off the 
subsistence farming of maize and beans, and off raising small domestic animals 
such as chickens, turkeys and goats. This was supplemented by the hunting of 
small animals, fishing where rivers, lakes or the sea are close and the collection of 
wild plants and fruits such as the cactus fruit in Zacatecas and a wide range of 
tropical fruits in Veracruz. Elderly people in all communities say that they did not 
need money when they were young, because they could farm, raise, or collect 
everything they needed for their diet. Nowadays, both subsistence farming and 
foraging are perceived to have become more difficult. The older generation often 
says that young people are unwilling to work hard all day only to satisfy their basic 
food needs.  
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While fieldwork showed that this observation seems to some extent to be true, 
some changes also have affected subsistence farmers and foragers. First, 
subsistence farming is suffering from the same problem as small scale commercial 
farming, which has been described in the previous section. Rising prices of seeds, 
fertilizers, pesticides, and for the machines needed to prepare the soil, made 
farming for many poor people unaffordable. Second, the extensive use of 
pesticides and fertilizers and the dominance of monocultures rendered the soil less 
fertile and productive. Furthermore, pesticides and fertilizers limited the growth of 
plants and herbs that people used to collect from around the fields. This 
phenomenon can especially be observed in Cascajal del Río, a community in 
which wild vegetables and fruits guaranteed a very balanced diets some decades 
ago. In addition, extensive exploitation and pollution locally extinguished many 
animal species that people used to hunt. In Cascajal del Río many small animals 
are now protected and hunting them is prohibited. According to the ‘ejido’ 
representatives of Cascacal del Río this does not necessarily reduce hunting for 
people's personal consumption but limits the possibilities of selling the meat to 
fellow village dwellers.  
 
Another problem is that climate stressors increasingly affect subsistence farming 
and also the growth of wild plants and herbs. As chapter 5.2 showed, in both 
communities in Zacatecas, all interviewees said that the climate had become dryer 
over the last twenty years, that the annual cycle of precipitation had changed, and 
that rainfall is less frequent but often more severe nowadays than it used to be in 
the past. These changes are thought to be severely affecting the success of the 
harvest. Therefore, in recent years, many people decided to refrain from farming. 
This development was aggravated by the fact that larger investments are needed 
for more unpredictable results. Longer periods of droughts are also affecting the 
growth of the cactus and its fruit; both the plant and the fruit are usually consumed 
in large quantities in El Tigre. Interviewees in both villages in Zacatecas reported 
that in 1997 a period of frost and snow, which usually does not occur in this region, 
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destroyed most of the cactus plants in Laguna Seca. Since then, cactus does not 
grow anymore and people had to adapt their diets accordingly.  
 
In Veracruz, the effects of climate stressors on farming are perceived as being less 
severe than in Zacatecas. Chapter 5.2 also showed that in Cascajal del Río some 
people think that floods of the river have become more severe, while others do not 
think that this is the case. Interestingly, those who own farmland, that is so close to 
the river that it gets flooded and their harvests get destroyed, think that the flooding 
is more severe than it used to be some decades ago, while those who only own 
land further up the hill do not think so. In 2005, hurricane Stan destroyed many 
houses and almost the complete harvest of the village. Most people are afraid that 
another hurricane might soon affect their village again, but they do not perceive 
hurricanes as a threat to their harvests but mainly to their houses. The people in 
Nuevo Renacimiento were resettled to this village because a huge flood of the river 
destroyed their native communities and all their farmland in 1999. Many people 
discontinued farming after that event because the farmland is close to the river and 
to their old communities and therefore difficult to reach without transportation. 
None of the interviewees in Zacatecas and Veracruz directly mentioned changes to 
precipitation patterns and extreme events as livelihood stressors or drivers of 
migration. Yet it seems that these climatic shocks and stresses contribute to a large 
extent to the decline of the potential of subsistence agriculture and foraging and 
indirectly affect people’s livelihoods.  
 
6.3.4 Increased desires and aspirations 
Cultural change is affecting people's livelihoods in two ways. First, many young 
people are not willing to continue subsistence farming and foraging because they 
think that it is hard work that does not offer enough revenues. Sometimes, they 
help their parents in the fields but they do not want to farm by themselves. In El 
Tigre this development can be most clearly observed. It is very often the case that 
young people migrate to the USA and their parents who do not migrate anymore 
farm the land. If they are physically not able to farm anymore, the fields are 
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abandoned and many of the young men do not continue farming during the years 
when they are at home either. They think that their stay at home should be used to 
relax and to prepare for the next trip and not to be spent working for basic food 
items only. In Cascajal del Río, there is a disagreement between the younger and 
the older generation about the reasons why subsistence farming and foraging is 
decreasing. While the younger people say that the plants just do not grow anymore 
like they used to some 20 or 30 years ago, many elderly people think that their 
children are just too lazy to farm. One 55 year old man said about the farming 
habits of young people: 
 
“They probably told you that nothing grows anymore. Do not believe them. 
Everything grows as it did when I was young. They just don't want to work as we 
did. I always got up at four in the morning to work. Worked in the sun, in the heat, 
when I was tired. Now they only want to relax and have fun” (Valentin, 8 February 
2009 – translation author). 
 
It is likely that both points of view are true to a certain extent. In any case, a 
decrease in subsistence farming increases people's need for money. Another 
aspect that increases the need for money, especially among young people, is the 
changing lifestyle. Many young people are more demanding than previous 
generations as far as their diet, their way of dressing and their way of spending 
their free time are concerned. Influenced by their stays in the USA or Canada and 
by TV shows, many young people want to break with the traditions of their parents 
and to create their own way of life, which is often more expensive than the lifestyle 
of the older generations. Their children often take over these new ideas and refuse 
to wear certain clothes and to eat or drink certain food items.  
 
6.4 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter started with an analysis of migration patterns in Mexico and 
specifically in Zacatecas and Veracruz as well as in the four researched 
communities. This overview was based on the Mexican migration literature and on 
information obtained during fieldwork. It showed that migration patterns are 
heterogeneous within Mexico, and between and also within the two researched 
regions. In a second step, the chapter showed the drivers of migration identified in 
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the Mexican migration literature and the stressors to people’s livelihoods and 
potential drivers of migration that were found in the four researched communities in 
Zacatecas and Veracruz. They are summarized in table 6.3. Both, the literature 
review and the empirical results revealed economic as well as social and cultural 
aspects as drivers of migration, while environmental stressors were not mentioned.  
 
The analysed migration literature often focuses on Mexico-US migration because 
wage differentials between Mexico and the USA and the instability of jobs in 
Mexico are regarded as major drivers of migration. However, in Cascajal del Río 
und Nuevo Renacimiento, internal migration is at least as important as international 
migration and in Laguna Seca international migration hardly plays any role at all. 
Only in El Tigre, the argument that work is paid better in the USA than in Mexico is 
used by many people. Nevertheless, it is much more a reason for the choice of 
destination than for the choice of migrating or not migrating. As there are almost no 
jobs available in or around El Tigre, people have to leave the village if they want to 
find paid employment. Thus they do not migrate because of the higher wages in 
the USA but they choose the USA over destinations in Mexico because of the wage 
differentials.  
 
Table 6.3: Drivers of migration found in the literature and during fieldwork 
 
 
Source: author 
 
 Economic drivers Social and cultural drivers 
Literature Lack of 
employment 
opportunities 
in Mexico 
Wage 
differentials 
Mexico-
USA 
Instability of 
jobs in 
Mexico 
Increased 
desires 
(cultural 
change) 
Culture of 
migration (social 
pressure) 
 
Fieldwork Lack and 
decrease of 
employment 
opportunities, 
including 
seasonalities 
 
Decreasing 
purchasing 
power 
Small-scale 
and 
subsistence 
agriculture 
and 
foraging 
more 
difficult 
Increased 
desires 
and 
aspirations 
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The majority of respondents in all four researched communities said that one of the 
major problems was that prices for basic consumer goods were rising while the 
level of wages was stagnating or even decreasing. The resulting decrease in 
people’s purchasing power is seriously affecting many families because already 
before the prices rose they had difficulties to meet their basic needs with the 
income they could earn in Mexico. This problem is not mentioned in the Mexican 
migration literature because it is a very recent phenomenon that is mainly caused 
by the global food crisis that started in 2007, and the global economic and financial 
crisis that started in 2008.  
 
The decrease in the productivity of subsistence agriculture is to some extent linked 
to the problem of rising prices because all items needed to farm have also become 
more expensive. However, other reasons such as the degradation of the soil, 
changes of the climate, and a change of the perception of the importance of 
farming for the younger generation also appear to play a role. In the 1980s, the 
crisis of the Mexican countryside was linked to the rural exodus and also to 
international migration (Arizpe 1983) but afterwards agricultural problems have not 
been mentioned as drivers of migration anymore in the Mexican migration 
literature. 
 
The migration literature introduces two forms of social and cultural drivers of 
migration. First, the fact that the majority of young people in a village community 
migrate, creates a culture of migration (Kandel and Massey 2002), which socially 
forces young people to migrate if they want to or not. Second, cultural change 
brought about by visits to the USA or Canada and by the media entails an 
increased desire of the younger generation for different kinds of food, clothes, 
electronic equipment, cars and other items. Fieldwork showed that the latter point 
was an important aspect, especially in El Tigre, while the former argument was not 
found in any of the four communities. 
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This chapter provides the basis for understanding the causes of migration based 
both on expert opinion and previous studies as well as on the perceptions of village 
dwellers. However, it has not fully explained why the livelihood stressors identified 
in the researched communities might lead to migration as opposed to other 
responses. Chapter 7 seeks to do this by discussing the factors that affect people's 
willingness and ability to migrate, and the responses that might be available as 
alternatives to migration. Furthermore, it will analyse what factors influence 
people's decisions about the form of migration they choose. In chapter 8 the factors 
that are threatening people's livelihoods and that were analysed in the third part of 
this chapter will be tested for their sensitivity to climate change.  
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Chapter 7: Factors affecting migration decisions in Mexico 
The previous chapter argued that the potential drivers of migration identified during 
fieldwork can be summarised in the following categories: Lack and decrease of 
employment opportunities, decreasing purchasing power, small-scale and 
subsistence agriculture and foraging more difficult, and increased desires and 
aspirations. However, these potential migration drivers might also drive other 
responses. The first part of this chapter is, therefore, concerned with an analysis of 
other factors that are involved in the decision-making process for or against 
migration, given the underlying conditions identified in the previous chapter. The 
second part of the chapter then analyses the choice of the form of migration, 
internal or international, and legal or illegal. This element of decision-making is 
critical in terms of the magnitude of any future flows, should these factors change. 
In the third part of the chapter, alternative response strategies developed by non-
migrants or, as an additional source of income, by families which send migrants, 
are presented. The chapter is based on information obtained during fieldwork in the 
four communities Laguna Seca, El Tigre, Cascajal del Río, and Nuevo 
Renacimiento. 
 
7.1 Factors facilitating migration decisions 
Fieldwork in the four communities showed that the relationship between the factors 
that people perceive as affecting their livelihoods and migration is not linear. The 
answer to the question to what extent these factors translate into migration 
decisions depends on several aspects, which have been grouped in the following 
four categories for analytical purposes: the availability of financial resources, the 
perceived benefit of migration, the perceived ability to migrate, and the willingness 
to migrate which includes the approval of others. These categories partly match the 
adaptation appraisal section in the process model of private proactive adaptation to 
climate change (MPPACC) by Grothmann and Patt (2005:204). Like the categories 
of drivers of migration, these categories of factors that affect the decision to 
migrate or not are drawn from fieldwork and they are interlinked and overlap. Many 
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interviewees also mentioned that a combination of several of these aspects 
affected their migration decision. 
 
7.1.1 Financial resources 
The lack of financial resources, caused by the lack of employment opportunities 
and increasing prices, is one of the major threats to people’s livelihoods and 
therefore a potential driver of migration in all four researched communities. 
Paradoxically, however, the lack of financial resources is also one of the major 
restraints of migration. Migration is expensive because the transport to the 
destination area, and – in case of illegal international migration – the border 
crossing have to be provided for. Depending on the services provided and the 
destination in the USA, the ‘coyote’ or smuggler charges 2,000 to 4,000 USD for 
the border crossing per undocumented migrant. Sometimes this amount, or at least 
a part of it, can be paid off by the migrant’s first salaries in the USA but this carries 
the risk of not being able to pay the debts in case the migrant does not find any 
employment. In most cases though, a part of the trip, including the transportation to 
the border by bus, has to be paid in advance. Some families manage to save this 
money over some months, while others have to borrow the money from a relative 
or a friend.  
 
Furthermore, the life of migrants away from home costs more than the life in their 
home communities. The rent for a room and the utilities have to be paid, while 
people in most cases live in their own houses in their communities where they do 
not pay any rent and the consumption of gas, electricity, and water per person 
within the family is smaller than for the single household of a migrant. Food and 
clothes have to be bought, which is often more expensive in the destination areas 
than in the communities of origin because many migrants move to Mexican 
agglomerations, to the border region, or into the USA. Migrants from all four 
researched communities are usually welcomed by relatives at the destination, 
provided with food and clothes, and invited to stay in their relatives’ homes for the 
first days or weeks. Although in many cases they are not obliged to pay back all the 
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expenses, some kind of reciprocity is expected. This means that migrants who 
successfully finished the migration process will often have debts in their home 
communities, with the ‘coyote’, and at the destination. Therefore, particularly 
undocumented international migrants either need some financial reserves or a 
trustworthy social network to rely on for the financing of the project. Also, illegal 
international migration will only be profitable if the migrant stays for an extended 
period of time and if he or she finds at least one job. According to people who 
crossed the border illegally several times before, this is a relatively new 
development because the border crossing was not so expensive in the past.  
 
Raúl, a 43 year old married man with two children, living in El Nuevo Tigre, has 
been to Chicago twelve times before. He says that he used to go for a year at 
most, then come back preferably before Christmas or the celebration for the village 
Saint in May, stay for a year or two, and go back to Chicago. He explains why this 
is not possible anymore: 
 
“[…] Now I have to go for at least two or three years. Because of the family, I don’t 
want to stay longer than that. But just for a year… no, that is not worth it anymore. 
The ‘coyote’ is very expensive right now. Before it was less than 1,000 dollars. Now 
it is at least 3,000.” 
“Why did it change?” 
“Have you been to the border? They are building this big wall everywhere. You 
cannot cross where and when you want anymore. They have got these big lights to 
find you. When it moves to the left, you start to run. When it moves back you have 
to be on the other side or you get caught. They catch you three times and you go to 
prison. […] So the ‘coyote’ has to choose the route carefully, often the way is also 
longer than before, so they charge more”  
(Raúl, 10 March 2008 – translation author). 
 
According to Hanson (2006), prices for ‘coyotes’ have been rising since 2001, 
when the USA started to enforce their border protection measures. He quotes 
Orrenius (2001) who found, using MMP data, that between 1978 and 1996 the 
average price for a ‘coyote’ varied between 385 and 715 USD. Cornelius (2005) 
calculated that “between the 1996-98 and 2002-04 periods average coyote prices 
rose by 37% from 1,180 USD to 1,680.33” (quoted in Hanson 2006:289). Figure 
7.1 illustrates the development of the costs of border crossings between 1980 and 
2008, adjusted to the 2009 consumer price index. 
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Figure 7.1: Border crossing costs between 1980 and 2008 
 
Source: Mexican Migration Project (MMP)39 
 
Fieldwork also showed rising prices for border crossings between 2004 and 
2008/09. Prices for ‘coyotes’ between 2,000 and 4,000 USD were mentioned by all 
respondents in Zacatecas and Veracruz, depending on the service requested. 
Interviewees in El Tigre said that illegal international migration has become 
significantly more expensive over the last decade and, therefore, it is not an option 
(anymore) for everybody who would be willing to go in search of work to the USA.  
 
However, also for internal migration, people need some financial resources, mainly 
for the bus fare and for a place to stay away from their home. Also, some families 
in the rural communities still farm their own staple food, such as maize and beans. 
If a family member migrates, he or she cannot benefit from this source of food and 
has to buy at the destination what will be farmed at home. Furthermore, the family 
                                                 
39
 http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/009firsttrip-en.aspx 
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might not have the human resources anymore to farm at all if many male family 
members migrate, and therefore need to buy what they might have farmed if 
nobody had migrated. 
 
In Laguna Seca, where internal migration to regions of commercial farming in the 
states of Jalisco or Sonora is the most important form of migration, many people 
cannot afford to migrate even internally. Ana and her family belong to the poorest 
people in the community. The family, consisting of the parents, their five children, 
and a daughter in law lives in a one-room house made of adobe, which is 
substantially smaller and in a worse condition than the majority of the other houses 
in the village. Ana complains about the bad employment opportunities in Laguna 
Seca. All adult family members work as day labourers in commercial farming but 
often they do not find a job. Nobody in her family ever migrated.  
 
“It has never been necessary to go away. Now it would be good but it is too difficult. 
[…] It is the money, that’s the problem. We don’t have enough money to move. If we 
had enough money, then why would we want to move?”  
(Ana, 4 February 2008 – translation author) 
 
Thus, although Ana would not really be happy to move or to see one of her family 
members do so, she is aware of a certain benefit in migration to improve the 
livelihood of her family. Yet, she thinks that it is not possible because of their 
poverty. It is not certain to what degree this perception is influenced by the actual 
unwillingness to migrate, the perception of her family as being poorer as others, or 
the objective impracticality of migration due to a lack of access to financial 
resources. Access to financial resources as a prerequisite for migration, however, 
is not necessarily completely determined by the family’s income. Ana’s family 
consists of six adults who are able to apply for work in commercial farming, the 
major source of income in Laguna Seca. They are thus not disadvantaged as 
opposed to other families working in agriculture who also might find work on some 
days and not on others. The high consumption of alcohol of her husband that Ana 
mentioned later in the interview is also not very uncommon in the village and is 
unlikely to be the only factor that contributes to the household’s poverty. 
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The degree of poverty and, accordingly, the question if a family can pay for the 
migration of one of its members or not, also depends on the family’s social 
position. If there is not enough money available to pay for the expenses, making 
use of credit is an option for those who have got networks and strong bonds to 
relatives or friends. In all researched communities, people are used to asking 
members of their social group to lend them money. It is likely that a formal credit for 
a migration project would be very difficult to obtain, unless the applicant has got 
considerable assets that could serve as a security. 
 
7.1.2 Perceived benefit 
Apart from the fact that many families cannot afford migration or cannot choose a 
certain form of migration because of financial constraints, some people do not want 
to spend their money on migration. As mentioned in chapter 4, people in El Tigre 
do not perceive internal migration as beneficial. They think that the low salaries all 
over Mexico, as opposed to the salaries in the USA, as well as the chance not to 
find a job at all, do not justify spending money for transportation, rent, and general 
living expenses. In all four communities some people think that the situation on the 
labour market at the destination, in the USA or within Mexico, will be the same as 
in their community of origin. Therefore, for them migration is neither a beneficial 
nor a logical alternative to staying at home.  
 
The number of people sharing this point of view has increased during 2008, when 
the consequences of the global economic and financial crisis translated into a 
decrease of employment opportunities. Since then, migration is seen as having 
become a more and more insecure endeavour. The labour market tremendously 
changed, both in the USA and in the traditional migrant receiving regions in 
Mexico, such as the big agglomerations Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey, 
the border cities, and the agricultural zones. As a consequence, many migrants 
became unemployed. The prospective migrants in all four communities are well 
aware of this development and people who consider migration, also consider the 
possibility that they might not find employment at the destination.  
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Juan lives in Zapotal, a small community close to Nuevo Renacimiento. He had left 
for New York two months before his village was flooded in 1999. One week after 
the flood he returned home because he wanted to help his family and the 
community members to reconstruct his house and the public buildings in the 
village. He says that he always wanted to return to New York to stay a bit longer 
and to earn some money. However, he always hesitated.  
 
“Now is not the time to leave. You see, people are just coming back. They lost their 
jobs. How would I find one?” (Juan, 27 February 2009 – translation author) 
 
In El Tigre, the researched village with the most important culture of international 
migration, people are generally more confident to find employment. Many of them 
have worked for the same employer for many years and they know where to look 
for work. Pedro shows me a T-Shirt with the logo of a steak restaurant in Chicago.  
 
“I have worked for them for nine years in total. Every time I went back they had 
work for me. […] I will always find something. There are many restaurants. People 
always need help in the kitchen. I can wash dishes, chop vegetables. I also know 
how to make a pizza. I worked in an Italian restaurant as well.”  
(Pedro, 8 March 2009 – translation author) 
 
Thus the perception of the usefulness of migration, also in a precarious economic 
situation of the destination area, seems to depend on the degree to which the 
prospective migrant knows (or thinks to know) what he can expect on the labour 
market. People, who successfully migrated before, are more likely to be confident 
in finding employment than those who never migrated or who had a negative 
previous migration experience.  
 
However, in some cases, even those people who worked at the destination for 
several years lost their job. In light of this situation, in addition to the question about 
the benefit of migrating, migrants have to ask themselves the question about the 
benefit of staying over returning home. García Zamora (2009) argues that, contrary 
to alarming scenarios of a massive return of migrants to Mexico provided by the 
Mexican press, there is no scientific evidence for this development. He quotes a 
study by the Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF) indicating that recent figures do 
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not show a major return of migrants from the USA to Mexico, and speculating that 
this is also not very likely in the future. COLEF indicates three reasons for this 
assumption: 1) Part of the Mexican migrants are integrated into the US American 
society; 2) The increase of border protection measures has increased the costs of 
returning to Mexico and trying to cross the border again at a later stage; 3) As a 
consequence of the second argument, patterns of circular migration that were 
common for Mexico-US migration have been disrupted and more permanent 
moves occur now instead (García Zamora 2009). 
 
Although evidence for all three above statements was found in the four 
communities, fieldwork shows that in many families migrants returned home earlier 
than they had planned or are at least considering doing so. Carolina’s husband 
worked for four years consecutively in a car wash in California. He returned to 
Cascajal del Río in December 2008 because he could not find any employment 
anymore. Carolina says that there was always less work in winter because of the 
rain but that it had never been that bad in previous years. Her husband wanted to 
earn all the money he needed for the construction of his new house before 
returning. During the last months in the USA, he was losing money because he 
had to pay his rent all the time, while working sometimes only one or two days per 
week. Therefore, he decided to return and to start farming again, hoping to earn 
enough to maintain his family and to finish his house construction project. Migrants 
in the USA, but also internal migrants have been affected by the crisis.  
 
Susana also lives in Cascajal del Río. During our first interview in October 2008, 
she told me about her son who lived in Ciudad de Juárez. She said that he was 
doing very well, earning a living and also sending some remittances. When I visited 
her again in February 2009, she told me that her son and his wife had both lost 
their jobs. 
 
“It is difficult. They do not know what to do. They cannot send me anything 
anymore. They can hardly maintain themselves and their son. One day soon they 
will have to come back. My son is thinking about it. They don’t want to live here but 
where else can they go?” 
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“Do you think that many people who left Cascajal will come back here?” 
“I don’t know. Many already came back. There are no jobs here, there are no jobs 
there. Then they are better off at home.” 
(Susana, 9 February 2009 – translation author) 
 
Many migrants were not able to make the profit they expected to make and some 
of them were also losing money while trying to maintain themselves at the 
destination areas without earning anything. Thus, while employment opportunities 
in rural Mexico are declining, the perceived benefit of migration also declines for 
many people. Yet, still many mainly young people have got the intention to migrate, 
often to leave their home village which they think has nothing to offer for them. For 
example, again in Cascajal del Río, in autumn 2008 eight out of the twelve 
students in the last year of secondary education indicated that they wanted to 
leave the village right after finishing school or at least very soon thereafter. 
 
7.1.3 Willingness to migrate and approval of others 
As fieldwork showed, in most cases, the expected benefit or non-benefit of 
migration over staying in the home village is financial. However, some people in the 
researched communities do not consider migration as beneficial for different 
reasons. Many of them think that the social cost of leaving their family and friends 
behind does not outweigh the financial gain they might expect. For some people, 
the emotional bonds with their home community are so important that they do not 
want to leave.  
 
Roberto lives with his wife and three children in Laguna Seca. He went to Chicago 
twice, making use of the migration networks of his wife who was born in El Nuevo 
Tigre. After the birth of his second child, he decided with his wife that he would not 
migrate again. Because of his employment in road construction in San Luis Potosí, 
a neighbouring state in the south-east of Zacatecas, for several years and now in a 
mine in the extreme north of the state of Zacatecas, he is used to being away from 
home during the week or sometimes for several weeks. However, he does not want 
to go to the USA anymore, where he would be obliged to stay for a year or longer.  
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“With the work I have, I can maintain my family and help my parents. I just could not 
construct a new house for my parents so far, I promised them to do that. […] In 
1999 and 2001 [the years in which he migrated – author], I earned enough money 
to construct this house. So now I prefer to be here. Now my children are small and 
my parents still alive. (Roberto, 9 June 2008 – translation author) 
 
Concerns for the family and the old parents are often a reason for, or at least a 
factor leading to, the decision not to migrate. Another example is Bertha in Nuevo 
Renacimiento. She does not want to migrate and says that one factor that 
influences this decision is that she does not want to leave her mother alone with 
the care for her handicapped brother. Arturo in Cascajal del Río is considering to 
migrate but is concerned because all his siblings have already left. He does not 
want to leave his old parents alone in the village and he thinks that he will not be 
able to maintain them in case they would want to move with him and his family. 
Therefore, he thinks that he will most likely stay in the community as long as his 
parents need his help.  
 
Thus people are often unwilling to migrate because of the responsibility they feel 
for family members. Yet, social pressure to take care of family members also 
affects migration decisions. The literature about migration in Mexico, presented in 
chapter 5, showed that in some communities people are socially 'forced' to migrate 
because migration is a rite of passage and all young people should make this 
experience and earn money away from home for the family. However, fieldwork 
showed that in some cases people can also be socially 'forced' to stay. The 
disapproval of migration by family members discourages some potential migrants 
from leaving the village. This is especially the case for women who have small 
children. They are expected to take care of their children, their parents and their 
parents in law and, therefore, often cannot migrate.  
 
Mariana said that her father left the family in El Tigre to go and work in Chicago in 
2002, when she was 11 and her brother 1 year old. Her mother followed him two 
years later and left her children with the parents of her husband. In El Tigre it is 
very common and socially accepted that husbands and fathers migrate and leave 
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their family alone for many years. However, the decision of a mother to leave their 
children with the grandparents is regarded as being “the bad example” and put a 
stigma on the whole family. Mariana would now like to migrate herself but does not 
do so because she feels responsible for her brother and because she is expected 
to stay and help her grandparents take care of him.  
 
Next to the feeling of responsibility and the social pressure with respect to taking 
care of family members, some people feel very attached to their life in the village, 
their house, their cattle, their land, or other belongings. Fieldwork in the 
surrounding villages of Nuevo Renacimiento shows that many people refused to 
leave their home communities that were destroyed after the flood in 1999 although 
they were offered a house provided by the government in Nuevo Renacimiento. 
Those who moved to Nuevo Renacimiento still miss their village and their farmland 
after eight years in their new house. They are only a few kilometres away from the 
communities in which they used to live and still do not feel at home. Many of them 
said that they would never want to move further because now they can sometimes 
go back to their land although they often do not farm it anymore.  
 
Eduardo and his wife live in Corronado about ten kilometres away from Nuevo 
Renacimiento on the other side of the river Tecolutla. Their house was flooded in 
1999 and was completely destroyed. They also lost the complete harvest and all 
their cattle. The government offered them a house in Nuevo Renacimiento eight 
months after the flood and they refused. 
 
“I was afraid that the government would take away my farmland if I leave. So, I 
stayed with my son for two months and then we returned to clean the house. […] 
This is a high danger zone for floods now. So far, nothing has happened. When we 
see that a big flood is coming, we will go to Zamora” [Gutierrez Zamora, the nearest 
bigger agglomeration where his son lives – author]. 
(Eduardo, 25 February 2009 – translation author) 
 
The fact that people do not want to leave their village is also often caused by their 
fear of the dangers of migration. The stories about people who disappeared on 
their way into the USA that circulate in Laguna Seca were already mentioned in the 
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previous chapter. Also migration within Mexico, mainly to the border cities, is 
considered very dangerous by many people. People are aware of drug wars and 
crime but also of pollution and the danger of accidents in big cities. As they are not 
confronted with these problems in their home communities, many people prefer to 
stay. Often, those who never left their village before said that they found migration 
a very dangerous endeavour. Yet, also some people who have been away from 
their community and returned, resent the idea of migration. Sometimes this is 
founded in fear or in the memory of a bad experience; sometimes it is caused by a 
general unwillingness to leave a familiar environment.  
 
Lilia has lived in Cascajal del Río for all of her life. Her three adult daughters 
moved to Matamoros at the US border some years ago. Her son is still living in the 
house of his parents with his wife and his two children. Lilia often takes the coach 
service to Matamoros to visit her daughters. She is convinced that they are leading 
a better life there than they would be able to have in the village.  
 
“I have been thinking about moving there as well for a long time. I could open a 
food stand and take care of my grandchildren when their mothers are working. 
Renato [her husband – author] and I like Matamoros. There are many opportunities 
there, which we don’t have here. […] But then I come home and I wonder how I 
could live in this heat, in this dust. The city smells bad. Everything is green and 
fresh here. […] And we worked so hard to build the house.  
(Lilia, 2 November 2008 – translation author) 
 
 
7.1.4 Perceived ability 
As migration is not only expensive and potentially dangerous but also an 
endeavour that requires a certain degree of physical and mental fitness, some 
people do not consider themselves, or are not considered by others, as suitable to 
migrate. Age and gender are the most important factors that limit people's ability to 
migrate. People over 50, or sometimes even younger people, often do not think 
that they will be able to successfully finish the journey and to obtain employment at 
the destination area. Therefore, they often do not think that migration is a suitable 
livelihood strategy for them anymore. Fernando lives in El Nuevo Tigre and is 55 
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years old. He has been to Las Vegas four times for several years when he was 
younger.  
 
“I really liked to be in Las Vegas but not anymore. Now I am too old for that. 
Walking for days to cross the desert, climbing the wall, no, not for me. And, even if 
they carried me there, nobody would employ me anymore.” 
(Fernando, 11 March 2008 – translation author) 
 
It was mentioned in the previous chapter already that gender affects migration 
decisions in different ways in Zacatecas and in Veracruz. In Zacatecas, women 
often do not consider themselves or are not considered by their husbands or 
parents as capable to migrate, at least not internationally. Furthermore, migration is 
often perceived as being too dangerous for them. This attitude has developed over 
the last twenty or thirty years in El Tigre. In the 1980s many women migrated to 
Chicago, mainly following their husbands but sometimes also on their own or with 
relatives. Angelica lived in Chicago for two years with her husband in the mid-
1980s.  
 
“Yes, I crossed the desert as well. It was not dangerous at that time, just a very long 
walk. Today, I would not do that anymore, and I certainly don’t want my daughters 
to do it.” (Angelica, 22 March 2008 – translation author) 
 
In Veracruz, women migrate, internally and internationally, and people do not seem 
to consider them less suited to do so than men. However, also in Veracruz mainly 
young people cross the border illegally. 
 
People's experience in coping with unknown environments and their confidence in 
it, also contribute to their perceived ability to migrate. Mainly those who never left 
their village before are afraid of doing so and never would consider leaving in 
search of work. In Laguna Seca, several people said: “I cannot even find my way in 
Zacatecas. How do you want me to find my way anywhere further than that?” Often 
combined with an unwillingness to leave their village, the fear of not being able to 
cope with a new environment deters many people in Laguna Seca from migrating. 
Also the lack of formal education shows to be a barrier to migration, or even to 
leaving the village to visit family members. Illiteracy is a major problem among 
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adults in rural Mexico. Although Mexico on average has an illiteracy rate of 7.2% 
among people of the age of 15 or over (UNDP 2009), in villages of less than 2,500 
inhabitants, the rate is 20% (INEGI 2006). Many people who cannot read and write 
fear that they will get lost on the way to their destination or at the destination.  
 
Carla lives in Cascajal del Río with her husband and two grandchildren. The 
parents of the grandchildren she is taking care of live on a ranch close to Cascajal 
del Río. Two of Carla’s sons live in Coatzacoalcos and a daughter lives in the 
Harbour City of Veracruz. If she wants to visit them, she has to take the bus to 
Acayucan and then another bus to either of the two destinations.  
 
“They sometimes come and visit me but they are all working and the children have 
to go to school, so they don’t have time. They always want me to come and visit 
them and they will pay for the bus fare. I can go to Acayucan, but any further? How 
do I find the right bus? I cannot read what it says on the bus. People can tell me 
anything and then I end up in Mexico City.” (Carla, 22 October 2008 – translation 
author) 
 
A lack of formal education and of a secondary school diploma is also perceived by 
many people as a reason for not finding employment. However, in Mexico, the 
positive relationship between education and success on the job market only exists 
for women, while for men the rates of unemployment are similar for all levels of 
education (INEE 2008). Nevertheless, the assumption that only those who study 
will find a job is shared by many people in Laguna Seca.  
 
“It used to be a good idea to start working as early as possible to earn money. 
School has never been important here. Now, if you don’t finish secondary school 
you will not work at all. In Zacatecas they want papers [meaning a diploma in this 
context – author] for everything. If you want to sell shoes they ask for papers, if you 
want to clean public toilets, they ask for papers.” (Ruth, 9 June 2008 – translation 
author) 
 
The previous sections showed that, in general, migration projects in Mexico are 
well-planned. People know that migration is expensive and that it therefore 
requires financial resources, but they also know that migrants need some personal 
strengths to be able to cope with the journey and with the demands at the 
destination areas. Those who fear that they cannot comply with these requirements 
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prefer not to migrate. Furthermore, although the lack of financial resources is a 
major problem in rural Mexico and an important driver of migration for many, some 
people consider their quality of life as more important than their financial well-
being. Taking care of family members and relatives is a desire for some and a 
social obligation for others. In both cases it influences the decision not to migrate. 
Thus, the relationship between potential migration drivers and real migration 
decisions has proven not to be linear. Those who want to migrate also need to 
decide about the form of migration. The next section is concerned with this 
decision. 
 
7.2 The choice of the form of migration 
Migration can be internal or international, legal or illegal, temporary or permanent, 
and people can migrate alone or with the whole family or with some family 
members. Apart from personal preferences and the financial resources needed for 
the migration project, fieldwork shows that decisions about the form of migration 
are mainly influenced by people’s access to migration networks and recruiters.  
 
7.2.1 Migration networks 
Fieldwork shows that migration networks have been and are crucial for the 
development of international migration in Zacatecas, and for both international and 
internal migration in Veracruz. Migration networks provide support to new migrants 
and help to share the financial and emotional costs of migration by providing 
credits to pay for the move, accommodation at the destination area, support in 
finding employment, and reassurance in a new environment. In El Tigre, fifty years 
of US migration, mainly to Chicago, shaped a network to which everybody who 
wants to migrate internationally has got access. However, in Laguna Seca, such a 
network never developed which is why almost nobody migrates to the USA illegally, 
except for those people who have got access to the migration networks of friends 
or relatives who live in a village with stronger migration networks. Perez 
Monterosas (2003) describes how migration networks developed first in the 
classical migration states Zacatecas, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Nayarit, and 
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Durango after the ‘Bracero’ programme ended in 1964, and Mexicans did not have 
any legal access to employment in the USA anymore. However, Mines and De 
Janvry (1982) argue that illegal migration, and as a consequence migration 
networks, already developed long before the end of the ‘Bracero’40 programme. 
 
“In the 1940s men from Las Animas, Zacatecas started to move to the USA again 
after the depression in the 1930s. Soon, many of them abandoned their bracero 
contracts or crossed the border illegally from the beginning. As illegal workers in the 
USA they could earn higher wages and stay longer than contracted labourers.” 
(Mines and De Janvry 1982:451). 
 
It is likely that in different communities, illegal migration developed at different 
times. However, it is evident that in Zacatecas, migration networks developed as a 
consequence of the legal access that was provided to the first migrants by the 
‘Bracero’ programme. 
 
People in Veracruz never had access to the ‘Bracero’ programme, and international 
migration only started in the 1990s. Nevertheless, this new migration flow did not 
develop without migration networks. Perez Monterosas (2003) explains that people 
in Veracruz made use of existing migration networks in the classical migration 
states. This happened in two ways. First, in the early 1990s, Veracruz was still one 
of the most important migrant receiving states in Mexico. Therefore, migrants from 
the classical migration states also moved to Veracruz. Often the migrants invited 
locals in Veracruz to join them on their next trip to the USA and offered to use the 
migration network of their village. Second, people from Veracruz also migrated to 
other destinations within Mexico, where they met migrants from the classical 
migration states and became involved in their migration networks (Perez 
Monterosas 2003). 
 
This historical development explains the observation during fieldwork in Cascajal 
del Río and Nuevo Renacimiento that migration networks in both communities 
seem to be more ‘individual’ than in El Tigre. In El Tigre, the whole community 
shares one network. In the two communities in Veracruz, different families have got 
                                                 
40
 See chapter 4 for a more detailed description of the ‘Bracero’ programme. 
179 
 
 
access to different networks. Although these networks and links to different 
destinations in the USA exist, some people in the communities in Veracruz say that 
they cannot migrate to the USA because they do not know anybody there. This 
means that the migration networks are not open to all village dwellers as it is the 
case in El Tigre.  
 
7.2.2 Recruiters 
Recruiters for employment in the USA thus historically played an important role in 
contributing to the development of international migration networks. However, also 
nowadays, recruiters from the USA but mainly from Canada search for workers in 
rural Mexico. Employers in the USA can apply for the admission of seasonal 
labourers from several countries, including Mexico, in agriculture or in non-
agricultural occupations under the H-2A or H-2B immigration schemes, 
respectively
41
. The majority of these visas are issued to Mexicans. In recent years, 
90% of the H-2A and 60% of the H-2B visas were issued to workers from Mexico 
(Mohar 2007). Recruiters in Mexico then contract the requested number of workers 
and a visa application for the worker is filed. Canada has a similar temporary 
foreign worker scheme42, which already exists since 1974 without interruption 
(Verduzco Igartúa 2007). 
 
For some people, going to the USA or to Canada with a legal working contract is a 
safe alternative to illegal migration. However, like illegal migration, international 
legal migration requires some financial resources. Although the migrant workers 
are not supposed to bear any of the visa costs43, people in all four researched 
communities said that the prospective migrants usually have to pay for their 
passports and for the immigration test themselves because the employers refuse 
to pay for them. Furthermore, migrant workers need to travel to Mexico City or 
Guadalajara to apply for their papers, and sometimes several visits are necessary, 
                                                 
41
 See information of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis 
42
 See information of Citizenship and Immigration Canada: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/index.asp 
43
 See the statement of the US based ‘Farm Labor Organizing Committee’: 
http://cgi.unc.edu/programs/mellon/working_group_papers/LaborRecruitment.pdf 
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which is expensive and time-consuming. Additionally, the prospective migrant 
bears the risk of losing his money if the passport, the visa, or entry into the USA or 
Canada are not granted. While a 'coyote' is only paid when the border crossing is 
successful, applicants for legal employment programmes in the USA or Canada 
are not reimbursed for their costs if their application is not successful. Therefore, 
the use of recruiters is not an attractive option for everybody and some people do 
not have access to them at all. 
 
Corona Vázquez et al. (2007) suggest that recruiters for work in the USA are likely 
to be effective in finding workers among the population in the classical migration 
states and in the North. They argue that those people already have got migration 
experience and will more easily cross the border with contracts. However, fieldwork 
in El Tigre shows that those who possess international migration networks are 
unlikely to follow the invitation of recruiters because they prefer to migrate illegally. 
Usually they argue that when they go without a legal contract they can earn more, 
work as many hours as they want, and stay as long as they want. Furthermore, 
many people in El Tigre would have problems passing the admission test of the 
USA. According to the Immigration and Nationality Act44, admission to the USA 
cannot be granted for five years if the candidate has been expelled from the 
country once, or for twenty years if the candidate has been expelled from the 
country several times. As many people have been arrested and sent back to 
Mexico when they tried to cross the border illegally, they would not fulfil this 
requirement. 
 
However, also in El Tigre, some people decide to migrate legally, mainly to 
Canada. Miguel was 17 years old at the time of the interview and watched how 
most of his friends started to move to Chicago. He did not want to migrate illegally 
because he said that it was too dangerous.  
                                                 
44
 See the legal code of the Immigration and Nationality Act at: 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.f6da51a2342135be7e9d7a10e0dc91a0/?vgnextoid
=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM
1000000ecd190aRCRD&CH=act. 
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“My brother is in Chicago now for two years. He suffered a lot when he crossed the 
border. And now he is unhappy, he always has to hide. He is not free. I don't want 
this. I applied to go to Canada. We will see, if not I stay here and help my father.” 
(Miguel, 10 April 2008 – translation author) 
 
While in El Tigre the majority of people do not want to migrate legally, in Laguna 
Seca the majority cannot afford it. Only some people have got the money and the 
confidence to apply for papers and for a job. Often those people leave for six 
months or a year, return and apply again. 
 
Also in Nuevo Renacimiento, some people make use of recruiters for the same job 
every year. Leonardo has been to Canada four times and he was always recruited 
by the same company. He is expecting to be able to go again soon. 
 
“Unfortunately, this year the recruiter came to my house when I was visiting my 
daughter in Mexico City. He will probably come again. He knows where I live and 
they always liked my work. If it is too late this year, then certainly next year again.” 
(Leonardo, 12 March 2008 – translation author) 
 
In Nuevo Renacimiento mainly men over 30 are making use of recruiters. As 
opposed to people at the same age in El Tigre they are not used to illegal 
international migration and often find it dangerous and irresponsible towards their 
families. Furthermore, the temporary migrant worker scheme for Canada is limited 
to men between 22 and 45 and for women between 23 and 40 years of age and 
people on average are 38 years old when they participate in the programme. Only 
3% of the participants are women (Verduzco Igartúa 2007). Therefore, young 
people, women and men, in Nuevo Renacimiento who want to leave Mexico, 
migrate illegally while legal migration is an alternative for middle-aged men who 
can still work but think that they are unable to migrate illegally or do not want to do 
so.  
 
In Cascajal del Río, which is the most remote village of the municipality of 
Acayucan, few people leave with recruiters. They do not come into the village, 
potentially because of its remoteness and only few people approach recruiters in 
other villages. 
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As the previous sections have shown, all four communities show different migration 
patterns, which have been shaped to a large degree by the access to migration 
networks and to recruiters. Those who do not have access to either of the two, only 
have got the choice between migrating internally or staying at home. This is the 
case for the majority of people in Laguna Seca, while in the other three 
communities people have got access to at least one of the facilitators of 
international migration, networks or recruiters. 
 
7.3 Alternative responses 
Migration – in its different forms – can be one response to livelihood stressors. 
However, as the first section of this chapter showed, some people cannot or do not 
want to migrate. Nevertheless, they experience shocks and stresses affecting their 
livelihoods and have developed responses. Chapter 5 already introduced the most 
important livelihood strategies in the four researched communities. This section 
analyses in more detail how those who stay respond to the potential drivers of 
migration identified in the previous chapter. 
 
7.3.1 Conversion of assets into money 
In times of economic hardship, many people try to use the assets and skills they 
have to earn money. The most common strategies are starting micro-businesses, 
selling land and livestock and making use of credits. While men are responsible for 
contributing to the household income by looking for paid work, they tend to despair 
very fast when no jobs are available instead of looking for alternatives, such as 
starting their own business. This is a female domain and not always welcomed by 
husbands because it happens that women earn more with their small businesses 
than men in their jobs, which undermines the male idea of being the breadwinner. 
Therefore, women sometimes only work for their businesses when their husband is 
away to work or with his friends. Carmen in Laguna Seca has got two businesses. 
In the village she sells pottery for her cousin who owns a pottery shop in 
Zacatecas, and she does sewing work for her fellow village dwellers but also for 
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the school or the church, if they need new curtains or dresses for a special 
occasion.  
 
“I usually sew at night when the house is clean and the children are sleeping. This 
only works when Roberto [her husband, he works in a mine in Mazapil and is only 
home for about ten days every month - author] is not here. He does not like that I 
am doing this. When he is here, I always have to cook, or he wants me to watch 
television with him. I never get anything done when he is around.”  
(Carmen, 7 February 2008 – translation author) 
 
The range of products that women sell and of the services they offer is diverse. 
The most important business, which requires some investment, is a convenience 
shop in the village. Laguna Seca with its about 600 inhabitants counts at least 15 
small shops selling mainly candy and basic food and household items. Those who 
do not want or cannot invest a lot of money in their business, produce and sell 
homemade food items such as cheese, bread, hamburgers, tacos, or ice cream. 
This kind of activity can be observed in all four communities in Zacatecas and 
Veracruz.  
 
In El Tigre and Laguna Seca, many women also sell products that they or one of 
their relatives buy in bigger agglomerations and bring to the villages such as 
pottery, clothes, and diapers. In Laguna Seca, many women have got a contract 
with a shop in the city of Zacatecas. They offer products such as clothes, shoes, 
bedding, and household items. The women receive a provision of 10% of the value 
of each product that they sell. Customers can pay the amount in as many 
instalments as they want. Shops in the city do not offer this option because they 
are afraid of losing too much money if customers do not manage to pay everything. 
Some women in all four communities have got contracts with direct sales 
companies such as Jafra, Avon and Tupperware. Furthermore, many women offer 
services such as cutting hair, ironing, and tailoring and repairing clothes in their 
homes. Obviously, the success of these micro-businesses depends on the financial 
situation in the village communities. If nobody has got money to spend, nobody will 
require any of the products or services offered. Therefore, in Nuevo Renacimiento, 
many women use the proximity of Gutierrez Zamora, which is a larger town with 
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shops, hotels, and a bus and a coach station, to sell their products there. The 
walking distance between Nuevo Renacimiento and Gutierrez Zamora is about 
twenty minutes; a bus ride takes less than five minutes and costs 3 pesos. The 
three other villages are more remote, and the loss of time and money for the bus 
fare are considered too significant, so that women do not bring their products to 
town. 
 
Another way to convert existing assets into money is to sell land or livestock. Large 
parts of the former communal ‘ejido’ land were privatised after the agrarian reform 
in 1992, so that farmers can now decide to sell their piece of land. In Cascajal del 
Río some farmers have done that, leading to a distribution of farmland into larger 
parcels because most of the land was bought by larger-scale farmers. In Nuevo 
Renacimiento, the option of selling land is limited because many people 
exchanged their house and farmland in their native communities against a house in 
Nuevo Renacimiento after the flood in 1999. Some of them still farm the land but 
do not legally own it anymore so that they cannot sell it. Furthermore, the farmland 
in the communities around Nuevo Renacimiento has been declared to be situated 
in a high risk zone for floods. In Zacatecas, more and more farmers are not farming 
their land anymore or intend to stop doing so soon. This is caused by the loss of 
productivity of the land as a consequence of the lack of rainfall, low soil fertility, and 
rising costs of farming equipment, as described in chapter 6. Many of them would 
be willing to sell their land, but they either do not find a potential buyer, or the 
prices are so low that the majority of people prefer not to sell. Selling land is thus a 
profitable livelihood strategy only in Cascajal del Río among the researched 
communities.  
 
The selling of livestock is an important livelihood strategy in El Tigre because a 
large number of families still own cattle. Many people regard owning cattle as an 
insurance against shocks and stresses to their livelihoods. However, apparently the 
number of people who are willing to take care of cattle is decreasing. 
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“If somebody dies, you have to pay for the funeral. You can sell a cow. If somebody 
gets ill, you need to pay for the treatment. You can sell a calf. This is how it should 
work. Nowadays people often do not want to work anymore. They sold all their 
cattle for parties, or to have a bigger house. Now, somebody gets ill or dies, what 
do they do?” (Claudia, 13 March 2008 – translation author) 
 
Another problem that severely affects cattle holders in El Tigre is the lack of rainfall 
leading to a drying up of water holes at the end of the dry season. During the last 
years, people had to bring their cattle to their houses to give them tap water 
several times a week between May and August or September. Furthermore, plant 
growth is limited due to a lack of water and, therefore, the animals often also have 
to be fed for several months a year. Many people cannot afford buying fodder for 
their animals and have to sell them, others see that the benefit of cattle raising is 
decreasing and do not want to continue working for a smaller profit. 
 
The development that seems to have started in El Tigre, namely that more and 
more people are selling their livestock, took place some decades ago in Laguna 
Seca. Nowadays very few families still own cattle. However, older people 
remember that some decades ago, almost every family had farm animals. Rosario 
was 72 years old at the time of the life history interview and had lived all her life in 
Laguna Seca. 
 
“When I was young, there was more life in the village. Cows were everywhere in the 
street – and donkeys. Today you only see chickens and sometimes a pig. […]” 
“What happened?” 
“Well, people sold the animals. Some families were really rich, now they have got 
nothing anymore.” (Rosario, 12 February 2008 – translation author) 
 
 
In Cascajal del Río, few people own cattle but many people take care of cattle for 
the richer farmers. In exchange, they can sell the milk and keep every second calf 
that is born to the cows they are taking care of. Often people raise their calves for a 
year and then sell them. In Nuevo Renacimiento very few people still own cattle 
because the majority does not own and farm land anymore. Selling cattle is thus a 
livelihood strategy that only very few people can make use of. 
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During times of financial hardship, people in all four researched communities were 
making use of formal or informal credits. While informal credits among family 
members and close friends are a common strategy in all communities, there are 
some differences between the accessibility of formal credits between the 
communities. In El Tigre, people can go to a bank providing farmers’ credits, which 
is located in Villanueva, about twenty minutes away from the village. As many 
families still own cattle and/or receive remittances from family members in 
Chicago, projects can often be financed by taking a small credit at the bank.  
 
In Laguna Seca, the situation is different for two reasons. First, most people neither 
own cattle, nor do they receive remittances, so that they cannot provide any 
security for a bank. Second, as opposed to people in El Tigre, people in Laguna 
Seca are less used to acting outside of their village so that going to a bank in 
Zacatecas, which is about an hour away, and negotiating a credit is too big a 
challenge for many of them.  
 
Both in Nuevo Renacimiento and in Cascajal del Río, companies providing micro-
credits come to the villages to offer their services. They mainly do business with 
women and only exceptionally with men when no woman lives in the household. In 
both villages, about twenty women jointly hold a credit. They meet every month 
and pay part of their debts back. If one participant fails to pay, the others have to 
jointly pay the missing amount. Apparently, this creates a social pressure big 
enough to make the system work because according to the chairs of both ‘credit 
groups’ so far always everybody paid in time. The prerequisite for being allowed to 
join a group that is sharing a credit is to have plans for a certain project, ideally a 
micro-business. Women who want to open a shop or expand a small one, need 
seed money to do so, which they often do not possess. Therefore, micro-credits 
encourage the formation of micro-businesses, another important livelihood strategy 
in rural Mexico.  
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7.3.2 Relying on external aid 
Although many people find a variety of income resources in times of economic and 
financial hardship, others do not succeed in doing so. Those people often manage 
to adapt their needs to the precarious circumstances. In Laguna Seca, during the 
winter months when no employment in commercial farming is available, “living with 
what there is” is one of the most important strategies in many families. For some 
families, it is sufficient to postpone their spending on clothes, make-up, and toys for 
the children to the summer months when many family members are likely to be 
working again. Others need to cut down their nutrition and medical expenses as 
well. 
 
Also in the other three communities, several people say that they had to learn to 
live with less money over the last years. Some of them do not want to migrate, 
neither do they think that any other livelihood strategy would work for them. As a 
consequence, next to adapting their needs, some people rely on external aid. This 
is especially the case in times of environmental hardship, such as the drought 
years of 2006, 2007 and 2008 in Zacatecas, and after the floods and hurricanes 
that the inhabitants of Cascajal del Río and Nuevo Renacimiento suffered from. In 
Veracruz, aid in form of blankets, clothes, and food packages was provided by the 
local government and international agencies, such as the Red Cross, after the 
floods and the hurricanes. People, who suffered the 1999 flood close to Gutierrez 
Zamora, were offered new houses by the government in Nuevo Renacimiento. 
People in Zacatecas and Veracruz also regularly receive small items, such as milk 
for the children, blankets, kitchen utensils, or construction materials. Often, these 
are sponsored by political parties, which expect to attract voters for the next 
elections.  
 
Structural government aid is another important form of household income, and for 
some households even the only income. The programme ‘Oportunidades’45 is 
designed to support the poorest families in each rural community, although the 
                                                 
45
 http://www.oportunidades.gob.mx 
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decision of who should be integrated into the programme and who should not be 
integrated seems to be ambiguous. Recipients of the support need to fulfil a variety 
of requirements if they want to stay involved in the programme such as taking care 
of the health of the family, sending the children to school, following advice about 
nutrition and hygiene, and seeing to it that all family members finish their primary 
and secondary education. Families receive 420 pesos every two months and can 
get a small grant for every child they send to school. The ‘Oportunidades’ 
programme also provides basic health insurance for those who are unemployed or 
are not ensured via their employer or a relative. ‘Procampo’ is another government 
programme that has been specifically designed to support farmers. In Zacatecas 
many farmers benefit from this programme. Every landowner is supposed to 
receive 1,000 pesos for every hectare of land he farms. However, this system is 
abused by some farmers who prepare their land, receive their money, and then do 
not farm at all. 
 
7.4 Chapter conclusion 
Table 7.1 summarises the results of this chapter regarding the different forms of 
migration that can be found in Laguna Seca, El Tigre, Cascajal del Río and Nuevo 
Renacimiento. The chapter explained how historical, social and financial factors 
affect decisions about destinations and about who migrates and who does not 
migrate. The chapter also showed the different alternative livelihood strategies that 
people make use of instead of migration or in addition to the migration projects of 
their family members. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 analysed the migration patterns in the researched communities 
in Zacatecas and Veracruz. The previous chapter analysed the empirically 
identified drivers of migration and compared them to the drivers of migration in 
Mexico found in the literature. This chapter analysed how these drivers of migration 
translate into actual migration decisions, taking factors such as financial resources, 
human agency, access to networks and to recruiters as well as alternative 
livelihood strategies into account.  
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Table 7.1: Factors involved in migration decisions in the researched communities 
 Main factors 
affecting 
migration 
decisions 
Dominant forms 
of migration 
Major alternative 
livelihood strategies 
Laguna Seca Fear to migrate 
internationally, 
often no money to 
migrate 
internationally or at 
all, perceived lack 
of education, lack 
of international 
networks 
Internal rural, some 
legal international 
Small businesses 
ranging from selling 
products for direct 
sales companies to 
sewing (women) 
El Tigre Long history of 
international 
migration, easy 
access to network 
in Chicago, money 
for migration 
projects from 
remittances, young 
men expected to 
migrate, internal 
migration and legal 
international 
migration not 
considered 
worthwhile, high 
aspirations to 
change existing life 
among the young 
Illegal international, 
some legal 
international 
Selling livestock 
(sometimes land), 
credits 
Cascajal del Río Short history of 
international 
migration, access 
to networks by 
family, hardly 
access to 
recruiters, 
sometimes fear to 
migrate mainly 
among elder 
generation, high 
aspirations to 
change existing life 
among the young, 
destinations 
depend on financial 
resources and 
preferences 
Internal rural, 
internal urban and 
illegal international 
Small businesses 
(women), micro credits 
for women 
190 
 
 
Nuevo 
Renacimiento 
Short history of 
international 
migration, access 
to networks by 
family, also access 
to recruiters for 
some families for 
many year, 
sometimes fear to 
migrate mainly 
among elder 
generation, high 
aspirations to 
change existing life 
among the young, 
destinations 
depend on financial 
resources and 
preferences 
Internal rural and 
urban, illegal and 
legal international 
Small businesses, also 
outside the village 
(women), micro credits 
for women 
 
Source: author, based on own empirical fieldwork 
 
The chapter is based on the three assumptions that 1) drivers of migration do not 
directly translate into migration decisions but depend on intervening factors, 2) that 
migration has different forms and 3) that drivers of migration also drive different 
responses.  
 
The results of chapters 6 and 7 are summarised in figure 7.2. This mind map 
shows people’s different responses to external livelihood stressors, as well as the 
role that migration might play as one potential adaptation strategy among others. It 
also shows the elements that are affecting migration decisions at the meso and the 
micro level, leading to decisions for or against migration, as well as to decisions for 
the most suitable form of migration. 
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Figure 7.2: Migration decisions in Mexico 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author, based on empirical fieldwork
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The livelihood stressors, which might become drivers of migration as analysed in 
chapter 6, lead to a need to adapt. If people have got access to assets, they might 
convert them into money, otherwise they need to wait for external aid or adapt their 
consumption patterns. If migration is considered, two decisions have to be taken, 
the decision to migrate or not at all, and – if the decision for migration is positive – 
the choice of the most appropriate form of migration. The decision to migrate at all, 
requires that the financial resources are sufficient or that somehow money for the 
migration project can be acquired, that people think that migration is beneficial, that 
people think they are able to deal with the often difficult journey to the destination 
and that they will find a job, and that people are willing to leave their home 
community and that this is accepted by family members and their fellow village 
dwellers. The choice of the form of migration depends, in addition to the amount of 
the financial resources available, to a large extent on the access to individual or 
village networks and to recruiters. The next chapter will analyse the sensitivity to 
climate change of the migration flows that were described in chapters 6 and 7. All 
elements involved in migration decisions, summarised in figure 7.2, are tested for 
their sensitivity to the direct and indirect effects of climate change at the local and 
the global level. 
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Chapter 8: Climate sensitivity of migration flows in Mexico 
The previous two chapters analysed the perceived livelihood stressors in the 
researched communities, explained under what circumstances these livelihood 
stressors might become drivers of migration, what alternative strategies are used, 
and how intervening factors are involved in migration decisions in the two Mexican 
states of Zacatecas and Veracruz. In chapter 6 the perceived livelihood stressors, 
which are potential drivers of migration but also of other livelihood strategies, were 
summarised in the categories ‘small-scale and subsistence agriculture and 
foraging more difficult, ‘lack and decrease of employment opportunities’, 
‘decreasing purchasing power’, and ‘increased desires and aspirations’.  
 
Table 8.1: Livelihood stressors in the researched communities 
 
Livelihood stressor 
 
Detailed process 
 
Small-scale and subsistence agriculture 
and foraging more difficult 
 Variability in precipitation and 
temperature patterns 
 Extreme events such as droughts, 
hurricanes, floods 
 Decreasing soil fertility 
 Low revenues for yields 
 High prices for seeds, fertiliser, 
irrigation 
Lack and decrease of employment 
opportunities 
 Lack of industries or services in or 
near the communities 
 Lack of infrastructure to facilitate 
commuting 
 Lack of formal education needed to 
obtain work 
 Seasonal employment in agriculture 
decreasing 
Decreasing purchasing power  Low and decreasing salaries 
 High and increasing prices for basic 
consumer goods 
Increased desires and aspirations  Cultural change 
 Some young people unwilling to work 
hard for little revenue 
 Increased material desires (food, 
clothes, cars) 
Source: author 
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Table 8.1 shows these categories of livelihood stressors as well as the detailed 
processes that were empirically observed in the four researched communities, and 
from which the four categories were derived. The climate sensitivity of these 
elements is analysed in the first part of this chapter. In the second part of the 
chapter, these results are integrated into the analysis of the climate sensitivity of 
the four different forms of migration that were found during fieldwork in Zacatecas 
and Veracruz: illegal international migration, legal international migration, urban 
internal migration, and rural internal migration.  
 
Some of the empirically observed livelihood stressors listed in the table are likely to 
become affected by the local consequences of climate change, such as changes to 
temperature and precipitation patterns as well as extreme events in the researched 
communities. Other livelihood stressors are more likely to become influenced by 
the global consequences of climate change, such as the development of world 
market prices. While people’s increased desires and aspirations do not seem to be 
directly related to climate change, they might play into decisions about solutions 
when climate change is affecting livelihood strategies. The following two sections 
analyse the susceptibility of the livelihood stressors shown in table 8.1 on a local 
and on a global level, respectively.  
 
8.1 Sensitivity of livelihood stressors to local effects of climate change 
The effect of changing precipitation and temperature patterns on yields has often 
been cited as the most important consequence of the local effects of climate 
change. Climate models indicate that area mean precipitation in Central America is 
predicted to be decreasing in all seasons, with the exception of some parts of 
north-eastern Mexico, where some increases in summer precipitation are projected 
(Solomon et al. 2007). Furthermore, as shown in chapter 3.1, extreme events such 
as droughts, hurricanes, and floods, which affect agriculture, are likely to become 
more frequent (droughts) or more severe (hurricanes). However, as chapter 3.1 
also showed in detail, a large degree of uncertainty exists regarding the degree of 
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temperature and precipitation changes as well as regarding changes to the 
frequency and severity of extreme events. 
 
Based on climate models, the working group II report of the 2007 IPCC 
assessment predicts a possible yield reduction of 30% in Mexico, considering 
direct CO2 effects, as well as a 73% to 78% reduction in coffee production due to 
climate change in Veracruz (Magrin et al. 2007). Yet, in the context of the debate 
around the nexus between climate change and agricultural productivity, the 2007 
IPCC assessment report stresses Latin America’s high level of heterogeneity “in 
terms of climate, ecosystems, human population distribution and cultural traditions” 
(Magrin et al. 2007: chapter 13.2.1). This statement also holds true for Mexico with 
its climatic zones ranging from deserts in the north to tropical rainforest in the 
south, and its various ecosystems and forms of land use. Therefore, the prediction 
of a possible yield reduction on the country level seems to be very imprecise. 
Nevertheless, it shows that in general, yields are more likely to decline in Mexico 
as a consequence of climate change as opposed to, for example, Argentina, for 
which a 5% increase of yields is predicted under the same conditions (Magrin et al. 
2007).  
 
Compared to the rather brief section about the likely effects of climate change on 
crop yields in the 2007 IPCC assessment report, the subject has gained growing 
scientific attention from the early 1990s onwards. One of the first international 
initiatives was a workshop on climate change and world food security at the 
University of Oxford in 1993 followed by a special issue of the journal “Food Policy” 
(Downing and Parry 1994). In the same year one of the first and most widely cited 
analyses was published by Rosenzweig and Parry (1994), in which the authors 
combine the results of national and regional crop growth models under different 
climate change scenarios, and integrate them into a world food trade model to 
predict how these potential changes to the productivity of crop yields are likely to 
affect global food prices and the number of people without access to food. They 
find that climate change will increase the worldwide production disequilibrium for 
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cereals between developing and developed countries. In low latitude, i.e. mostly 
developing countries, adaptation measures that were considered feasible for 
farmers, such as slight changes to the planting date, the use of more water where 
irrigation systems already exist, as well as the use of different crop varieties, which 
are accessible, are not considered likely to be sufficient to compensate for yield 
losses brought about by climate change.  
 
Adaptation measures that are more complex and likely not accessible to all 
farmers, such as the use of fertilisers, the installation of irrigation systems, and the 
development of new crop varieties, were found to compensate for yield losses 
under moderate climate change scenarios, while under more severe scenarios 
even the complex adaptation mechanisms were found not to be able to 
compensate for the negative impacts of climate change. The authors conclude 
that, while in the developed world agricultural production might not be affected or 
even benefit from climate change, yields are likely to decline in developing 
countries, even if adaptive measures are included in the equation. As a 
consequence, cereal prices are projected to rise, putting a larger amount of the 
world population at risk of hunger (Rosenzweig and Parry 1994). Rosenzweig and 
Parry’s model does not distinguish between small-scale subsistence and 
commercial agriculture. Fieldwork in Mexico, however, showed that this distinction 
is empirically important as the following two sections indicate.  
 
8.1.1 Climate sensitivity of small-scale and subsistence farming 
With the model described above, Rosenzweig and Parry developed one of the first 
integrated assessments analysing the likely effects of climate change on food 
availability and prices. Their scenarios include demographic, economic, and 
technological developments, as well as different degrees of potential adaptation 
measures. Yet, their conclusions imply that farmers will continue farming as good 
as they can under more precarious circumstances. However, as fieldwork in 
Zacatecas and Veracruz showed, many people have become discouraged from 
farming in the first place because of a combination of environmental and economic 
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factors as shown in table 8.1. As analysed in more detail in chapter 6, one of the 
crucial factors that determine why people stop small-scale or subsistence farming 
is the discrepancy between the revenues they get and the amount of money they 
need to invest. According to many interviewees, farming is not beneficial anymore 
because seeds, fertilizers, and the maintenance of machinery have become very 
expensive, while the macro prices for the yields they could sell after feeding their 
families are very low. Furthermore, due to climatic variability the outcome of 
farming is perceived to have become more uncertain over the last decades. 
Already in 1994, Appendini and Liverman mentioned that after the Green 
Revolution in the 1970s, the output of small-scale farming became more risky with 
regard to climatic variability: 
 
“In favourable weather conditions, improved seed and fertilizer give much higher 
yields of crops such as wheat and corn, especially with irrigation. However, when 
drought, frost or flood destroys the crop, farmers are often left in debt because of 
the cost of the technical inputs (Walsh, 1993). Previously farmers did not purchase 
inputs, they kept seed from one year to another and perhaps used some green or 
animal manure as fertilizer. They might lose their crop to drought, and be hungry, 
but would not be making a major financial risk.”   
(Appendini and Liverman 1994:158) 
 
Decreasing soil fertility is another aspect affecting agriculture and mainly small-
scale subsistence agriculture. The report of the conference “Climate change – can 
soil make a difference”, organised by the Environment Directorate-General of the 
European Commission, stresses both the role of healthy soils for climate change 
mitigation as well as the fact that climate change is likely to “put further pressure on 
soil quality and will increase the risk of desertification and land degradation” 
(European Commission 2008). The 2011 Foresight Report on the Future of Food 
and Farming (Foresight 2011) suggests that climate change is likely to negatively 
change the impact of pests and pathogens on the quality and fertility of soils and 
on plant life. According to the interviewees in both Zacatecas and Veracruz, 
decreasing soil fertility started about one generation ago and has worsened since. 
Farmers do not connect it to the changing climate but attribute it to previous 
mismanagement of the farmland by using fertilisers (see Head et al. 2011). As a 
consequence, the soil was left without natural nutrients and dependent on 
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industrial fertiliser, which people often cannot afford to buy anymore. This argument 
has been repeated in many publications about the link between intensive farming 
and soil degradation. Yet, in addition, decreasing precipitation and increasing 
temperatures brought about by climate change negatively affect the moisture of the 
soil needed for farming (Fischer et al. 2005). Terrazas-Mendoza et al. (2010) who 
investigated the climate sensitivity of soil fertility in Mexico, show unsurprisingly 
that rainfed agricultural soil is more likely to be sensitive to climate change than 
irrigated soil, so that mainly subsistence farming will be affected. Decreasing soil 
fertility, which might be worsened by the local effects of climate change, is thus 
another factor that adds to the perceived decrease of profitability of small-scale 
and subsistence agriculture. 
 
In addition to not being profitable and bearing a huge financial risk, in many 
households farming is increasingly not perceived as an attractive livelihood 
strategy. As chapter 6.3.4 showed, many young people think that their increased 
desires and aspirations, as compared to the previous generations, cannot be met 
with a farmer’s income or with the prospect of living a farmer’s life. Rosenzweig 
and Parry’s analysis implies that different degrees of temperature increases and 
precipitation decreases will accordingly affect agricultural output at different 
degrees. Yet, using the example of monthly precipitation in Zacatecas, chapter 
5.2.2 showed that people’s perceptions of climate variability are not necessarily 
congruent with scientific climate observations. In El Tigre, increased variability in 
rainfall during the months in which most rainfall is needed for farming over the last 
two decades was perceived as a general decline in annual precipitation, and many 
people abandoned or reduced farming as a consequence. Also, in Cascajal del 
Río, Veracruz, perceptions of more severe floods over the last years have 
discouraged many families who own land close to the river from farming. 
 
Thus the analysis of Rosenzweig and Parry (1994) misses the important element 
of human agency. The case of Mexico shows that a growing part of the Mexican 
rural population has discontinued farming because of a combination of high 
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investments for seeds and equipment, low revenues for agricultural produce, and 
uncertain yield outputs, which are to a large degree caused by uncertain climatic 
conditions. This development, reinforced by cultural change creating higher 
aspirations of the younger generation, has led to a situation in which fewer people 
than in the past still want to farm. The observation that farming is now rarely the 
main family income of rural dwellers in many parts of Mexico (Appendini and 
Torres-Mazuera 2008) supports this argument.  
       
Therefore, it does not seem unreasonable to conclude, at least for the case of 
Mexico, that the climate change related threat to small-scale agriculture is caused 
by the fact that climate variability and therefore yield uncertainty is increasing. Yet, 
the severity of these changes to climate variability do not seem to matter that 
much. Models of changes to agricultural productivity under climate change, such 
as the one by Rosenzweig and Parry (1994), tend to rely on calculations of 
expected yield losses under different scenarios of temperature increase and 
precipitation decrease. While these models provide valuable results for societies in 
which farming is the only livelihood strategy, they fail to take into account the fact 
that people might anticipate that farming is becoming less and less cost-effective, 
and switch instead to alternative livelihood strategies. For the case of Mexico, this 
shift seems irreversible under future climate change, unless adaptive measures 
become affordable and accessible for farmers, and people consider farming more 
attractive again under these circumstances. 
 
8.1.2 Climate sensitivity of commercial agriculture 
The lack of employment opportunities is an important livelihood stressor and 
potential migration driver throughout Mexico, and commercial farming is an 
important source of employment. Therefore, the climate sensitivity of commercial 
agriculture will not only affect the livelihoods of large-scale farmers but also of large 
parts of the Mexican rural population. While the majority of labourers in rural 
Mexico are needed in commercial farming, others are employed by factories, in 
road construction, or mining. The effect of climate change on the availability of non-
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agricultural employment opportunities is likely to be small. Yet, it is perceivable that 
investment into industries that need large quantities of freshwater will remain low in 
regions with low and decreasing groundwater resources due to lack of rainfall, 
such as Zacatecas. Also, the danger brought about by the potential increase to the 
severity of hurricanes and related floods (Solomon et al. 2007) might limit the 
investment of companies in coastal regions including Veracruz. Furthermore, the 
accessibility of places of potential employment as well as schools regularly 
becomes limited when roads are flooded or washed away during torrential rainfalls 
so that commuting is very difficult. This problem might worsen as a consequence of 
changing precipitation patterns brought about by climate change. Thus climate 
change, in combination with infrastructural problems, might to some extent affect 
the availability of non-agricultural employment opportunities in Mexico. 
 
Nevertheless, climate change is likely to have the most important effect on 
employment opportunities in commercial agriculture. Commercial farmland in 
Zacatecas is often equipped with irrigation systems so that even if rainfall is ‘too 
little’ or ‘too late’, production is not necessarily affected. Yet, the irrigated farmland 
is not protected against torrential rainfall, hail, and early frost, which are 
increasingly destroying harvests according to commercial farmers in the region. 
Interviews with four large-scale commercial farmers who employ day labourers on 
their fields close to Laguna Seca, Zacatecas demonstrate that landowners realised 
that farming, also on irrigated fields, has become more difficult. All four 
interviewees noted that uncertain weather conditions and low market prices for 
agricultural produce are the main problems threatening their businesses. They all 
used the example of maize, which has a long growing cycle so that harvests often 
fail because of early frost. One strategy to overcome the problems brought about 
by increasing climatic uncertainty might be the diversification of crops. Yet, while 
the interviewed landowners agreed that farming maize is increasingly unproductive 
and none of them farms only maize, they hold different views about the crops that 
they should farm instead.  
 
201 
 
 
Thus Raúl Torres46 argued that he started farming “a bit of everything”, which also 
enables him to spread the planting and harvesting periods over the year. As his 
fields are equipped with irrigation systems, he reported planting beans very early in 
the year, so that they can be harvested in July before the most important rainfalls 
occur, and the risk of torrential rainfall and hail increases. He suggested that crop 
diversification will increase the need for agricultural workers because “one worker 
can easily harvest some hectares of maize on his own but harvesting onions is 
much more labour demanding.” Yet, Alejandro Alemán47, a farmer whose family has 
been specialising in the production of garlic for more than 30 years, commented 
that many large-scale farmers will start producing fodder for animals, which can be 
produced at low cost but also sells for a very low price. The production of fodder is 
easier than of maize, beans or vegetables, so that fewer day labourers need to be 
employed. Alemán also reported that some of his friends advised him to specialise 
in ecological products. However, he felt that too few people will be able to afford 
those products so that he risked making a big investment without the prospect of 
adequate revenues. Ignacio Hernández, one of five brothers who own most of the 
land around Laguna Seca and who employ many inhabitants of the village told me: 
- “There are two things we can do to stay in the business, just farming chilli is not 
doing it anymore. I have been thinking about changing to stronger crops such as 
alfalfa. You receive very little but the production is cheap and simple [....]. I also 
thought about getting a greenhouse. It is very expensive though but you can 
produce whatever you like. If tomatoes do well on the market – I think you saw the 
greenhouse with tomatoes – you can do tomatoes. Or you can change to anything 
else, you just need the money to build it [the greenhouse], then you can do 
whatever you want.” 
 
Q: “What does this mean for the number of workers you need? Will you employ the 
same number of people?” 
 
A: “If we do alfalfa we need very few people and the job is simple so we can pay 
them less. We need to make a profit by saving costs. For the greenhouse, we need 
more people, also well-trained people to operate it. But they [the well-trained 
people], usually come here from Spain. For the planting and picking the same 
workers we have now can come but we would need people all year round. So it 
really is expensive.” 
(Ignacio Hernández – 22 March 2008 – translation author) 
                                                 
46
 Interviewed on 12 June 2008 
47
 Interviewed on 12 June 2008 
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Over the last decade, in the centre of the state of Zacatecas, agricultural 
production in greenhouses became increasingly important, showing a mean annual 
growth rate of the cultivated area of more than 30% between 2001 and 2007. The 
total cultivated area in greenhouses in Zacatecas was estimated to be about 185 
hectares in 2008. Tomatoes were cultivated on about 95% of this area, almost 
exclusively for export to the USA and to a smaller extent to Canada (Padilla Bernal 
et al. 2010). Julio, who works as a supervisor in one of the greenhouses at 
Vallehermosa, a neighbouring village of Laguna Seca, explained that greenhouses 
offer protection against temperature and precipitation extremes and allow two 
cycles of plant growth per year. The first growing cycle of the year starts in January 
and the harvest is between May and June. In July, the second growing cycle 
begins for a harvest in December. Production in greenhouses offers the further 
advantage that insects usually cannot enter and therefore there is less crop 
damage. One of the major advantages for investors in greenhouses is thus its 
potentially high return on investment. Padilla Bernal et al. (2010) argue that the 
proximity of Zacatecas to the US border is another factor acting in favour of the 
growing importance of greenhouse tomato production for export in Zacatecas. This 
argument does not seem to be very convincing though, because of the distance of 
about 600 km to the closest border cities in the south-east of the USA, and taking 
into account that states at the Mexico-US border, such as Sonora and Chihuahua, 
also produce greenhouse tomatoes for export (Padilla Bernal et al. 2010).  
 
The most important disadvantage of greenhouses is their cost. Ignacio’s brother 
Mario Hernández estimated a construction cost of three million pesos per hectare 
of land. He expressed his interest in building a greenhouse on his land, yet said 
that he could not afford it, despite the fact that he thought that the Mexican 
government paid for three quarters of the construction costs. According to the 
Mexican Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries, and Food 
(SAGARPA), government support for the construction of greenhouses can be 
granted for up to 50% of its cost, but not exceeding 4 million pesos for each project 
(SAGARPA 2010). Nonetheless, many local landowners and large-scale farmers, 
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despite their relative wealth in relation to the majority of the rest of the population in 
the region, appear unlikely to be able to construct greenhouses over large areas of 
their land. As a result, greenhouses in Mexico are often constructed and operated 
by foreign investors, mainly from the USA (Padilla Bernal et al. 2010). In the area 
around Laguna Seca in Zacatecas, several greenhouses owned and operated by 
Spanish investors exist.  
 
As the example of Laguna Seca illustrates, existing climatic variability affects 
commercial agriculture in a different way than small-scale or subsistence 
agriculture. While many small-scale farmers have abandoned farming because of 
low prices for crops and uncertain climatic conditions, commercial farmers think 
about adaptation by crop diversification. Whether this will lead to the availability of 
fewer or more jobs in commercial farming depends on landowner’s decisions about 
the crops they want to farm in the future. Historically, beans have been the most 
important commercial crop in Zacatecas, followed by maize and chilli (Márquez 
Herrera 2008). Compared to these “traditional crops”, the decision to switch to 
cheaper and more robust perennial crops, such as alfalfa, would entail a need for 
fewer workers. In contrast, a switch to crops such as tomatoes, potatoes, carrots, 
onions, cauliflower, and cucumber would imply a need for more workers during 
different times of the year. Beans, maize and chilli usually only have one growing 
cycle per year. According to local commercial farmers, potatoes can be farmed 
twice a year as they only need up to 90 days between planting and harvest. For the 
harvest of some of these crops machines might be used in the future, which would 
entail a loss of a large amount of jobs in the long run. Yet, at the moment, human 
labour is cheaper than machines, so initially crop diversification is likely to lead to 
more employment opportunities in commercial farming. A third option might be a 
growing investment in greenhouses, which would also create a need for more 
unskilled labourers as well as for technicians to operate and maintain the heating 
and irrigation systems. Indeed, employees in greenhouses are needed all year 
round and they often receive contracts over several months, which should provide 
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access to more benefits and rights than the status of a day labourer without a 
contract. 
 
So far, all three developments can be observed in Zacatecas. Some landowners 
are farming alfalfa; others different kinds of vegetables; whilst some greenhouses 
mainly operated by foreign investors exist as well. The question of how climate 
change is likely to affect the availability of employment opportunities thus depends 
to a large extent on landowners’ decisions about what crops they will farm in the 
future. These decisions will certainly depend on price developments for seeds and 
agricultural produce, but also on individual preferences. It is also feasible that 
some large-scale farmers might discontinue farming and sell their land to investors 
who seek to build more greenhouses, especially when the farmland is passed from 
one generation to the next.  
 
8.2 Sensitivity of livelihood stressors to global effects of climate change 
The global effects of climate change on the observed livelihood stressors will most 
likely be expressed by changing prices on a regional or a global level. These price 
changes might affect the currently low revenues for agricultural products, and the 
high prices for seeds, fertiliser, and irrigation, which many interviewees identified 
as major factors which render small-scale or subsistence agriculture more difficult 
and which they argue cannot be attributed to local climatic conditions. Also the fact 
that people think that their purchasing power is decreasing, caused by low and 
decreasing salaries, as well as high and increasing prices for basic consumer 
goods, might be affected by price developments linked to climate change.  
 
8.2.1 Climate sensitivity of agriculture 
Conde et al. (2007) apply the concept of ‘double exposure’ introduced by O’Brien 
and Leichenko (2000) to Mexican agriculture. They argue that agriculture in 
developing countries, such as Mexico, is both vulnerable to economic globalisation 
and its often negative consequences for local farmers, as well as to the 
consequences of climate change. This conceptualisation acknowledges that the 
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success of farming is not only susceptible to local climatic conditions but also to 
price developments of agricultural inputs and outputs. Yet, the approach by Conde 
et al. (2007) does not take into account that price developments of seeds, 
fertilisers, water, and energy for irrigation as well as retail prices for agricultural 
produce might also become affected by climate change. The 2011 Foresight 
Report on the Future of Food and Farming (Foresight 2011b) noted that agricultural 
production will become more vulnerable as a consequence of increasing seed and 
fertilizer prices, particularly with respect to the uncertainties of climate change. 
Thus from the perspective of food producers, food production is likely to become 
less lucrative. Yet, the same Foresight Report as well as other assessments of the 
effects of climate change on food prices predict a global increase in commodity 
prices because of a significant global reduction in the production of staple foods 
such as corn, wheat, and rice (Foresight 2011b, Brown and Funk 2008, Lobell et al. 
2008). Thus, from the consumers’ perspective, food is likely to become more 
expensive and fewer people might have access to sufficient food in the future. 
 
Past changes to agricultural commodity prices in Mexico over the last three 
decades have mainly been attributed to political developments such as internal 
market reforms and the creation of NAFTA (Eakin 2005, Márquez Herrera 2008) 
and not to environmental stressors. The main arguments are that farming became 
more expensive because of the withdrawal of subsidies, while the value of 
agricultural produce decreased because of favourable conditions for imported 
agricultural products, mainly from the USA but also from Canada. Yet, farmers’ 
observations that the revenues they receive for their produce have been 
decreasing over the last years seems to be contradicted by the price movements of 
staple food crops such as maize and beans, and for the cash crop sugar cane. As 
figure 8.1 shows, prices for all three crops have been rising in real terms over the 
last 20 years. The steep rise of the price for maize and sugar cane since 2005 
could be explained by the demand of these crops for the production of biofuels, 
which also caused a rise in the consumer price for maize and tortillas. Yet the price 
for beans also shows a tremendous rise from 2,000 Mexican Pesos per ton in 1990 
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to more than 9,000 Mexican Pesos per ton in 2008 with a steep rise in the mid-
1990s and again in the second half of the first decade of the 21st century.  
 
Figure 8.1 Price development for three major crops in Mexico between 1990 and 2008  
(Average cost price per ton in Mexican Pesos)  
 
Source: author, based on INEGI 2009: Estadísticas históricas de México 
 
Thus, statistics of average prices for the entire country contradict empirical 
observations in the four researched communities. It has to be mentioned that the 
above presented data are constant prices and do not take inflation into account. 
Yet, interviewees referred to decreasing absolute prices in Mexican Pesos for their 
agricultural produce as opposed to a decrease of their purchasing power. Although 
observations in these four communities are not necessarily always representative 
for entire Mexico, it is unlikely that all four communities differ so much from the 
national average. Obviously, as chapter 5.2 showed regarding the discrepancy 
between rainfall statistics and interviewees' thoughts about changing rainfall 
patterns, people's perceptions do not always match reality. Nonetheless, the 
contrast between a general consensus about decreasing prices for produce locally, 
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and the sharp increase in recorded prices at a national level over the last years is 
both striking and surprising. One plausible explanation is that, as Márquez Herrera 
(2008) shows for rural areas in Zacatecas in the 1990s, small-scale farmers usually 
do not receive the official price for their products but have to negotiate with 
mediators who tend to make a huge profit themselves. While some farmers receive 
less than the official price for their produce, others are not paid at all or with a very 
large delay. For example, five farmers in Cascajal del Río, Veracruz said that they 
had farmed sugar cane on their fields and delivered it to a local processing plant. 
However, at the time of the interviews they had not received any payment for more 
than a year. Several weeks after the interviews, after their representative had been 
sent to talk to the operators of the processing plant, these farmers received part of 
their payment, but when fieldwork in Cascajal del Río ended three months later, 
they claimed they had still not received the full payment for their produce. 
 
This means that although prices for agricultural produce are expected to rise under 
scenarios of climate change, farmers will likely not benefit from increased revenues 
– or at least are likely not to believe that they will benefit. Therefore, the link 
between the prices that farmers receive, which are the revenues that might 
motivate them or not to continue farming in the future, and climate change seems 
to be difficult to establish. Fieldwork suggests that Mexican farmers did not even 
benefit from the increased market price of maize caused by the demand for biofuel 
production over the last years. Therefore, it is unlikely that they would benefit from 
any increases of the official market price for agricultural produce in the future. 
 
8.2.2 Climate sensitivity of purchasing power 
Interviewees attribute the perceived decrease in purchasing power to the generally 
low and decreasing salaries as well as to the generally high and increasing prices 
for basic consumer goods. The climate sensitivity of salaries seems to be low as 
the level of salaries depends on the supply and demand of labour and on 
government policies. Yet, some changes to the payment of day labourers in 
commercial agriculture might occur as a consequence of a changing demand for 
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workers brought about by the different adaptation measures to increasing climatic 
uncertainty, as demonstrated above. As landowners might need more or fewer 
workers, depending on their choice of which crops they will farm in the future, daily 
salaries might decrease or increase. However, also if more labour is needed but 
the supply stays much higher than the need for workers, salaries might remain the 
same. 
 
The climate sensitivity of prices for basic consumer goods can to a large extent be 
measured by assessing the climate sensitivity of consumer prices for agricultural 
produce because rural households in Mexico spend the most important amount of 
their household income on food items. Diets in rural Mexico are traditionally based 
on agricultural produce including staples such as tortillas made of maize, beans, 
rice, chillies, eggs, vegetable oil, as well as some fruits and vegetables if families 
can afford them. People also claim that products which cannot directly be linked to 
agricultural production – such as soap and detergent – have become more 
expensive.  
 
Fischer et al. (2005) develop an assessment to predict the impact of climate 
change on agro-ecosystems until 2080. They link the different regional outcomes of 
the model to world market prices for agricultural produce by matching global 
demand with global supply. Their findings suggest that price increases for 
agricultural produce caused by climate change are likely to be relatively modest at 
around 2-20% or 4-10% using different climate change models. Also the global 
GDP for agriculture is projected to be only marginally affected with changes 
ranging from -1.5% to +2.6% again depending on different models. In line with 
earlier assessments (e.g. the one by Rosenzweig et al. in the 1990s), the 
assessment by Fischer et al. (2005) predicts positive effects of climate change on 
agriculture for most developed countries with some exceptions for parts of Europe 
and mainly negative consequences for agriculture in developing countries with the 
exception of Latin America. In a similar exercise, Parry et al. (2004) assess the 
effects of climate change on crop yields and in a second step simulate the impact 
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of these changes to crop productivity on global food prices and the number of 
people at risk of hunger worldwide. They find that in a reference scenario of a 
world without climate change, agricultural production worldwide would rise, yet 
because of an increase in the global demand for food, world market prices for 
cereals would also be projected to rise by between 30% and 160% compared to 
current market prices, depending on different scenarios. In a world with climate 
change, a severe decrease of agricultural production would be expected without 
considering CO2 fertilisation effects. Consequently, the authors model large world 
market price increases for cereals without considering CO2 effects and find that 
while most models project that prices are likely to double by 2050, under some 
scenarios price increases of more than 350% were to be expected by 2080. Yet, 
considering CO2 effects, a much more moderate projected price increase between 
10% and 20% as compared to current market prices can be observed by 2080, 
while some scenarios even suggest a price decrease between 2050 and 2080 
(Parry et al. 2004). More recent studies though have shown that the expected 
effect of high CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere are likely to have a much 
smaller effect on yield productivity than previous research suggested (Good et al. 
2010). 
 
However, agricultural losses are mainly expected in developing countries 
(Rosenzweig and Parry 1994, Brown and Funk 2008, Lobell et al. 2008). 
Therefore, climate related stressors such as droughts might impact on the national 
budgets of poor countries and therefore on their ability to supply their citizens with 
staple food items purchased on the international market. Brown and Funk (2008) 
use the example of Tanzania, which had to compete for maize with ethanol 
producers and pig farmers in the USA, leading to higher prices and a reduced 
access to food for the poor. Thus, the question of the worldwide distribution of food 
seems to be more important, also under future climate change, than the question 
of global availability of food. For the case of Mexico this means that international 
and national policies and agreements about export and import of food need to be in 
favour of the needs of people, bearing in mind that agricultural conditions in many 
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parts of the USA and Canada, Mexico's NAFTA partners, are likely to improve 
under future climate change (Lane and Jarvis 2007). Thus, food security in Mexico 
might also be achieved by negotiating affordable prices for imported crops in 
Mexico. Furthermore, the problem of rising prices for basic food items on the local 
market is closely linked to the problem of the high production costs of staples such 
as maize and beans, as well as the profits of intermediate traders, as shown 
above. 
 
8.3 Summary: Climate sensitivity of livelihood stressors 
Feng et al. (2010) quantitatively analysed the climate sensitivity of agriculture and 
its effect on migration in Mexico. According to different climate change and 
adaptation scenarios, they predict an additional 1.4 to 6.7 million Mexicans to 
migrate to the USA because of changes to precipitation patterns and subsequent 
yield decreases by 2080. They acknowledge the impact of factors such as 
economic growth in Mexico as compared to the USA, demographic change in 
Mexico, the importance of farming for people’s livelihoods and agricultural policies, 
as well as immigration policies and border enforcement, on the development of 
migration flows. Yet, their analysis is only based on the predicted impact of climate 
change on yields, which in turn they predict to affect migration. This approach 
bears several shortcomings. As shown above, assessments of the impacts of 
climate change on yields, such as the one by Rosenzweig and Parry (1994), seem 
to assume that people continue farming under most precarious conditions until no 
farming is possible at all anymore. Thus, they fail to acknowledge that people might 
stop subsistence farming when it becomes increasingly unproductive and turn to 
alternative livelihood strategies, potentially including migration. Furthermore, as 
chapter 6.3 showed, young people’s interest in farming is generally declining in 
Mexico. Also, those who continue farming, in many cases belong to an age group 
for which international migration in particular has already become very difficult, due 
to the physical effort demanded at the border crossing and the prospects of finding 
employment at the destination. Thus, those who farm often do not migrate and vice 
versa. Climate change also might create more or fewer jobs in commercial 
211 
 
 
agriculture, depending on how landowners decide to diversify crops under 
changing climatic conditions. As the previous sections showed, some crops are 
likely to require more labour, others less, resulting in opposite developments of the 
need to migrate as an alternative to finding local employment. Nevertheless, many 
of these moves might also be seasonal and internal, as empirical evidence from 
the village of Laguna Seca in Zacatecas shows. 
 
Barbieri et al. (2010) also analyse the climate sensitivity of existing migration 
patterns by focusing on the climate sensitivity of stresses to people’s livelihoods. 
Unlike Feng et al. (2010), they concentrated on the climate sensitivity of generic 
economic migration drivers, mainly the income differentials between different 
regions in Brazil. They acknowledge that their approach “emphasizes an economic 
perspective on human migration, and does not consider the operation of other 
adaptation mechanisms” (Barbieri et al. 2010:351). Thus, both studies, the one by 
Feng et al. (2010) and the one by Barbieri et al. (2010) base their analysis on the 
climate sensitivity of migration to only one potential driver of migration. Although it 
has to be acknowledged that both decreasing agricultural productivity and a 
decreasing availability of employment are important livelihood stressors, climate 
change might, to various extents, affect other livelihood stressors in the sending 
areas. Furthermore, climate change might affect these livelihood stressors at the 
local and at the global level.  
 
So far, this chapter has analysed the climate sensitivity of the livelihood stressors 
empirically observed in Zacatecas and Veracruz. As opposed to the studies by 
Feng et al. (2010) and Barbieri et al. (2010), the approach applied in this chapter 
so far has aimed at a holistic analysis of the potential local and global effects of 
climate change on existing livelihood stressors. The results of this analysis are 
summarised in table 8.2. 
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Table 8.2: Climate sensitivity of livelihood stressors in the researched communities 
Livelihood stressor Projected climate change 
impact 
Local vs. 
global climate 
sensitivity 
Degree of 
climate 
sensitivity 
variability in precipitation and 
temperature patterns 
increased uncertainty leads 
farmers to abandon farming 
local very high 
extreme events such as 
droughts, hurricanes, floods 
more frequent or more severe, 
uncertainty increasing 
local high 
decreasing soil fertility increased risk of land 
degradation and of pests and 
pathogens 
local medium 
low revenues for yields caused by decreasing yields, 
revenues likely to increase on a 
global level. Yet, in Mexico 
counterbalanced by policies 
global very low 
high prices for seeds, fertiliser, 
irrigation 
feasible but not documented global/local very low 
lack of industries or services in 
or near the communities 
potentially less investment 
because of lack of water or risk 
of floods or hurricanes 
local medium 
lack of infrastructure to facilitate 
commuting 
potentially some impacts on 
accessibility of work places 
local low 
lack of formal education 
needed to obtain work 
potentially some impacts on 
accessibility of schools 
local low 
seasonal employment in 
agriculture 
depending on crop choice by 
landowners increase or decrease 
of employment possible 
local (uncertain 
climate), global 
(prices) 
very high 
low and decreasing salaries potential for some changes 
caused by need for more/fewer 
workers in commercial farming 
local, global low 
high and increasing prices for 
basic consumer goods 
danger of price increase due to 
decreasing yields on a global 
level, can be mediated by 
national policies 
global high 
cultural change plays into farming decision, but 
not affected by climate change 
none very low 
some young people unwilling to 
work hard for little revenue 
plays into farming decision, but 
not affected by climate change 
none very low 
increased material desires 
(food, clothes, cars) 
plays into farming decision, but 
not affected by climate change 
none very low 
 
Source: author 
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While livelihood stressors are potential drivers of migration, as chapter 7 showed, 
elements, such as human agency, financial resources, access to recruiters and 
networks, and the availability of alternative livelihood strategies are also important 
elements in migration decisions. As these intervening elements might also become 
affected by the local or global consequences of climate change, the role they play 
in migration decisions might change in the future. Furthermore, the availability of 
employment opportunities at migrants’ destinations might to various extents 
become affected by climate change. Therefore, a holistic assessment of the 
potential effects of future climate change on migration needs to include all 
elements involved in migration decisions at the macro, the meso and the micro 
level. It also needs to analyse the potential differences regarding the climate 
sensitivity of different migration flows. The next sections are concerned with the 
analysis of different migration flows observed in Zacatecas and Veracruz.  
 
8.4 Climate sensitivity of different forms of migration 
One interesting result of the analysis of migration decisions in Mexico in chapters 6 
and 7 is that the livelihood stressors at the macro level are identical in the 
historically and socio-economically different communities El Tigre and Laguna 
Seca in Zacatecas, as well as in Cascajal del Río and Nuevo Renacimiento in 
Veracruz. However, the manner and extent to which these livelihood stressors 
contribute to migration decisions, or to the choice of alternative livelihood 
strategies, is very different in the four communities. These differences are to a 
large extent caused by intervening factors at the micro and the meso level such as 
agency, including people’s individual choices and preferences, networks, recruiters, 
and financial resources. 
 
Table 8.3 shows the different forms of migration that were identified in the 
communities Cascajal del Río, Nuevo Renacimiento, Laguna Seca, and El Tigre, 
and seeks to summarise the empirical findings regarding the destinations, origins, 
and the intervening factors at the meso and micro levels involved in these different 
migration flows. Chapter 7 analysed the different degrees of importance of these 
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elements for different migration flows. One example is that, while access to 
networks at the destination is a crucial factor for international illegal migration 
decisions, it is helpful but not mandatory for internal migration decisions.  
 
Table 8.3: Migration flows in the researched communities 
 Illegal 
international 
Legal 
international 
Internal urban Internal rural 
Destination US cities or 
agricultural 
regions 
US cities or 
agricultural regions 
Local 
agglomerations, 
northern border 
cities, Mexico 
City, Monterrey, 
Guadalajara 
Farming regions 
in Jalisco, 
Sinaloa, and 
tropical states 
including 
Veracruz 
Origin El Tigre, Cascajal 
del Río, Nuevo 
Renacimiento 
Cascajal del Río 
Nuevo 
Renacimiento, 
Laguna Seca 
Cascajal del 
Río, Nuevo 
Renacimiento 
Laguna Seca, 
Cascajal del Río, 
Nuevo 
Renacimiento 
Facilitators Access to 
networks 
mandatory 
Access to 
recruiters 
mandatory 
Access to 
networks helpful 
Access to 
networks or 
recruiters helpful 
Financial 
resources 
needed 
3000-4000 USD 
for the border 
crossing 
Up to 500 USD for 
passport and 
papers 
Money for the 
journey and for 
accommodation 
and food at 
destination in 
case of no 
networks 
Money for the 
journey and for 
accommodation 
and food at 
destination in 
case of no 
networks 
Agency Perceived ability 
to cross border 
and find work, 
willingness and 
approval of others 
(no disapproval 
because of 
danger and long 
separation from 
family), in El Tigre 
social restrictions 
for women 
migrating alone, 
in Veracruz not a 
problem. 
Perceived ability to 
obtain papers and 
work, willingness 
and approval of 
others (no 
disapproval 
because of long 
separation from 
family), 
perceived benefit 
(often income 
perceived to be 
inferior compared 
to illegal migration 
Perceived ability 
to find work and 
manage life 
outside of home 
village, 
perceived 
benefit (salaries 
in Mexico are 
lower than in the 
US), willingness 
and approval of 
family members 
Perceived ability 
to find work and 
manage life 
outside of home 
village, perceived 
benefit (salaries 
in Mexico are 
lower than in the 
US), willingness 
and approval of 
family members, 
especially for 
women in 
Veracruz 
 
Source: author 
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An assessment of the climate sensitivity of existing migration flows in Mexico thus 
needs to take into account the different degrees of climate sensitivity of all above 
mentioned elements involved in migration decisions. It also needs to consider the 
different degrees of relevance for migration decisions of these elements. The 
following matrix combines these two factors: 1) to what extent each element 
involved in different forms of migration is sensitive to climate change; and 2) how 
relevant this element is for this form of migration. This combination of factors 
measures to what extent the effects of future climate change on each specific 
element involved in migration decisions will affect different migration flows as a 
whole.  
 
Figure 8.2: Matrix measuring the effect of climate change on migration flows 
 
5 10 15 20 25 
4 8 12 16 20 
3 6 9 12 15 
2 4 6 8 10 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
 
 
Source: author 
 
This approach is a modified version of the qualitative risk assessment, which 
measures the impact of a phenomenon, in relation to the likelihood that this 
phenomenon will actually occur (Fletcher 2005). As figure 8.2 shows, possible 
scores are the following: 1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = medium, 4 = high, and 5 = very 
high. Table 8.4 explains the meaning of each score and of the colour codes, which 
Degree of 
climate 
sensitivity 
(score 1-5) 
Degree of relevance for migration 
decisions (score 1-5) 
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are attributed to the degree of climate sensitivity and to the degree of relevance for 
migration decisions of the elements involved in different migration flows.  
 
Table 8.4: Scores for degree of climate sensitivity and relevance for migration decisions 
 Degree of climate 
sensitivity 
Degree of relevance for 
migration decisions 
1 (very low) effect very unlikely, 
negligible 
almost nothing to do with 
migration decisions, 
negligible 
2 (low) small effect possible, yet 
non-climate factors stronger 
small effect on migration 
decisions possible, yet other 
factors more important 
3 (medium) some changes to existing 
situation possible but no 
large ones, other factors 
might be stronger 
some effect on migration 
decision, yet not a 
determining argument 
4 (high) substantial effect, changes 
of existing situation likely 
strong effect on migration 
decisions 
5 (very high) very substantial effect, 
changes of existing situation 
almost certain 
major factor in migration 
decision, determining 
argument 
 
Source: author, adapted from Fletcher (2005) 
 
In the analysis which follows, the product of the scores for the degree of climate 
sensitivity and for the degree of relevance for migration decisions is calculated for 
each element involved in migration decisions. The potential results range from 1 
(very low effect) to 25 (very high effect). As figure 8.2 shows, results between 1 and 
6 indicate a very low and low impact of climate change on migration, results 
between 8 and 12 a medium impact, and results between 15 and 25 a high to very 
high impact. Elements scoring very high for the combination of the degree of their 
climate sensitivity and of their relevance for migration decisions are likely to 
contribute most to changes to existing migration patterns caused by future climate 
change. As chapter 7 showed, several elements involved in migration decisions 
can be of different degrees of importance for different forms of migration. 
Therefore, also the impact of climate change can be expected to be different on 
different forms of migration. 
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Table 8.5 seeks to show the climate sensitivity of different migration flows in 
Mexico based on empirical fieldwork, which was analysed in detail in chapters 6 
and 748. Scores marked in red identify the elements involved in migration 
decisions, which, when affected by climate change, are likely to bring about the 
most significant changes to existing migration patterns. The highest positive effect 
of future climate change on illegal international migration can be expected when 
climate change negatively affects the availability of employment opportunities in 
industries or services near the sending areas and when climate change causes 
price increases for basic consumer goods. The availability of financial resources 
also scores very high, yet, the relationship between access to money and illegal 
international migration is positive. Illegal international migration is the most 
expensive form of migration. The negative effects of household income in the form 
of decreasing agricultural outputs and a decreasing availability of employment 
opportunities, partly caused by climate change and resulting in decreasing financial 
resources, are likely to entail severe restrictions to potential international migrants. 
Empirical evidence from Zacatecas and Veracruz showed that international 
migrants often rely on financial support from members of the extended family in the 
sending and the receiving areas. Without these informal credits, fewer people are 
likely to be able to afford the high costs for the journey, the crossing of the border 
and maintenance in the USA. 
                                                 
48
 See appendices 1-4 for separate tables for each migration flow, including explanations why the degree of 
climate sensitivity and the degree of relevance for migration decisions was set at the values presented in table 
8.5. 
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Table 8.5: Climate sensitivity of different migration flows in Mexico 
 degree of 
climate 
sensitivity 
degree of 
relevance: 
illegal 
international 
migration 
score: 
illegal 
international 
migration 
degree of 
relevance: 
legal 
international 
migration 
score:  
legal 
international 
migration 
degree of 
relevance: 
internal 
urban 
migration 
score: 
internal 
urban 
migration 
degree of 
relevance: 
internal 
rural 
migration 
score: 
internal 
rural 
migration 
variability 
precipitation/ 
temperature 
patterns 
very high 
(5) 
low (2) 10 low (2) 10 high (4) 20 very high 
(5) 
25 
extreme 
events  
high (4) low (2) 8 low (2) 8 high (4) 16 very high 
(5) 
20 
decreasing 
soil fertility 
medium (3) low (2) 6 low (2) 6 high (4) 12 very high 
(5) 
15 
low revenues 
for yields 
very low (1) low (2) 2 low (2) 2 high (4) 4 very high 
(5) 
5 
high prices 
for seeds, 
fertiliser, 
irrigation 
very low (1) low (2) 2 low (2) 2 high (4) 4 very high 
(5) 
5 
lack of 
industries or 
services in or 
near the 
communities 
medium (3) very high (5) 15 very high (5) 15 high (4) 12 high (4) 12 
lack of 
infrastructure 
to facilitate 
commuting 
low (2) medium (3) 6 medium (3) 6 medium (3) 6 medium (3) 6 
lack of formal 
education 
needed to 
obtain work 
low (2) very low (1) 2 very low (1) 2 medium (3) 6 very low (1) 2 
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seasonal 
employment 
in agriculture  
very high 
(5) 
low (2) 10 very high (5) 25 high (4) 20 very high 
(5) 
25 
low and 
decreasing 
salaries 
low (2) very high (5) 10 very high (5) 10 medium (3) 6 low (2) 4 
high and 
increasing 
prices for 
basic 
consumer 
goods 
high (4) high (4) 16 very high (5) 20 very high 
(5) 
20 very high 
(5) 
20 
cultural 
change 
very low (1) very high (5) 5 very low (1) 1 medium (3) 3 very low (1) 1 
unwilling to 
work hard for 
little revenue 
very low (1) very high (5) 5 very low (1) 1 very low (1) 1 very low (1) 1 
increased 
material 
desires 
very low (1) very high (5) 5 low (2) 2 very low (1) 1 very low (1) 1 
access to 
networks 
low (2) very high (5) 10 medium (3) 6 medium (3) 6 medium (3) 6 
access to 
recruiters 
low (2) very low (1) 2 very high (5) 10 low (2) 4 medium (3) 6 
financial 
resources 
medium (3) very high (5) 15 very high (5) 15 medium (3) 9 low (2) 6 
agency low (2) very high (5) 10 medium (3) 6 high (4) 8 medium (3) 6 
alternative 
livelihood 
strategies 
medium (3) very low (1) 3 very low (1) 3 medium (3) 9 very high 
(5) 
15 
Source: author
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Anecdotal evidence from interviews during the second phase of fieldwork, which 
coincided with the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, suggests that, because of 
decreasing financial resources, many families could not afford international 
migration any more. The latest Mexican Census data (INEGI 2010) show that 
Mexico-US migration had decreased over the last years, which might or might 
not have been caused by the effects of the global financial crisis. Yet, the 
decrease of Mexico-US migration coincides with two phenomena: 1) the global 
financial crisis, which severely affected employment opportunities in the USA and 
in Mexico and decreased household income; and 2) climatic extremes which 
might be attributed to climate change, such as severe droughts in some parts of 
Mexico including Zacatecas, and severe floods in other parts of Mexico including 
Veracruz. This observation suggests that the negative effect of economic factors 
on illegal international migration is likely to be stronger than the positive effect of 
phenomena related to climate change. In sum, it seems unlikely that future 
climate change will increase illegal Mexico-US migration. It seems more likely 
that economic restraints, reinforced by the consequences of climate change, will 
result in illegal international migration either decreasing or remaining stable in the 
future. 
 
The role that climate change is likely to play in relation to legal international 
migration is similar to the effects of climate change on illegal international 
migration. The most important difference is related to the effects that climate 
change might have on the availability of seasonal employment in commercial 
agriculture. Where the possibility exists at all – i.e. where recruitment agencies 
operate, and/or social connections exist, legal international migration is 
accessible to a larger group of people than illegal international migration because 
it is cheaper. Therefore, if employment opportunities in commercial agriculture in 
the sending areas were to decrease, more people would be likely to consider 
working in the USA or in Canada, also likely in commercial farming. Yet, as this 
chapter has demonstrated, two scenarios are feasible regarding the impacts of 
climate change on the availability of employment in commercial agriculture in 
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Mexico. The diversification of commercial farmers to more labour intensive crops 
and the expansion of greenhouses would be expected to entail a need for more 
workers, also possibly during different times of the year, in which previously no 
work in commercial farming was available. Yet, a change of commercial farmers 
to crops which need fewer workers, or the abandonment of farmland, would lead 
to more pressure on agricultural workers to seek employment opportunities 
somewhere else.  
 
The second scenario might, in combination with a decrease of internal migration, 
also lead to an increase of legal international migration. Access to recruiters in or 
near their home communities, however, is mandatory for legal international 
migration and, as fieldwork showed, recruiters are not active all over rural 
Mexico. Furthermore, the generic climate sensitivity of migrants’ destinations was 
not included in table 8.5 because rural agricultural destinations are likely to be 
affected differently by climate change than urban destinations. Mexican migrants 
work in both agricultural and non-agricultural jobs in the USA. Nevertheless, it is 
feasible that the effects of climate change might also lead to changes to 
commercial farming in the USA. The effect of climate change on legal 
international migration thus remains unclear because it is subject to uncertainties 
in both the sending and the receiving regions.  
 
Like the two forms of international migration, the two forms of internal migration 
are likely to become affected in similar ways to each other by future climate 
change. The major difference between international and internal migration is that 
the direct effects of climate change on agriculture, manifested by changing 
temperature and precipitation patterns and extreme events, are likely to 
contribute to a larger extent to changes in internal migration patterns than to 
changes in international migration patterns. Internal migrants often rely much 
more still on subsistence agriculture and on jobs in commercial farming than 
international migrants, particularly people engaged in illegal international 
migration. Changes to prices of basic consumer goods are also important 
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elements in the decision for internal migration, both to rural and to urban 
destinations. Yet, internal migration is less expensive than international migration 
and access to migration networks or recruiters is not necessary. Therefore, 
internal rural or urban migration is accessible to most of the rural population, 
although the poorest village dwellers might still be unable to pay for the journey. 
It is thus likely that climate change, by depriving people of several sources of 
their income, might stimulate internal movements. Nevertheless, as mentioned 
above, climate change is likely to also affect destination areas, so that rural 
destinations within Mexico might become less attractive. Furthermore, both rural 
and urban destinations might become saturated when more people from entire 
Mexico decide to move. 
 
Another major difference between international and internal migration is the 
importance of the availability of alternative livelihood strategies. While the 
potential effect of climate change on alternative livelihood strategies on both 
forms of international migration is likely to be minimal, it is likely to be much 
bigger on internal migration, particularly on rural internal migration. The reason 
for the importance of alternative livelihood strategies for internal rural migration is 
the fact that internal moves to rural destinations are often seasonal and temporal. 
As empirical evidence from Zacatecas shows, many migrants only move during 
the winter months, when commercial farming does not offer any jobs. Their 
intention is to find some kind of income, which enables them to secure their 
maintenance during these months. Some village dwellers who do not migrate, 
manage to do so by setting up micro-businesses. However, due to the general 
lack of money in the winter months, they often lack customers who can afford to 
buy their products. Furthermore, these micro-businesses in general do not 
generate enough money for a whole family to survive. Therefore, in many cases 
they are not considered an alternative to international moves or to moves to 
urban areas in Mexico, which are often more permanent. Yet, they are an 
alternative to internal rural migration, which can be used to bridge the lack of 
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income during the months when few employment opportunities in agriculture are 
available. 
 
8.5 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the potential effects of climate change on existing 
migration flows in Mexico. It has argued that the consequences of climate 
change will manifest at the local and at the global level. Therefore, climate 
change will also affect elements involved in migration decisions on both levels. 
The first part of the chapter was concerned with an analysis of the climate 
sensitivity of the livelihood stressors that were empirically observed in Zacatecas 
and Veracruz. It demonstrated that the local effects of climate change will most 
seriously affect subsistence and commercial agriculture. Previous assessments 
of the effects of future climate change on agriculture calculated the yield losses 
that the effects of climate change on agriculture will entail. However, unlike these 
assessments, this chapter has argued that small-scale farmers are likely to stop 
farming altogether when uncertain weather conditions lead to a significant risk of 
losing money that is invested in agriculture. This argument is based on empirical 
evidence in Zacatecas and Veracruz, which has shown that uncertainty of 
precipitation and temperature patterns has already led some farmers down this 
path.  
 
While subsistence farmers may not have the means to adapt to changing climatic 
conditions and may stop farming altogether, adaptation measures are a more 
realistic option for many commercial farmers. However, based on empirical 
observations, the chapter has presented three adaptation options for commercial 
farmers in Mexico as a response to climate change. All three responses are 
based on diversification away from traditional crops including maize. This 
development has already started as the example of Zacatecas showed. 
Importantly, farmers consider switching either to crops which demand more 
labour or to crops which demand less labour. Depending on the investment 
capacity, greenhouses are a third option. Thus, the effects of climate change on 
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the availability of employment in commercial farming, an important source of 
employment for Mexican village dwellers, depends on the future choice of crops. 
Growing local and foreign investment in greenhouses in particular is likely to 
increase the availability of jobs, and greenhouses demand labour during times of 
the year in which conventional farming does not employ workers.  
 
Agriculture might also become affected by the global effects of climate change. 
Rising prices for agricultural inputs, in combination with local climate stressors, 
are currently rendering farming less profitable. This might add to people’s 
decision to abandon their farmland. Furthermore, the global consequences of 
climate change are likely to translate into growing prices for basic consumer 
goods, negatively affecting people’s purchasing power. Although consumer prices 
for agricultural products are predicted to increase under future climate change, 
these price increases are likely not to be transferred to producers because of the 
strong position of middlemen involved in the buying and selling of agricultural 
produce.  
 
Based on analysis of the climate sensitivity of the livelihood stressors and 
potential drivers of migration at the macro level, it was argued that an 
assessment of the climate sensitivity of migration flows needs to include all 
elements involved in migration decisions at the macro, the meso and the micro 
level. Two recent studies – by Feng et al. (2010) and Barbieri et al. (2010) – have 
analysed the climate sensitivity of migration drivers but both concentrated on only 
one element. In contrast, this chapter presented an approach that includes an 
analysis of the climate sensitivity of livelihood stressors, which might translate 
into drivers of migration, access to networks and recruiters, human agency, as 
well as the access to alternative livelihood strategies. It has argued that these 
elements are likely to be affected in different ways by the consequences of 
climate change and that these elements are of different degrees of relevance in 
the decision-making process for different forms of migration. The chapter has 
developed a matrix, based on the principle of the risk matrix used for qualitative 
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risk assessments, which measures the degree of climate sensitivity against the 
degree of relevance for migration decisions for each element involved in different 
forms of migration. 
 
The results of this analysis show that local climate stressors are likely to affect 
internal migration but can be expected to have a much smaller effect on 
international moves. Global effects of climate change on people’s purchasing 
power are the most important element that might put pressure on people to 
migrate both internally and internationally. Yet, this effect is countered by the 
negative effect that climate change is likely to have on people’s access to 
financial resources, which are needed for international migration. Thus, 
decreasing purchasing power might entail more internal migration but is unlikely 
to lead to more international migration.  
 
This chapter analysed the climate sensitivity of migration flows in rural Mexico. It 
stressed the complexity of the likely impacts of climate change on migration 
patterns at the local and the global level. The chapter demonstrated that 
research into the climate change-migration nexus requires an in-depth 
understanding of the local context. The following chapter – the conclusion of this 
thesis – argues for a shift of research and policy interest towards such an 
understanding of the complex relationship between climate change and 
migration.   
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Chapter 9: Conclusion – Towards a better understanding of the climate 
change-migration nexus 
This thesis has been concerned with the potential nexus between climate change 
and migration in Mexico. It argues that most existing predictions of people 
expected to become displaced by the future consequences of climate change are 
unconvincing on conceptual and methodological grounds. As a result, these 
approaches have failed to deliver a complete understanding of the complex 
relationship between climate change and migration. Indeed, concrete, empirical 
knowledge about the circumstances under which future climate change might 
lead to more or less migration in particular places is scarce. Meanwhile, 
estimates of large numbers of 'climate change refugees' have dominated the 
public discourse over recent decades. This concern with estimating the volume of 
climate change related migration, and with finding definitions and categorisations 
for people whose migration decisions are affected by climate change, have been 
unhelpful in terms of advancing scientific understanding.  
 
In response, this thesis has argued for a shift away from attempts to define and 
categorise climate related migration towards the development of approaches that 
seek to understand the complex relationship between climate change and 
migration. This thesis aims to contribute to this understanding by developing an 
alternative conceptual and methodological approach for research into the climate 
change-migration nexus. The first part of this concluding chapter analyses these 
theoretical contributions to the debate about the nexus between climate change 
and migration. The second part demonstrates how this approach is applied to the 
case of Mexico and highlights the most important empirical results. These 
empirical findings include information on different migration flows in Mexico, the 
main causes for migration in Mexico, as well as the climate sensitivity of these 
migration flows. Furthermore, empirical results suggest that people’s perceptions 
of climate change are not necessarily always congruent with statistical evidence. 
The third and fourth part of this conclusion then analyse how these empirical 
results could influence the direction of future research and inform policies. Finally, 
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this chapter acknowledges the limitations of the work presented in this thesis, 
and considers its theoretical and empirical contribution to a future better 
understanding of the nexus between climate change and migration.  
 
9.1 Theoretical contribution of this thesis 
This thesis has argued that understanding of the potential nexus between climate 
change and migration has significant gaps. Chapter 3 demonstrated that one of 
the reasons for this research gap is the lack of a clear and convincing conceptual 
approach. Most existing approaches identify climate stressors and analyse how 
and to what extent they are likely to affect migration. In contrast, the approach 
developed in this thesis starts with existing migration flows and analyses the 
climate sensitivity of the elements involved in migration decisions.  
 
9.1.1 Beyond definitions and categories 
A first impediment to the understanding of climate change-migration linkages is 
the prioritisation of definitions and categories. Chapter 2.2 showed that several 
definitions of 'environmental refugees', 'climate change refugees' or 'climate 
change migrants' exist. Attempts to define people who migrate because of 
climatic stressors have been ongoing for more than a decade (Black 1999, 2001) 
and have not resulted in a universally accepted definition so far. The main issue 
regarding existing definitions is that they fail to capture the complexity of both 
migration and climate change and implicitly assume a linear relationship between 
the two. Yet, the multi-causality of migration and the complex effects of climate 
change on people's livelihoods, analysed in chapter 3, demonstrate that the 
relationship between climate change and migration cannot be linear.  
 
Furthermore, empirical evidence, presented in chapters 7-9, has shown that 
separating climate stressors from other drivers of migration is not possible 
because the elements involved in existing migration flows can be expected to be 
affected by the direct and indirect consequences of future climate change at the 
local and the global level. Furthermore, chapter 7.3 argued that not all changes 
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to people's livelihoods caused by the consequences of climate change 
necessarily lead to migration, as people are making use of various alternative 
responses. Thus, the complexity of the relationship between climate change and 
migration adds to the difficulty of defining and categorising people whose 
migration decisions are influenced by the consequences of climate change.  
 
Attempts to define, categorize and estimate the volume of future migration 
related to climate change need to be based on a sound theoretical framework 
and on profound empirical knowledge to produce valid results. The complexity of 
the climate change migration nexus raises doubts about the question if it is 
feasible at all to define and categorise climate-related migration. This thesis has 
shown that separating climate change from other drivers of migration is not 
possible because climate change is likely to directly and indirectly affect existing 
migration patterns at the local and at the global level. The category of 'climate 
change migrant' is thus difficult if not impossible to define. Instead, it is preferable 
to concentrate on achieving a holistic understanding of the complex relationship 
between climate change and migration, based on a new conceptual and 
methodological approach. 
 
9.1.2 A new conceptual and methodological approach 
Chapter 3 developed the conceptual approach of this thesis on which the 
methodological approach presented in chapter 4 builds. Unlike previous 
approaches, which assume a linear relationship between environmental 
stressors or climate change and migration, the approach presented in this thesis 
acknowledges the complexity of these linkages. It further argues that climate 
stressors cannot be separated from other elements in migration decisions as 
several previous studies have tried. In contrast, it develops an approach that 
starts with existing migration flows and analyses the extent to which these 
migration flows might become affected by the consequences of climate change. 
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A small number of studies do already exist that are based on an approach that 
analyses how climate change might affect existing drivers of migration. In 
particular, research by Feng et al. (2010) and Barbieri et al. (2010) for Mexico 
and Brazil, respectively, analysed the climate sensitivity of what they considered 
the most important driver of migration in their studied region. Barbieri et al. 
(2010) studied the potential effects of climate change on economic differences in 
different regions of Brazil and how migration might be affected by these changes. 
Feng et al. (2010) concentrated on the projected impact of climate change on 
yield output and on the effects that decreasing agricultural productivity might 
have on the volume of Mexico-US migration.  
 
Feng’s study concluded that migration from Mexico into the US can be expected 
to increase by 1.4 to 6.7 million people by 2080, depending on different emission 
scenarios. Yet, recent Mexican census data (INEGI 2010) shed some doubts on 
the validity of this forecast. It shows that the volume of international migration 
from Mexico has actually decreased over the last decade. At the same time, as 
chapters 5.2 and 6.3 show, farming has been perceived to become more and 
more difficult in different parts of Mexico. Thus while farming became more 
difficult, fewer people migrated to the US, which is the opposite development to 
what Feng et al. (2010) forecast. One of the major issues regarding the studies of 
both Barbieri and Feng is that, although they acknowledge that other factors are 
involved in migration decisions, they analyse the climate sensitivity of only one 
migration driver. In contrast, another study by Black et al. (2011) developed a 
conceptual framework, based on the analysis of the sensitivity to changes to 
local climate stressors of all drivers of migration that had been identified for a 
region. This approach is illustrated by two case studies for Bangladesh and 
Ghana to show how this methodology can be applied in different contexts.  
 
The conceptual approach of this thesis goes a step further and includes the 
predicted local as well as global consequences of climate change and its 
potential effects on migration. Thus it also considers how, for example, climate 
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change might indirectly affect migration through changes to commodity prices 
and related increasing stresses to people's livelihoods. It includes factors at the 
meso and micro level, such as access to networks and recruiters as well as 
individual perceptions and preferences. It considers how people's access to 
alternative livelihood strategies, such as micro-businesses, might be affected by 
climate change. It also considers how the attractiveness of particularly rural 
destinations, where migrants go to work in commercial farming, might be affected 
by a changing climate. 
 
The qualitative analysis of the climate sensitivity of elements involved in 
migration decisions provides a more profound understanding of climate change-
migration linkages in Mexico. Based on this qualitative analysis, an adapted risk 
matrix measures the degree of climate sensitivity of elements involved in 
migration decisions against the importance of these elements for migration 
decisions. Elements scoring high on both scales can be expected to have the 
highest impact on existing migration flows under future climate change. 
 
9.1.3 Empirical findings on Mexico 
The qualitative analysis of migration and its climate sensitivity in Mexico is based 
on empirical data obtained during long-term empirical fieldwork in the Mexican 
states of Zacatecas and Veracruz. Previous fieldwork mostly concentrated on 
single case studies into the effects of local climate stressors on migration, whilst 
the climate sensitivity assessments of migration described above (Feng et al. 
2010, Barbieri et al. 2010, Black et al. 2011) were based on secondary data. In 
contrast, this thesis provides an assessment of the sensitivity of migration flows 
based on first-hand empirical data. The next section provides a detailed overview 
of the main empirical findings of this thesis and analyses what they contribute to 
the theoretical understanding of the nexus between climate change and 
migration. 
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9.2 Main findings 
Qualitative data from the four studied village communities in Mexico allow a 
better understanding of the linkages between climate change and migration. 
These empirical results show that people are affected by various livelihood 
stressors, Yet, how these livelihood stressors translate into migration decisions or 
not depends on intervening factors on the micro and the meso level as well as on 
the availability of other livelihood strategies. Also, different forms of migration 
exist in rural Mexico, which are motivated by different factors. Next to detailed 
data about different forms of migration and its causes, this thesis also provides 
information on people's perceptions of changing climatic conditions and their 
responses.  
 
9.2.1 Causes of migration in Mexico 
Chapter 6 analysed the livelihood stressors that might lead to migration found 
during fieldwork and compared them to drivers of migration found in the Mexican 
migration literature. Both the migration literature and empirical data suggest that 
economic drivers are the dominant motive for migration in Mexico. A lack of 
employment opportunities can be considered the most important cause of 
migration found in the literature and mentioned by interviewees in all four 
researched communities. The migration literature stresses the general lack of 
employment opportunities in Mexico and the instability of jobs, mainly in the 
informal sector. Fieldwork showed that next to the general lack of employment 
opportunities, seasonal fluctuations of the availability of labour are of major 
concern to village dwellers.  
 
Fieldwork showed that the fact that small-scale and subsistence agriculture has 
become increasingly difficult is perceived as a serious stressor to people's 
livelihoods. Yet, difficulties related to farming were not identified as a driver of 
migration in the literature. Chapter 5.1 of this thesis argues that in many cases 
farmers and migrants do not belong to the same group of people in rural Mexico. 
While international migrants are most often adolescents and young adults, the 
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generation of their parents are farmers. The older generation owns the land and 
often they feel too old to take the strains of the journey and of the border 
crossing. Furthermore, they are aware of the difficulties of finding a job, which 
often involves hard physical labour. Thus, while people perceive the decreasing 
productivity of agriculture as a livelihood stressor, in many cases it does not 
translate into migration decisions. Next to the lack and the seasonality of 
employment opportunities and decreasing agricultural productivity, fieldwork 
showed that people perceived decreasing purchasing power as an important 
livelihood stressor. This includes both rising prices and the decreasing value of 
salaries taking inflation into account. Furthermore, increased material desires 
and aspirations, particularly of the younger generation, have led to a larger need 
for money as compared to previous generations.  
 
Despite the different socio-economic and cultural backgrounds of the four 
researched communities, the perceived livelihood stressors were the same in all 
four villages. Yet, there is a large difference in how these livelihood stressors 
translate into migration decisions and between the different forms of migration 
that can be found in each community. Fieldwork showed that migration decisions 
depend to a large extent on people's access to networks and recruiters but also 
on people's perceptions of the feasibility and the utility of migration. Indeed, while 
economic stressors are important drivers of migration, particularly international 
migration is also an expensive endeavour, which not everybody can afford. 
Perceived livelihood stressors thus not necessarily translate into migration. 
People are also making use of several other livelihood strategies such as micro-
businesses, formal and informal credits, and the selling of land or livestock. 
Fieldwork shows that the village history plays a large role in people's access to 
migration networks and recruiters and in how different forms of migration are 
perceived. While illegal international migration is the dominant form of migration 
in some villages in Mexico and internal migration is not considered worthwhile, 
other villages are not connected to international migration networks. People in 
these villages are likely to consider international migration as too dangerous and 
233 
 
prefer to migrate internally to diversify their income. This leads to different 
migration patterns and to different migration flows in different parts of rural 
Mexico. Empirical evidence about these different migration flows and about their 
causes is presented in the next section. 
 
9.2.2 Different migration flows in Mexico 
Fieldwork identified four migration flows for rural Mexico, illegal international 
migration, mainly to the USA; legal international migration to the USA and to 
Canada; internal rural migration to centres of commercial farming within Mexico; 
and internal urban migration to the big cities in Mexico and to larger 
agglomerations within each state. The development of these migration flows in 
each village has been strongly linked to the migration history of the four 
communities. Zacatecas has got a century long history of migration to the USA 
and has been one of the major migrant sending states in Mexico. Yet, patterns of 
international migration in Zacatecas are heterogeneous. Some communities, 
such as El Tigre, show a very high international migration rate, with flows 
concentrated on one destination in the USA. These migration patterns already 
exist for centuries and were developed when the USA actively recruited migrant 
workers in the context of the 'bracero' programme in the middle of the 20th 
century. After the end of this programme in 1964, networks and knowledge built 
during the phase of labour recruitment were used to facilitate illegal access to the 
USA. Villages which lack this history of international migration, such as Laguna 
Seca, often do not have access to migration networks and few people from these 
villages migrate internationally.  
 
The history of international migration from Veracruz is much younger than the 
migration history of Zacatecas. Therefore, migration networks developed 
differently in the two states. When illegal international migration started growing 
in the 1990s, migrants from Veracruz used the existing migration networks of 
other states. Prospective migrants often met fellow migrants from traditional 
migration states and crossed the border with them. This led to the development 
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of different migration patterns in Veracruz. The case of El Tigre illustrates that 
communities with long-established migration networks tend to send their 
migrants to one single destination in the USA because migration networks 
developed at the village level. In the states from which international migration is 
relatively new, such as Veracruz, migration networks developed at the household 
level and are based on individual relationships with migrants, who have access to 
the migration networks developed in their communities.  
 
In contrast to international migration, internal migration seems to depend to a 
lesser extent on people's access to migration networks. The degree of 
importance of internal migration varies between the four studied communities 
and seems to be connected to the role of international migration in each village. 
In El Tigre, where illegal international migration has been an important livelihood 
strategy for several generations, people do not consider internal migration a 
worthwhile strategy because the low Mexican salaries do not justify the efforts 
and costs related to moving away from their home village. In contrast, in Laguna 
Seca internal migration is the only feasible form of migration for many village 
dwellers because most of them do not have access to migration networks or 
recruiters. In both researched villages in Veracruz, internal migration had been 
an important livelihood strategy before the growing importance of international 
migration since the 1990s. Fieldwork shows that today they co-exist and are both 
considered useful alternatives to staying in the village. Empirical data from the 
four researched communities thus demonstrates that the same livelihood 
stressors translate into different forms of migration depending on intervening 
factors at the meso and the micro level.    
 
9.2.3 Climate change perceptions vs. statistical evidence 
Although this thesis is not primarily concerned with people's perceptions of 
climate change, fieldwork provided some insight into the ways how people 
perceive and react to climate stressors. Integrating these results into this thesis is 
important for a holistic understanding of climate change-migration linkages. 
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Fieldwork has shown that village dwellers in general have observed some 
changes to climate patterns in previous decades. People in Zacatecas said that 
rainfall in general had decreased and that more temperature and precipitation 
extremes such as frost, hail and snowfall during the winter months have occurred 
in recent years. In Veracruz, people affected by the flooding of their houses or 
their fields remarked that floods happen more often than in the past. In contrast, 
people not directly affected by floods said that they had not noticed any changes 
to the frequency and severity of floods in their village. Most interviewees only 
once or twice experienced a hurricane in their own village, and they do not have 
a way of comparing it to tropical storms elsewhere. Thus, most people in both 
communities said they had not noticed changes to the frequency or to the 
severity of hurricanes. 
  
A comparison of rainfall data in Zacatecas with interview data obtained during 
fieldwork suggests that statistical evidence is not always congruent with people’s 
perceptions. These differences might potentially be linked to some inaccuracies 
of the available precipitation data. Yet, they also might be linked to the fact that 
people tend to concentrate on climatic and non-climatic developments that affect 
their own livelihoods but not necessarily on all the others. For the example of 
Zacatecas, interviewees said that the amount of annual rainfall was decreasing, 
rendering farming more difficult. Participant observation in both Laguna Seca and 
El Tigre confirms that people were waiting for enough rainfall to be able to start 
farming, and that waterholes for the cattle were drying out during the time of the 
fieldwork in the first half of 2008. Precipitation statistics show that rainfall has 
been decreasing over the last decades for the crucial months for farming in early 
summer but not necessarily for all of the year as perceived by farmers.  
 
The important point here is less to analyse the exact discrepancy between 
statistics and people’s perceptions but to draw attention to the fact that this 
discrepancy exists and that it should be acknowledged in studies into climate 
change and migration. Another observation made during fieldwork relates to the 
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importance of climate stressors as an element in the decision-making process of 
potential future migrants. In general, people held that climate stressors were 
affecting their livelihoods and often rendering them poorer. Meanwhile, people’s 
perceived relationship between climate stressors and migration became less 
clear in the interviews. Many interviewees said that the environment or climate 
stressors have got nothing to do with migration. Nevertheless, climate change 
might indirectly affect the elements involved in migration decisions in different 
ways. The following section analyses how different migration flows might or might 
not become affected by different consequences of climate change. 
 
9.2.4 Climate sensitivity of migration flows in Mexico 
The approach in this thesis builds on the insight that climate change is likely to 
affect existing migration flows in various ways. The elements involved in different 
migration decisions, as specified in the previous sections of this chapter, were 
tested for their sensitivity to the local and global consequences of climate 
change. This approach provides two general outcomes. First, it allows the 
identification of those elements involved in migration decisions with the highest 
potential to alter existing migration patterns under future climate change 
scenarios. These are the elements involved in migration decisions scoring high 
on both axes of the risk matrix. This means that they are both of high importance 
to migration decisions and highly sensitive to the various consequences of 
climate change. It is suggested that these elements involved in migration 
decisions deserve the highest attention of policy makers to mitigate the potential 
negative effects of climate change on people’s livelihoods. 
 
The second general outcome of this approach is the fact that it allows to 
distinguish between the different effects of climate change on different migration 
flows, which can be found in rural Mexico. Previous empirical research since the 
1990s (Findley 1994, Henry et al. 2004, Gray and Mueller forthcoming) has found 
that the effects of environmental stressors entail different consequences for 
different migration flows. There has thus been evidence that the distinction 
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between internal and international migration and potentially, depending on the 
existing migration patterns in the regional context, between other forms of 
migration is important. Yet, the scientific and policy debate in most cases still 
seems to refer to migration as a generic concept and to ignore these differences. 
For the example of Mexico, four different migration flows were identified: illegal 
international migration, legal international migration, internal rural migration and 
internal urban migration. The impacts of future climate change on livelihoods are 
obviously the same for migrants involved in all four forms of migration, although 
different degrees of vulnerability at the household level to these livelihood 
stressors need to be taken into account. Yet, it is argued that these projected 
impacts of future climate change will have different impacts on the four different 
migration flows. The most important empirical results stressing these differences 
are highlighted in the following section. 
 
Table 8.5 in the previous chapter suggests that the most important effects of 
climate change on illegal international migration can be expected to be caused 
by changes to the availability of employment opportunities near the sending 
areas, by changing commodity prices and by changes to the financial capital of 
prospective migrants. Investment in employment opportunities near the villages 
and control of prices for basic consumer goods might therefore mitigate the 
expected impact of climate change on international illegal migration. As illegal 
international migration is the most expensive form of migration, the negative 
impact of climate change on people’s financial resources might enable fewer 
people to migrate internationally. The increased pressure to migrate might thus 
be balanced by the more difficult access to illegal international migration. 
Furthermore, many causes of illegal international migration are unrelated to 
climate change such as increased material desires and the culture of migration in 
the village. Also, wage differentials between Mexico and the USA have shown to 
be important in decisions for international migration as opposed to internal 
migration. Currently, many people with previous international migration 
experience say that they consider migration within Mexico not worthwhile 
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because the low salaries do not compensate the costs of moving. International 
migrants stressed the lack of local employment opportunities as a major cause 
for their decision to look for work in the USA. Yet, local salaries would need to be 
high enough for people to make a living. 
 
Therefore, much depends on the global effects of climate change on commodity 
prices, which potentially create a higher need for migration as a livelihood 
strategy. Yet, higher prices might also render families and communities poorer, 
which will make access to financial resources needed for international migration 
more difficult. It may also increase the profitability of agricultural production, if 
agricultural prices rise, providing an incentive for farmers to stay. Meanwhile, the 
availability of employment at migrants’ destinations might also be affected by 
climate change, directly in commercial farming but also indirectly through a weak 
economy. Thus it seems that the effects of climate change on illegal international 
migration are likely not very high – or at least may be rather contradictory. 
Indeed, there is the potential that illegal international migration might decrease 
under scenarios of future climate change. This trend observation is confirmed by 
2010 Mexican census data49, which suggest that in general migration from 
Mexico to the USA has been decreasing over the last decade (Lozano 2011). 
Furthermore, according to a study by the BBVA bank (BBVA 2011), also based on 
2010 census data, remittances sent from Mexican migrants in the USA, 
decreased by 18.3% between 2007 and 2010. Also the number of households 
receiving remittances decreased by 27%, mainly in rural marginalised areas 
(BBVA 2011). This development might potentially be linked to the economic 
situation in Mexico and the USA as a consequence of the global food crisis, the 
financial crisis and the agricultural crisis in Mexico. If and to what extent this 
trend will continue is unclear.  
 
 
                                                 
49
 The census is carried out by the Mexican Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics 
(INEGI) every 10 years. The latest census took place in 2010 and was published in early 2011. 
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The effects of developments in farming on international illegal migration are low 
because the profile of illegal international migrants (no own land, young, access 
to resources to pay for the trip) differs from the profile of farmers (own land, 
middle-aged, often too poor to afford migration). Yet, agricultural productivity for 
subsistence farming and access to jobs in agriculture are important determinants 
of decisions for legal international migration and even to a larger extent of 
decisions for internal migration. Legal international migration is less expensive 
than illegal international migration but requires some financial resources and 
access to recruiters. Therefore, it is not accessible for many people. 
 
Yet, internal migration requires fewer financial resources and not necessarily 
access to strong networks. Therefore, it is accessible for most people and often 
used as a livelihood strategy by poor farmers and day labourers in commercial 
agriculture. Therefore, the effects of climate change on internal migration to 
urban or rural destinations in Mexico are measurable through the local and global 
effects of climate change on commercial and subsistence agriculture. Fieldwork 
has shown that there are two potential scenarios for subsistence agriculture, 
leading to different needs of workers. First, some large-scale farmers might 
consider diversifying their production and switch to more labour intensive crops in 
order to spread the risk of failure of a single crop. Under this scenario more 
workers would be needed. Second, others might decide to farm labour extensive 
crops, which are more resistant to climate extremes but also cheaper so that the 
financial loss of a failed harvest would be smaller. This scenario requires fewer 
workers, who might potentially be paid less because of the nature of the work 
and because a decrease of job availability often entails lower wages. 
 
The effects of climate change on the development of commodity prices are also 
important determinants for internal migration. A decrease in agricultural 
productivity in combination with higher prices for basic food items is endangering 
many people’s livelihoods. In the future thus more people might need to make 
use of internal migration as a livelihood strategy when prices rise, subsistence 
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farming becomes more uncertain and commercial farming might require fewer 
workers. Yet, the same livelihood stressors are likely to affect destination areas. 
Therefore, unless the need for workers substantially increases in rural and urban 
migrant receiving areas, they are unlikely to be able to respond to the needs of 
an increased number of future migrants.  
 
9.3 Implications for further research 
As the previous sections showed, the relationship between the effects of climate 
change on migration is very complex and different for internal or international 
forms of migration. Therefore, this thesis argues for a shift of future research 
priorities away from a focus on improving forecasts of the number of people to 
become displaced by climate change towards a detailed understanding of the 
nexus between climate change and migration.  
 
9.3.1 The search for numbers 
As was argued earlier in this chapter, so far no convincing and generally 
accepted definition of 'climate change migrants' exists, despite numerous 
attempts. The most important impediment to formulating such a definition is 
linked to the difficulty in separating climate change from other causes of 
migration. The focus on definitions and categorisations of people expected to 
become displaced by climate change is closely linked to the search for numbers 
of those people. Researchers have been concerned with predicting the volume of 
future ‘environmental change migrants’ or ‘climate change migrants’ for decades 
without conclusive results. As chapter 2 demonstrated, existing predictions are 
often still based on estimates dating back to the 1990s and lacking a sound 
scientific approach.  
 
There is likely to be an intrinsic reason for attempts to estimate the volume of 
future migration related to climate change, which have been made for such a 
long time, not being successful. The climate change-migration nexus is highly 
complex and context-specific, requiring a profound understanding of existing 
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migration patterns. Yet, as the previous section demonstrated, different migration 
flows are likely to be affected in different ways by climate stressors. If at all 
possible, predictions of the volume of future migration related to climate change 
thus need to be based on a profound and detailed understanding of different 
migration flows around the world.  
 
Yet, this thesis has also shown that it is not feasible to separate climate change 
from other drivers of migration because the direct and indirect consequences of 
climate change are likely to impact on many elements involved in migration 
decisions at the local and the global level. This complexity of the relationship 
between climate change and migration suggests that a categorisation and 
definition of ‘climate change migrants’ might not be possible at all. Without a 
concrete definition of who should be counted, the search for numbers of ‘climate 
change migrants’ does not seem to contribute much to the advancement of a 
scientific understanding of the nexus between climate change and migration. 
 
9.3.2 Understanding the climate change-migration nexus 
Instead, research has an important role to play in advancing the understanding of 
the complex relationship between climate change and migration. This 
understanding is of scientific interest but also has got the potential to influence 
policies at the global and the local level. As chapter 2.3 shows, the results of a 
profound understanding of the climate change-migration nexus can also 
contribute to other fields of research such as development studies, conflict 
studies and research on climate change adaptation.  
 
The approach developed in this thesis, which has been adapted to the case of 
Mexico, can also be used in other geographic contexts. It is based on an 
understanding of people’s livelihoods, their adaptation measures to shocks and 
stresses, of the role of migration as an adaptation strategy and of the elements 
involved in migration decisions. While these elements are likely to be different in 
other parts of the world, some conclusions of the research presented in this 
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thesis seem to be generic. These include the use of different responses to 
livelihood stressors depending on the economic and social status, gender and 
individual preferences; the existence of more than one type of migration in any 
one locality; and the multi-causal nature of most migration streams.  
 
The conceptual and methodological approach developed in this thesis could thus 
be considered a generic tool to gain a more profound understanding of the 
climate change migration nexus at the global level. It can also be used to conduct 
research to identify region-specific policy priorities in response to climate 
stressors. Based on the results presented in this thesis for the case of Mexico 
some policy recommendations can be made, to which this chapter now turns.  
 
9.4 Policy implications 
This thesis has implications for policies at two levels, regarding future research 
into the nexus between climate change and migration in general and regarding 
country specific policy priorities in response to climate stressors. In particular, a 
case can be made for a shift towards a needs-based approach, which includes 
migrants as well as people affected by climate change and is not restricted to 
people displaced by climate change only. 
 
9.4.1 Is a protective mechanism needed? 
Calls for a protective mechanism so far have claimed that people displaced by 
climate change or environmental change more generally need legal protection. 
So far, no such mechanism exists. The lack of such a protective scheme seems 
to be caused by two factors. First, as this thesis has shown, a comprehensive 
definition of ‘climate change migrants’ does not yet exist and there is doubt if 
such a definition is feasible at all. Partly due to this lack of a definition, reliable 
estimates of the volume of climate related migration do not exist either. Installing 
a legal protection scheme for a category of people, which is not well-defined and 
the volume of which is unknown, seems to be practically difficult.  
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The second impediment to the installation of a protective mechanism for people 
displaced by climate change is related to the fact that governments are likely to 
be unwilling to commit to another humanitarian protection scheme, while 
struggling to comply with existing schemes. Chapter 2.2 shows that it has been 
suggested that protection of ‘climate change migrants’ could also be addressed 
under the auspices of inter-governmental bodies.  Yet, this would also require a 
commitment to soft-laws and non-binding agreements, which so far has not been 
achieved. 
 
It seems that legal protection for people displaced by climate change cannot 
easily be achieved. One could argue that efforts still should be made to urge 
governments or other bodies to install such a scheme. Yet, it is also questionable 
if such a scheme would address the right issues related to climate change and 
migration. This thesis has shown that the effect of climate change on the volume 
of international migration is likely to be small and potentially negative. Although in 
some other regional contexts this might prove to not be the case, the focus on 
international migration triggered by climate change alone does not seem to do 
justice to the complexity of the issue. This does not mean that international 
migrants, including Mexican migrants, should not benefit from a protection 
scheme. Yet, such a scheme should extend to protection to all migrants who 
cross a border with the intention to offer their human capital to the host society. 
 
On the other hand, empirical evidence from Mexico suggests that the effect of 
climate change on internal migration might be substantially bigger, which might 
justify a call for a protection scheme of internal ‘climate change migrants’. Yet, 
definitional issues also apply to internal migrants and their moves are not caused 
by climate stressors alone. Furthermore, such a protection scheme would 
exclude those who are affected by the consequences of climate change and are 
forced to stay. Instead, it seems to be more efficient for governments to 
concentrate on a set of policy priorities in response to climate stressors. The next 
section will make suggestions of these policy priorities for the case of Mexico. 
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9.4.2 Recommended policy priorities in response to climate stressors 
This thesis has produced results on issues that can be expected to have the 
most important impact on people’s livelihoods and migration decisions when 
affected by climate change. Empirical evidence for Mexico suggests that the 
negative effects of climate change on people’s livelihoods are highest in three 
areas. The first area of concern is the lack and decrease of employment 
opportunities in rural Mexico. Unemployment has been identified as a major 
driver of internal and international migration and there are signs that climate 
change might worsen the already precarious situation. Efficient policies could 
thus aim at creating employment opportunities in the country and at assuring 
salaries, which are high enough to make a living on. 
 
The second area of concern is Mexican agriculture, including both the 
commercial and the subsistence sector. Climate change together with non-
climate stressors, such as pricing policies, is likely to seriously affect large parts 
of the Mexican rural population through its negative effect on agricultural 
productivity. The lack of employment in commercial agriculture and the 
decreasing output of subsistence agriculture are also major drivers of internal 
migration in Mexico. Climate change is likely to have negative effects on these 
migration flows as more people than before might want to migrate internally in 
response to decreasing agricultural output in their home communities. Yet, rural 
migrant receiving areas are likely to experience similar problems and might thus 
not be able to accommodate migrants from other areas of Mexico. Meanwhile, 
urban destinations might also not be able to provide for the livelihoods of more 
migrants as employment opportunities are already scarce in many parts of 
Mexico. Thus people might not be able to make use of internal moves as a 
livelihood strategy anymore, which can be expected to have serious 
consequences for their well-being.  
 
The effects of the lack of employment opportunities and the decrease in 
agricultural productivity are aggravated by the expected negative effects of 
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climate change on global food and commodity prices, which is the third area of 
concern. As a consequence, people are likely to experience an increased 
pressure to migrate due to the decrease of their purchasing power. Yet, 
especially international migration is very expensive, so that some people might 
not be able to migrate internationally anymore. Climate change is therefore likely 
to deprive some people from using both internal and international migration as a 
livelihood strategy in response to climate change. Policies thus should not only 
focus on climate change related migration. The protection of people who cannot 
migrate (anymore) in response to the livelihood stressors aggravated by climate 
change seems to be of equal importance. A potential way forward might be the 
focus on needs-based approaches in the context of climate change adaptation 
and migration. These approaches should include affected people as stakeholders 
in the process of the development of appropriate response mechanisms.  
 
9.5 Limitations and future prospects 
Although the conceptual and methodological approach developed in this thesis 
might be considered an improvement as compared to existing approaches, it has 
some limitations, which have to be acknowledged. One of the inherent limitations 
to the prediction of any future development is its uncertainty. Due to unforeseen 
political or environmental events, realities might change quickly, making 
projections based on the current situation obsolete. Nevertheless predictions of 
future developments regarding the impacts of climate change on migration are 
useful to tailor future policies accordingly. Furthermore, as this thesis shows, they 
also provide a better understanding of the current situation. This thesis explicitly 
refrains from specifying a time frame for the predicted effects of climate change 
on migration. Instead it aims to provide an indication of likely trends that can to 
some extent already be observed today.  
 
The approach developed in this thesis seeks to integrate all elements involved in 
the relationship between climate change and migration decisions. Understanding 
all these elements and processes requires time, whereas the development of 
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effective policies to protect people from the effects that climate change is 
projected to have on their migration decisions is relatively urgent. Although the 
approach tried to capture as many context and local-specific aspects as possible, 
some generalisations had to be made. Categories of elements involved in 
migration decisions were constructed and during this process some nuances 
might have been lost. Furthermore, it could not be avoided that some of the 
categories overlap and are interlinked with each other.  
 
Nevertheless, the conceptual and methodological approach of this thesis has 
been designed to acknowledge the complexity of climate change, migration and 
of the relationship between the two phenomena. For the case of Mexico it 
provided a holistic picture of the projected effects of climate change on people’s 
livelihoods and more specifically on migration at the country level. There could be 
a potential for this approach to be used in other regional contexts. Similar 
research in other parts of the world would allow a comparison between the 
projected effects of climate change on migration in different contexts. Similarities 
and differences might be identified to achieve a comparison between the most 
urgent issues related to climate change and migration in different regions of the 
world. This might lead to a better understanding of the climate change-migration 
nexus at the global level and help identify policy areas, in which action is most 
urgently needed at the local and the global level. 
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Annex I: Climate sensitivity of illegal international migration 
 degree of 
climate 
sensitivity 
comments degree of 
relevance for 
migration 
decisions 
comments score 
variability in 
precipitation 
and 
temperature 
patterns 
very high (5) increased 
uncertainty 
leads farmers to 
abandon 
farming 
low (2) farmers (older 
generation) and 
migrants (youth) 
are often not the 
same group of 
people 
10 
extreme events 
such as 
droughts, 
hurricanes, 
floods 
high (4) more frequent or 
more severe, 
uncertainty 
increasing 
low (2) farmers (older 
generation) and 
migrants (youth) 
are often not the 
same group of 
people 
8 
decreasing soil 
fertility 
medium (3) increased risk of 
land 
degradation and 
of pests and 
pathogens 
low (2) farmers (older 
generation) and 
migrants (youth) 
are often not the 
same group of 
people 
6 
low revenues 
for yields 
very low (1) caused by 
decreasing 
yields, revenues 
likely to increase 
on a global 
level. Yet, in 
Mexico 
counterbalanced 
by policies 
low (2) farmers (older 
generation) and 
migrants (youth) 
are often not the 
same group of 
people 
2 
high prices for 
seeds, fertiliser, 
irrigation 
very low (1) feasible but not 
documented 
low (2) farmers (older 
generation) and 
migrants (youth) 
are often not the 
same group of 
people 
2 
lack of 
industries or 
services in or 
near the 
communities 
medium (3) potentially less 
investment 
because of lack 
of water or risk 
of floods or 
hurricanes 
very high (5) major reason to 
migrate 
15 
lack of 
infrastructure 
to facilitate 
commuting 
low (2) potentially some 
impacts on 
accessibility of 
work places 
medium (3) often perceived 
as problem but 
not determining 
for migration 
6 
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lack of formal 
education 
needed to 
obtain work 
low (2) potentially some 
impacts on 
accessibility of 
schools 
very low (1) same problem at 
destination, 
inverse effect 
feasible 
2 
seasonal 
employment in 
agriculture 
decreasing 
very high (5) depending on 
crop choice by 
landowners 
increase or 
decrease of 
employment 
possible 
low (2) severe problem 
in Veracruz but 
not at all in El 
Tigre 
10 
low and 
decreasing 
salaries 
low (2) potential for 
some changes 
caused by need 
for more/fewer 
workers in 
commercial 
farming 
very high (5) higher salaries in 
USA are a major 
pull factor 
10 
high and 
increasing 
prices for basic 
consumer 
goods 
high (4) danger of price 
increase due to 
decreasing 
yields on a 
global level, can 
be mediated by 
national policies 
high (4) salaries in 
Mexico often 
considered too 
low to maintain 
family because of 
high prices 
16 
cultural change very low (1) plays into 
farming 
decision, but not 
affected by 
climate change 
very high (5) international 
migration 
became (El Tigre) 
or is becoming 
(Veracruz) a rite 
of passage 
5 
some young 
people 
unwilling to 
work hard for 
little revenue 
very low (1) plays into 
farming 
decision, but not 
affected by 
climate change 
very high (5) change of young 
generation’s 
aspirations 
5 
increased 
material 
desires (food, 
clothes, cars) 
very low (1) plays into 
farming 
decision, but not 
affected by 
climate change 
very high (5) desire to satisfy 
own and family’s 
wishes and to 
compete with 
fellow village 
dwellers 
5 
access to 
networks 
low (2) small effects on 
willingness to 
help network 
members as 
consequence of 
effects on 
destinations 
feasible 
very high (5) migration not 
possible without 
networks 
10 
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access to 
recruiters 
low (2) number of jobs 
in farming at 
destination 
areas might 
decrease 
very low (1) recruiters not 
involved 
2 
financial 
resources 
medium (3) bad harvests in 
the village might 
decrease 
financial 
potential of 
family members 
to pay for 
migration 
very high (5) most expensive 
form of migration, 
large resources 
necessary 
15 
agency low (2) some people 
might become 
more willing to 
migrate when 
environments 
deteriorate 
very high (5) migration not 
feasible without 
positive attitude 
towards it 
10 
alternative 
livelihood 
strategies 
medium (3) selling of land 
and livestock 
susceptible to 
climate change, 
other strategies 
less so 
very low (1) migrants and 
people making 
use of alternative 
livelihood 
strategies often 
not the same 
group of people 
3 
 
Source: author 
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Annex II: Climate sensitivity of legal international migration 
 degree of 
climate 
sensitivity 
comments degree of 
relevance for 
migration 
decisions 
comments score 
variability in 
precipitation 
and 
temperature 
patterns 
very high (5) increased 
uncertainty 
leads farmers to 
abandon 
farming 
low (2) farmers and 
migrants often 
not the same 
group of people 
10 
extreme events 
such as 
droughts, 
hurricanes, 
floods 
high (4) more frequent 
or more severe, 
uncertainty 
increasing 
low (2) farmers and 
migrants often 
not the same 
group of people 
8 
decreasing soil 
fertility 
medium (3) increased risk of 
land 
degradation and 
of pests and 
pathogens 
low (2) farmers and 
migrants often 
not the same 
group of people 
6 
low revenues 
for yields 
very low (1) caused by 
decreasing 
yields, revenues 
likely to 
increase on a 
global level. Yet, 
in Mexico 
counterbalance
d by policies 
low (2) farmers and 
migrants often 
not the same 
group of people 
2 
high prices for 
seeds, 
fertiliser, 
irrigation 
very low (1) feasible but not 
documented 
low (2) farmers and 
migrants often 
not the same 
group of people 
2 
lack of 
industries or 
services in or 
near the 
communities 
medium (3) potentially less 
investment 
because of lack 
of water or risk 
of floods or 
hurricanes 
very high (5) major reason to 
migrate 
15 
lack of 
infrastructure 
to facilitate 
commuting 
low (2) potentially some 
impacts on 
accessibility of 
work places 
medium (3) often perceived 
as problem but 
not determining 
for migration 
6 
lack of formal 
education 
needed to 
obtain work 
low (2) potentially some 
impacts on 
accessibility of 
schools 
very low (1) same problem at 
destination, 
inverse effect 
feasible 
2 
seasonal 
employment in 
agriculture 
very high (5) depending on 
crop choice by 
landowners 
very high (5) major reason for 
migration where 
recruiters operate 
25 
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decreasing increase or 
decrease of 
employment 
possible 
low and 
decreasing 
salaries 
low (2) potential for 
some changes 
caused by need 
for more/fewer 
workers in 
commercial 
farming 
very high (5) prospect of 
earning more in 
USA or Canada 
10 
high and 
increasing 
prices for basic 
consumer 
goods 
high (4) danger of price 
increase due to 
decreasing 
yields on a 
global level, can 
be mediated by 
national policies 
very high (5) need to maintain 
family 
20 
cultural change very low (1) plays into 
farming 
decision, but not 
affected by 
climate change 
very low (1) migration often 
unwanted 
1 
some young 
people 
unwilling to 
work hard for 
little revenue 
very low (1) plays into 
farming 
decision, but not 
affected by 
climate change 
very low (1) migration 
perceived as hard 
work, too 
1 
increased 
material 
desires (food, 
clothes, cars) 
very low (1) plays into 
farming 
decision, but not 
affected by 
climate change 
low (2) migration often to 
satisfy basic 
needs 
2 
access to 
networks 
low (2) small effects on 
willingness to 
help network 
members as 
consequence of 
effects on 
destinations 
feasible 
medium (3) networks not 
crucial but 
sharing of 
experiences 
might be 
desirable 
6 
access to 
recruiters 
low (2) number of jobs 
in farming at 
destination 
areas might 
decrease 
very high (5) crucial 15 
financial 
resources 
medium (3) bad harvests in 
the village might 
decrease 
financial 
very high (5) expensive, need 
to obtain papers 
for travelling 
15 
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potential of 
family members 
to pay for 
migration 
agency low (2) some people 
might become 
more willing to 
migrate when 
environments 
deteriorate 
medium (3) migrants need to 
feel capable of 
doing the job but 
often do not want 
to migrate 
6 
alternative 
livelihood 
strategies 
medium (3) selling of land 
and livestock 
susceptible to 
climate change, 
other strategies 
less so 
very low (1) migrants and 
people making 
use of alternative 
livelihood 
strategies often 
not the same 
group of people 
3 
 
Source: author 
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Annex III: Climate sensitivity of internal urban migration 
 degree of 
climate 
sensitivity 
comments degree of 
relevance for 
migration 
decisions 
comments score 
variability in 
precipitation 
and 
temperature 
patterns 
very high (5) increased 
uncertainty 
leads farmers to 
abandon 
farming 
high (4) decreasing 
subsistence 
agriculture often 
reason to migrate 
20 
extreme events 
such as 
droughts, 
hurricanes, 
floods 
high (4) more frequent 
or more severe, 
uncertainty 
increasing 
high (4) decreasing 
subsistence 
agriculture often 
reason to migrate 
16 
decreasing soil 
fertility 
medium (3) increased risk of 
land 
degradation and 
of pests and 
pathogens 
high (4) decreasing 
subsistence 
agriculture often 
reason to migrate 
12 
low revenues 
for yields 
very low (1) caused by 
decreasing 
yields, revenues 
likely to 
increase on a 
global level. Yet, 
in Mexico 
counterbalance
d by policies 
high (4) decreasing 
subsistence 
agriculture often 
reason to migrate 
4 
high prices for 
seeds, 
fertiliser, 
irrigation 
very low (1) feasible but not 
documented 
high (4) decreasing 
subsistence 
agriculture often 
reason to migrate 
4 
lack of 
industries or 
services in or 
near the 
communities 
medium (3) potentially less 
investment 
because of lack 
of water or risk 
of floods or 
hurricanes 
high (4) lack of 
employment often 
reason to migrate 
12 
lack of 
infrastructure 
to facilitate 
commuting 
low (2) potentially some 
impacts on 
accessibility of 
work places 
medium (3) often perceived 
as problem but 
not determining 
for migration 
6 
lack of formal 
education 
needed to 
obtain work 
low (2) potentially some 
impacts on 
accessibility of 
schools 
medium (3) might be the 
same at 
destination but 
sometimes no 
choice but to try 
6 
seasonal 
employment in 
very high (5) depending on 
crop choice by 
high (4) important reason 
to migrate 
20 
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agriculture 
decreasing 
landowners 
increase or 
decrease of 
employment 
possible 
low and 
decreasing 
salaries 
low (2) potential for 
some changes 
caused by need 
for more/fewer 
workers in 
commercial 
farming 
medium (3) slightly better 
salaries expected 
in the cities but 
still on Mexican 
level 
6 
high and 
increasing 
prices for basic 
consumer 
goods 
high (4) danger of price 
increase due to 
decreasing 
yields on a 
global level, can 
be mediated by 
national policies 
very high (5) major reason to 
look for work 
elsewhere 
20 
cultural change very low (1) plays into 
farming 
decision, but not 
affected by 
climate change 
medium (3) some migrants 
trying to escape 
village life 
3 
some young 
people 
unwilling to 
work hard for 
little revenue 
very low (1) plays into 
farming 
decision, but not 
affected by 
climate change 
very low (1) work in cities also 
perceived as hard 
1 
increased 
material 
desires (food, 
clothes, cars) 
very low (1) plays into 
farming 
decision, but not 
affected by 
climate change 
very low (1) migration mainly 
to satisfy basic 
needs 
1 
access to 
networks 
low (2) networks in 
cities not likely 
to be affect by 
climate change 
medium (3) networks helpful 
but not 
mandatory for 
migration 
decisions 
6 
access to 
recruiters 
low (2) work in cities 
not likely to be 
affect by climate 
change 
low (2) migrants usually 
go without 
recruiters 
4 
financial 
resources 
medium (3) financial support 
of relatives often 
needed, 
dependent on 
agricultural 
output 
medium (3) travel often 
affordable, but 
maintenance in 
city expensive 
9 
agency low (2) people unwilling high (4) willingness to live 8 
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to migrate might 
consider their 
decision if 
maintenance in 
the village 
becomes more 
difficult 
in the city needed 
alternative 
livelihood 
strategies 
medium (3) selling of land 
and livestock 
susceptible to 
climate change, 
other strategies 
less so 
medium (3) if alternative 
strategies 
available, some 
people likely to 
consider staying 
9 
 
Source: author 
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Annex IV: Climate sensitivity of internal rural migration 
 degree of 
climate 
sensitivity 
comments degree of 
relevance for 
migration 
decisions 
comments score 
variability in 
precipitation 
and 
temperature 
patterns 
very high (5) increased 
uncertainty 
leads farmers to 
abandon 
farming 
very high (5) decreasing 
subsistence 
agriculture major 
reason to migrate 
25 
extreme events 
such as 
droughts, 
hurricanes, 
floods 
high (4) more frequent 
or more severe, 
uncertainty 
increasing 
very high (5) decreasing 
subsistence 
agriculture major 
reason to migrate 
20 
decreasing soil 
fertility 
medium (3) increased risk of 
land 
degradation and 
of pests and 
pathogens 
very high (5) decreasing 
subsistence 
agriculture major 
reason to migrate 
15 
low revenues 
for yields 
very low (1) caused by 
decreasing 
yields, revenues 
likely to 
increase on a 
global level. Yet, 
in Mexico 
counterbalance
d by policies 
very high (5) decreasing 
subsistence 
agriculture major 
reason to migrate 
5 
high prices for 
seeds, 
fertiliser, 
irrigation 
very low (1) feasible but not 
documented 
very high (5) decreasing 
subsistence 
agriculture major 
reason to migrate 
5 
lack of 
industries or 
services in or 
near the 
communities 
medium (3) potentially less 
investment 
because of lack 
of water or risk 
of floods or 
hurricanes 
high (4) lack of 
employment 
major reason to 
migrate, although 
work in 
agriculture often 
preferred 
12 
lack of 
infrastructure 
to facilitate 
commuting 
low (2) potentially some 
impacts on 
accessibility of 
work places 
medium (3) often perceived 
as problem but 
not determining 
for migration 
6 
lack of formal 
education 
needed to 
obtain work 
low (2) potentially some 
impacts on 
accessibility of 
schools 
very low (1) irrelevant for 
agricultural labour 
2 
seasonal very high (5) depending on very high (5) reason for 25 
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employment in 
agriculture 
decreasing 
crop choice by 
landowners 
increase or 
decrease of 
employment 
possible 
seasonal moves 
to other 
agricultural 
regions 
low and 
decreasing 
salaries 
low (2) potential for 
some changes 
caused by need 
for more/fewer 
workers in 
commercial 
farming 
low (2) salaries at 
destination often 
the same 
4 
high and 
increasing 
prices for basic 
consumer 
goods 
high (4) danger of price 
increase due to 
decreasing 
yields on a 
global level, can 
be mediated by 
national policies 
very high (5) need to migrate 
during times of 
unemployment 
20 
cultural change very low (1) plays into 
farming 
decision, but not 
affected by 
climate change 
very low (1) irrelevant 1 
some young 
people 
unwilling to 
work hard for 
little revenue 
very low (1) plays into 
farming 
decision, but not 
affected by 
climate change 
very low (1) work at 
destination as 
hard as at 
sending area 
1 
increased 
material 
desires (food, 
clothes, cars) 
very low (1) plays into 
farming 
decision, but not 
affected by 
climate change 
very low (1) migration mainly 
to satisfy basic 
needs 
1 
access to 
networks 
low (2) people at 
destinations 
might become 
less willing to 
help networks 
members in 
difficult times 
medium (3) helpful but not 
crucial for 
migration 
decisions 
6 
access to 
recruiters 
low (2) climate change 
might increase 
or decrease the 
need for 
workers 
medium (3) helpful but not 
crucial for 
migration 
decisions 
6 
financial 
resources 
medium (3) financial support 
of relatives often 
needed, 
low (2) travel and 
maintenance 
often affordable 
6 
278 
 
dependent on 
agricultural 
output 
agency low (2) people unwilling 
to migrate might 
consider their 
decision if 
maintenance in 
the village 
becomes more 
difficult 
medium (3) willingness to 
temporarily leave 
the village 
needed 
6 
alternative 
livelihood 
strategies 
medium (3) selling of land 
and livestock 
susceptible to 
climate change, 
other strategies 
less so 
very high (5) if alternative 
strategies 
available, many 
people likely to 
consider staying 
15 
 
Source: author 
 
